Q&A: Honouring the Silent Courage of Afghan Women

Global Geopolitics & Political Economy / IPS

Julia Kallas

UNITED NATIONS, Nov 24 (IPS) – Violence against women is internationally recognised as a threat to democracy, a burden on national economies, and a serious human rights violation.Yet in Afghanistan today, 87 percent of women face physical, sexual or psychological violence or are forced into marriage, according to recent data from Human Rights Watch.

"Afghan women have a very rich track record which is never acknowledged, never published, never spoken about," Sharmista Dasbarwa of UNDP told IPS. It is time to talk about "the resilience, the silent courage of the village women of Afghanistan who have gone through hell for so many years and (still) dream and hope for a better and peaceful Afghanistan."

Dasbarwa spoke to IPS correspondent Julia Kallas about the struggle to secure gender equality in the war-torn country, and why it is indispensable to lasting peace. Excerpts from the interview follow.

Q: Advancing women’s empowerment is an essential priority for the transition in Afghanistan, as it contributes directly to stability. How can women play a bigger role?

A: Although Afghanistan has got about 27 percent of women in the parliament, there are still some very deep biases against women. They want to achieve what every woman in the world wants, which is to have access to opportunities, education, training, political participation, economic activities. It is very difficult for an Afghan woman to achieve this.

Having said that, at the same time, the resilience and the character of Afghan women is very big. I feel that the establishment of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs in 2002, and the activities that they are doing in influencing different legal instruments to insure a better integration of women in the field, is very important.

At the moment, women are very eager to play an active role in the transition. Things are improving with the High Peace Council and different structures that the government of Afghanistan has established. There is a considerable scope to involve women in a very active way.

Q: How can you ensure that compromises made in the ongoing peace-building process do not lead to a rollback of women’s rights?

A: There is no official peace agreement in Afghanistan like there was in Sudan or Timor Leste. I wish I could answer your question in a very positive way, but the situation at the moment is very unstable.

Although there is a lot of political representation of Afghan women, nobody knows what will be their role during the transition and the peace-building process. So it is very difficult to say if there will be compromises. I hope not, but there is a possibility.

But Afghan women have developed a kind of determination, resilience and hope to ensure that if there are any compromises, their gains from the past 20 years are not lost and no compromises will be made in order to step them down to second-class citizens again.

At work I deal with women from the villages, from the rural communities, from the academic institutions, from the members of parliament, from the ministries. And they all have displayed a lot of determination which is a very rare thing. I worked in a number of countries and I have not seen this kind of resilience anywhere in the world.

Q: How does the new gender equality project focus on preventing violence against women in Afghanistan?

A: We are providing support for the elimination of violence in three different ways.

Firstly, to provide policy support to the legal department of the Ministry of Women’s affairs by ensuring that any legislation drafted which has a direct impact on the life of Afghan women is reviewed by the Legal Department of Women’s Affairs, passed through the government and translated into action.

Secondly, we aim to install more legal health centres. In the first phase we established 24 legal heath centers in four provinces. The purpose of the legal health centres is to reach women living in rural areas who do not have access to the formal justice system and police authorities, and to ensure that they have free legal advice and protection.

Thirdly is the advocacy campaign, which we have been doing involving different stakeholders and media. It will involve round table television discussions and debates. The focus will be to raise awareness on women’s rights and their access to legal protection.

The 2009 law on elimination of violence against women has got a commission established in national and subnational level. We propose in the next phase of the project to provide technical support to the commission so that this law becomes more active. A report from 2011 showed that the number of cases registered was 2,999 and the number of cases prosecuted was only 27 percent, so we want to improve the enforcement of the law.

Q: On Sunday, we celebrate the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women. What are the lessons that other countries can learn from the women’s programme in Afghanistan?

A: The level and depth of violence that Afghanistan women face is something very rare in other countries. Yes, there is violence in other parts of the world but I have not come across this kind of sustained nature of violence and weakness in the voices of women to come out and seek help.

I have worked in a number of countries in Africa, and I come from India, but I have not seen this kind of helplessness, powerlessness, and lack of voice. But this is one side of the picture.

Despite having this weak position, Afghan women are very determined. The lesson that women from all over the world should learn from our programmes is that the very small support and incentive that we are doing have changed the quality of life of these women.

Our programme needs to be replicated in other countries, especially countries emerging from conflict. Afghan women are also fighting to ensure that when peace happens and peace-building negotiations are over, there is sustainable peace right down at the grassroots level.

All rights reserved, IPS – Inter Press Service, 2012.

This article may not be republished, broadcast, framed, or redistributed without the written permission of IPS – Inter Press Service. Republication of this material without permission from IPS, the copyright holder, constitutes a violation of United States and international copyright laws and may result in legal action.


The Political Drones Get Louder

Global Geopolitics & Political Economy / IPS

By Ashfaq Yusufzai

PESHAWAR, May 17, 2012 (IPS) – Growing numbers of activists are beginning to counter U.S. Drone attacks into Pakistani territory. The activists are confronting the U.S., but increasingly now the Pakistani government for allowing such attacks to continue.

The Tehreek Insaf party led by former Pakistani cricket captain Imran Khan first stepped up the political heat against the Drones. Civil society groups, including Pakistani lawyers, and now also groups from the U.S. and Britain have joined the campaign.

"We believe Drone strikes are illegal according to international law because they kill innocent people," Imran Khan told IPS from Islamabad. "The U.S. or any other country has no right to violate frontiers of an independent state."

The cricketer-turned-politician blames the Pakistani government for its "indifference" to the killing of innocent tribesmen in the Drone attacks. "They have sold out our sovereignty to our enemies."

"A Drone attack killed the first ever head of outlawed Tehreek Taliban, Neik Mohammad Wazir in 2004," Prof Ziaullah at the Government College in Charsadda, one of 25 districts of the border state Khyber Pakhtunkhwa told IPS. "But lately attacks have assumed political dimensions largely due to Khan’s protests."

Those began on Apr. 23 last year when Tehreek Insaf activists blocked the road to NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) vehicles in Hayatabad town for two days. U.S.-led NATO attacks on two checkpoints in Salala Mohmand Agency earlier this year which killed 28 soldiers sparked off mass protests, forcing the government to halt NATO supplies to Afghanistan through Pakistan.

On Mar. 13, the National Assembly passed a resolution against Drone strikes in the border areas. Civil society activists are now pressuring the Pakistani government to do more to block such attacks.

The Foundation for Fundamental Rights (FFR), a Pakistan based legal charity, filed two constitutional petitions last week before the Peshawar High Court against the Federation of Pakistan, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence among others for failure to stop the attacks on Pakistan.

One petition is on behalf of victims of a Drone strike on members of a Jirga (council) on Mar. 17 last year. The second petition was filed by Noor Khan, whose father Malik Daud Khan, head of the North Waziristan Loya Jirga, was assassinated along with 50 other tribal elders and others last year by CIA operated Drones.

Shahzad Akbar acting on behalf of the victims told media representatives at the launch of the petition that Malik Daud Khan was a respected member of the local community and head of the North Waziristan Loya Jirga, a peaceful council of local elders. He is arguing that such attacks are illegal.

British human rights lawyer Clive Stafford Smith also addressed the press conference. "The first role of any government must be to protect its own citizens from harm, when they are innocent of any crime," Smith said. "If my child were killed by a Predator Drone in the English countryside, I would expect there to be very serious and immediate consequences. A Pakistani child should enjoy the same protection."

Smith, whose organisation Reprieve is reported to have helped secure the release of 65 prisoners from Guantanamo Bay, said: "We can kill people without any risk to ourselves and that’s why the politicians like it."

FFR works with Reprieve in campaigning on behalf of Drone victims. Reprieve has filed a similar petition in London seeking an end to the involvement of British secret services in Drone strikes in Pakistan. Reprieve and FFR have also filed a complaint before the UN Human Rights Council.

As of May 6, in all 2,193 people have been killed in 230 Drone strikes in Pakistan’s border regions of North and South Waziristan. Most of those killed have been Al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders who had taken refuge after dismissal of their government in Kabul.

According to official information from the U.S., 831 were killed in 90 attacks in 2010, up from 536 in 46 attacks in 2009. In 2011, 548 were killed in 59 attacks. This year 110 have been killed in 15 attacks, all in North Waziristan.

U.S. officials say the region is now the international headquarters of Al-Qaeda. John Brennan, the top counter-terrorism adviser to U.S. President Barack Obama told a meeting in Washington early this month that rigorous standards were applied to such attacks, and they were being carried out with laser-like precision.

He said nothing in international law prohibits the U.S. from using lethal force against enemies outside of an active battlefield.

Activists are challenging such claims. Nancy Maneiar, a peace activist with the U.S.-based anti-war Code Pink Group told a meeting in Washington Saturday last week, "We apologise to the people of Pakistan for the strikes that have killed so many civilians. The CIA needs to be held accountable for their strikes."

All rights reserved, IPS – Inter Press Service, 2012.

This article may not be republished, broadcast, framed, or redistributed without the written permission of IPS – Inter Press Service. Republication of this material without permission from IPS, the copyright holder, constitutes a violation of United States and international copyright laws and may result in legal action.


U.S.-Afghan Pact Won’t End War – Or SOF Night Raids

Global Geopolitics & Political Economy / IPS

Analysis by Gareth Porter*

WASHINGTON, May 2, 2012 (IPS) – The optics surrounding the Barack Obama administration’s "Enduring Strategic Partnership" agreement with Afghanistan and the Memorandums of Understanding accompanying it emphasise transition to Afghan responsibility and an end to U.S. war.

But the only substantive agreement reached between the U.S. and Afghanistan – well hidden in the agreements – has been to allow powerful U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) to continue to carry out the unilateral night raids on private homes that are universally hated in the Pashtun zones of Afghanistan.

The presentation of the new agreement on a surprise trip by President Obama to Afghanistan, with a prime time presidential address and repeated briefings for the press, allows Obama to go into a tight presidential election campaign on a platform of ending an unpopular U.S. war in Afghanistan.

It also allows President Hamid Karzai to claim he has gotten control over the SOF night raids while getting a 10-year commitment of U.S. economic support.

But the actual text of the agreement and of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on night raids included in it by reference will not end the U.S. war in Afghanistan, nor will they give Karzai control over night raids.

The Obama administration’s success in obscuring those facts is the real story behind the ostensible story of the agreement.

Obama’s decisions on how many U.S. troops will remain in Afghanistan in 2014 and beyond and what their mission will be will only be made in a "Bilateral Security Agreement" still to be negotiated. Although the senior officials did not provide any specific information about those negotiations in their briefings for news media, the Strategic Partnership text specifies that they are to begin the signing of the present agreement "with the goal of concluding within one year".

That means Obama does not have to announce any decisions about stationing of U.S. forces in Afghanistan before the 2012 presidential election, allowing him to emphasise that he is getting out of Afghanistan and sidestep the question of a long-term commitment of troops in Afghanistan.

The Bilateral Security Agreement will supersede the 2003 "Status of Forces" agreement with Afghanistan, according to the text. That agreement gives U.S. troops in Afghanistan immunity from prosecution and imposes no limitations on U.S. forces in regard to military bases or operations.

Last month’s Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on night raids was forced on the United States by Karzai’s repeated threat to refuse to sign a partnership agreement unless the United States gave his government control over any raids on people’s homes. Karzai’s insistence on ending U.S. unilateral night raids and detention of Afghans had held up the agreement on Strategic Partnership for months.

But Karzai’s demand put him in direct conflict with the interests of one of the most influential elements of the U.S. military: the SOF. Under Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal and Gen. David Petraeus, U.S. war strategy in Afghanistan came to depend heavily on the purported effectiveness of night raids carried out by SOF units in weakening the Taliban insurgency.

CENTCOM officials refused to go along with ending the night raids or giving the Afghan government control over them, as IPS reported last February.

The two sides tried for weeks to craft an agreement that Karzai could cite as meeting his demand but that would actually change very little.

In the end, however, it was Karzai who had to give in. What was done to disguise that fact represents a new level of ingenuity in misrepresenting the actual significance of an international agreement involving U.S. military operations.

The MOU was covered by cable news as a sea change in the conduct of military operations. CNN, for example, called it a "landmark deal" that "affords Afghan authorities an effective veto over controversial special operations raids."

But a closer reading of the text of the MOU as well as comments on by U.S. military officials indicate that it represents little, if any, substantive change from the status quo.

The agreement was negotiated between the U.S. military command in Kabul and Afghan Ministry of Defence, and lawyers for the U.S. military introduced a key provision that fundamentally changed the significance of the rest of the text.

In the first paragraph under the definition of terms, the MOU says, "For the purpose of this Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), special operations are operations approved by the Afghan Operational Coordination Group (OCG) and conducted by Afghan Forces with support from U.S. Forces in accordance with Afghan laws."

That carefully crafted sentence means that the only night raids covered by the MOU are those that the SOF commander responsible for U.S. night raids decides to bring to the Afghan government. Those raids carried out by U.S. units without consultation with the Afghan government fall outside the MOU.

Coverage of the MOU by major news media suggesting that the participation of U.S. SOF units would depend on the Afghan government simply ignored that provision in the text.

But Pentagon spokesman John Kirby told reporters flatly Apr. 9 that Karzai would not have a veto over night raids. "It’s not about the U.S. ceding responsibility to the Afghans," he said.

Kirby would not comment on whether those SOF units which operated independently of Afghan units would be affected by the MOU, thus confirming by implication that they would not.

Kirby explained that the agreement had merely "codified" what had already been done since December 2011, which was that Afghan Special Forces were in the lead on most night raids. That meant that they would undertake searches within the compound.

The U.S. forces have continued, however, to capture or kill Afghans in those raids.

The disparity between the reality of the agreement and the optics created by administration press briefings recalls Obama’s declarations in 2009 and 2010 on the withdrawal of U.S. combat troops from Iraq and an end to the U.S. war there, and the reality that combat units remained in Iraq and continued to fight long after the Sep. 1, 2010 deadline Obama he had set for withdrawal had passed.

Fifty-eight U.S. servicemen were killed in Iraq after that deadline in 2010 and 2011.

But there is a fundamental difference between the two exercises in shaping media coverage and public perceptions: the Iraq withdrawal agreement of 2008 made it politically difficult, if not impossible, for the Iraqi government to keep U.S. troops in Iraq beyond 2011.

In the case of Afghanistan, however, the agreements just signed impose no such constraints on the U.S. military. And although Obama is touting a policy of ending U.S. war in Afghanistan, the U.S. military and the Pentagon have public said they expect to maintain thousands of SOF troops in Afghanistan for many years after 2014.

Obama had hoped to lure the Taliban leadership into peace talks that would make it easier to sell the idea that he is getting out of Afghanistan while continuing the war. But the Taliban didn’t cooperate.

Obama’s Kabul speech could not threaten that U.S. SOF units will continue to hunt them down in their homes until they agree to make peace with Karzai. That would have given away the secret still hidden in the U.S.-Afghan "Enduring Strategic Partnership" agreement.

But Obama must assume that the Taliban understand what the U.S. public does not: U.S. night raids will continue well beyond 2014, despite the fact that they ensure enduring hatred of U.S. and NATO troops.

*Gareth Porter is an investigative historian and journalist specialising in U.S. national security policy. The paperback edition of his latest book, "Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam", was published in 2006.

All rights reserved, IPS – Inter Press Service, 2012.

This article may not be republished, broadcast, framed, or redistributed without the written permission of IPS – Inter Press Service. Republication of this material without permission from IPS, the copyright holder, constitutes a violation of United States and international copyright laws and may result in legal action.


Afghanistan: The Quagmire of U.S. Occupation

Global Geopolitics & Political Economy / IDN

By Nicole Colson*

IDN-InDepth NewsAnalysis

CHICAGO (IDN) – The U.S. war and occupation of Afghanistan was supposed to bring stability and democracy. Instead, Afghanistan remains a country on the brink of disaster – one that has clearly been exacerbated by the U.S. presence.

More than 10 years after the U.S. war began, in spite of the presence of about 2,000 international aid groups, at least $3.5 billion in humanitarian funds and $58 billion in development assistance, humanitarian conditions in Afghanistan remain abysmal.

This past winter, one of the harshest in recent years, compounded the suffering of those living in refugee camps – an estimated 35,000 people just in the capital of Kabul, and many more around the country. The camps, according to the New York Times, are euphemistically referred to as "informal settlements," because labeling them as what they really are, camps full of war refugees, is "politically sensitive." According to the Times, "The Afghan government insists that the residents should and could return to their original homes; the residents say it is too dangerous for them to do so."

The death rate for children under age five in these camps is 144 out of 1,000, according to Julie Bara of Solidarités International. The Times calls this "stunningly high even for Afghanistan, which already has the world’s third highest infant mortality rate."

As Mohammad Yousef, director general of Aschiana, an Afghan aid group that provides education and other services in 13 of the camps, told the Times, "There is no clear strategy to help these people. They don’t have access to anything–health, education, food, sanitation, water. They don’t even have an opportunity for survival."

Such a bleak picture of humanitarian conditions should give pause to anyone who might still believes that the U.S. could be a force for good in Afghanistan.

But it isn’t only the dire conditions in the refugee camps. By any measure, even those of the occupiers, the U.S. war and occupation has been a dismal failure – failing to liberate women, failing to improve conditions for ordinary Afghans, failing to bring about democracy, failing to stop the killing of civilians, failing to permanently oust the Taliban, failing to train a national armed forces.

Of course, that’s because the U.S. occupation was never about liberation and democracy in the first place. It was about securing an imperial foothold in the region – no matter the consequence to the Afghan people. Now, as the U.S. occupation unravels, it is ordinary Afghans who are suffering the consequences as the U.S. looks in vain for a "Plan B" that doesn’t exist.

Women’s Rights

Take women’s rights. Although the 2001 war was accompanied by relentless propaganda from both Democrats and Republicans telling us that the U.S. had to go to war in order to "save" Afghan women from repressive fundamentalism, reports today suggest that little has changed.

According to the Guardian, half of all Afghan women in prison–some 400–are there for "moral" crimes – including running away from abusive homes. Others have been imprisoned for the "crime" of sex outside of marriage – after being raped or forced into prostitution.

A report last fall from Oxfam found that 87 percent of Afghan women reported experiencing physical, psychological or sexual abuse or forced marriages.

The U.S.-backed stooge President Hamid Karzai, whose government is notorious for its corruption and its lack of legitimacy outside Kabul, recently backed a decree by the Ulema Council, a government-sponsored group of religious leaders, insisting that women are worth less than men, should be subordinate to men, should not mix with men in school or the workplace, and should always travel with a male guardian.

Karzai backed the decree as part of a plan to appeal to conservative forces and the Taliban – which his government is currently negotiating with as the date approaches for a planned September withdrawal of some 30,000 U.S. troops. This would bring the number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan down from approximately 90,000 to 60,000 – a necessary move for the Obama administration prior to the November election.

Whatever else is taking place, it’s clear that even empty rhetoric about women’s rights is being ditched. "There is a link with what is happening all over the country with peace talks and the restrictions they want to put on women’s rights," Fawzia Koofi, a member of Afghanistan’s parliament, told the Guardian, adding that the decree is a "green light for Talibanization."

Doubts and Protests

Karzai – along with the U.S. – is desperate to cut whatever deals he can with the Taliban and other forces now, because his isolated and weak government would have a hard time remaining in power once the U.S. presence is wound down.

Nor has the U.S. been able to train a stable Afghan army – at least not with any confidence that its soldiers will remain loyal to U.S. interests or to Karzai and the central government. The Obama administration is counting on the perception that its troop "surge" brought internal security and stability to large areas of the country, even though that’s clearly not the case.

In fact, the U.S. and its NATO partners in the Afghanistan occupation don’t trust the soldiers that they do recruit and train.

In many places outside Kabul, the Taliban and other warlords are in total control of local militias. In Ghor province in the West, for example, more than 150 illegally armed groups are estimated to contend for power in the area – against some 200 NATO soldiers. According to one report last month:

Governor Abdullah Hiwad recently told media that President Hamid Karzai had agreed to raising and deploying an additional 1,000-member militia to the province. He said the president had promised completing the process this solar year. However, provincial council members and officials believe militias cause unrest and fuel insecurity instead of bringing relief to the people.

On top of this local instability is the widespread outrage caused by repeated insults and massacres at the hands of U.S. troops.

Recent months have seen mass protests in Afghanistan over photos showing U.S. Marines urinating on the corpses of "insurgents," the burning of Korans at a U.S. military base in February and, last month, the massacre of 17 unarmed civilians by Staff Sgt. Robert Bales.

The atrocities committed by Bales didn’t provoke the immediate and furious protests seen during the Koran burning, but they have built on an even deeper sense of distrust of American and NATO forces by ordinary Afghans.

U.S. commanders are well aware that their own troops are a barely contained powder keg. According to journalist Robert Fisk, just three weeks before Bales carried out his massacre – after the death of six NATO troops, two of them Americans, in the wake of the protests against the Koran burning–the U.S. Army’s top commander in Afghanistan, Gen. John Allen, lectured his men, "Now is not the time for revenge for the deaths."

According to Fisk, Allen told soldiers that they should "resist whatever urge they might have to strike back" after an Afghan soldier killed the two Americans. "There will be moments like this, when your emotions are governed by anger and a desire to strike back," Allen continued. "Now is not the time for revenge, now is the time to look deep inside your souls, remember your mission, remember your discipline, remember who you are."

As Fisk wrote:

[T]his was an extraordinary plea to come from the U.S. commander in Afghanistan. The top general had to tell his supposedly well-disciplined, elite, professional army not to "take vengeance" on the Afghans they are supposed to be helping/protecting/nurturing/training, etc. He had to tell his soldiers not to commit murder.

I know that generals would say this kind of thing in Vietnam. But Afghanistan? Has it come to this? I rather fear it has. Because – however much I dislike generals – I’ve met quite a number of them and, by and large, they have a pretty good idea of what’s going on in the ranks. And I suspect that Allen had already been warned by his junior officers that his soldiers had been enraged by the killings that followed the Koran burnings–and might decide to go on a revenge spree.

The Bales Massacre

One of the things that made the Bales massacre particularly appalling was that the U.S. had specifically told civilians in the area who had previously fled the fighting to come back to their villages – that it was "safe," and there was no longer a threat from the Taliban.

Following the massacre, the U.S. military was so worried about the anger it could spark that, within days, it paid the families of the victims $50,000 for each murdered civilian – as opposed to the several hundred or few thousand dollars that has been routine during the war.

But payoffs won’t bring dead civilians back to life–nor will they make the resentment that fuels opposition to the U.S. and NATO war go away.

As one anonymous Afghan official told ABC News, "The villagers aren’t like animals that you can buy. Yes, it’s a lot of money. But their children are not coming back."

Adding to that resentment is the fact that the U.S. immediately whisked Bales out of the country following his murder spree–preventing Afghan officials or courts from having any role in investigating the crime or seeking justice for the victims’ families.

This comes on top of the February Koran burnings, which sparked days of mass protests around the country.

During the protests, Afghan soldiers – not "insurgents" – killed six occupying troops. Two were found dead with shots to the back of the head inside the Interior Ministry headquarters in Kabul. These two killings, at least, were certainly carried out by a person or persons that the U.S. had trained as part of the Afghan security forces, and who therefore had access to U.S. soldiers and a U.S. base.

In late March, following the Bales massacre, Afghan forces reportedly shot and killed three NATO soldiers. Reports suggest the person who carried out the attack had been in the Afghan army for four years – another sign that U.S.-trained soldiers are taking aim at the occupiers.

Also in late March, the Afghan defense ministry was forced to go on lockdown after discovering 10 "suicide bomb vests." More than a dozen Afghan soldiers were arrested on suspicion of plotting to attack the ministry and blow up commuter buses for government employees. As the New York Times noted, "The security breach took place in one of the most heavily fortified parts of Kabul, less than a mile from the presidential palace and the headquarters of the American-led coalition."

These are just a few of the recent attacks in which Afghan forces are suspected to have attempted to turn their weapons on U.S. and NATO occupiers.

According to the Associated Press, since 2007, an estimated 80 NATO service members have been killed by Afghan security forces. More than 75 percent of those attacks have actually occurred in the past two years, and they’re happening right in front of, and even on, military bases. Almost one in five of the NATO soldiers killed so far this year in Afghanistan, have been shot and killed by Afghan soldiers and policemen, or militants disguised in their uniforms.

For U.S. leaders, such attacks are particularly worrisome – because they expose the idea that a loyal Afghan army will soon be ready to take over security of the country.

The U.S. currently spends some $9 billion a year to fund and train the Afghan army. As Carl Bildt, the Swedish foreign minister, said recently, if the U.S. stops funding the Afghan army after its planned withdrawal of combat troops in 2014, "We will have given 100,000 people training and a gun, and then made them unemployed."

All of this complicates the Obama administration’s timeline for withdrawal. While Karzai remains largely a figurehead, the U.S. continues to rely on his administration to broker a deal with the Taliban in order to set the stage for the September drawdown of troops and, ultimately, the planned withdrawal of all combat troops by 2014.

Following the Bales massacre, the Taliban withdrew from talks- leaving the Karzai government and the U.S. scrambling now to figure out how to get them back to the table.

Within the U.S., this latest atrocities and tragedies have had a clear impact on people’s attitude toward the war. According to a New York Times/CBS News poll taken after the Bales massacre, in the last four months, American opposition to continuing the war in Afghanistan has climbed from 53 percent to 69 percent of the population. Some 60 percent of Republicans and 68 percent of Democrats now agree that the war is going badly.

Defense Secretary Leon Panetta immediately dismissed the poll, stating, "We cannot fight wars by polls. If we do that, we’re in deep trouble."

But the Obama administration is already in "deep trouble" when it comes to the quagmire in Afghanistan. It has no strategy except its hope to cut whatever deal it can with the Taliban, maintain the six U.S. military bases across the country, keep Karzai as a nominal figure in Kabul, and continue the drone war.

The Republicans, of course, don’t have an alternate strategy. Mitt Romney has been critical of Obama’s "withdrawal timetable," but all his campaign website says is that as president, he would "order a full interagency assessment of our military and assistance presence in Afghanistan."

As Sonali Kolhatkar of the Afghan Women’s Mission recently explained in an interview with the Real News Network:

[W]hat Afghans, ordinary Afghans have been subjected to over the past 10 years has been they get targeted from three different sides. You have the U.S. and NATO occupation on the one hand, which is conducting these night raids and killing civilians, the likes of which we just saw. And then you have the Taliban, who are only stronger because of the U.S. presence, because they have a great excuse to remain in Afghanistan. And then you have the U.S.-backed central government in Afghanistan, which is riddled with very corrupt and criminal warlords.

After 10 years, it’s long past time for ordinary Afghans to be able to decide their own fate–without the interference of the U.S. and NATO. As long as the U.S. military remains, Afghanistan cannot be free.

*Nicole Colson writes for SocialistWorker.org, in which this article was first published. [IDN-InDepthNews – April 10, 2012]

2012 IDN-InDepthNews | Analysis That Matters

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AFGHANISTAN: Land Triggers New Conflicts

Global Geopolitics & Political Economy / IPS

By Rebecca Murray

NANGARHAR, Afghanistan , Dec 4, 2011 (IPS) – A small plot of urban land has pitted Assadullah, 55, against an unwelcome neighbour in a bitter personal property dispute that has stretched on for almost a decade.

Assadullah’s story is a common one. A working-class barber who fled Jalalabad, in Nangarhar province, to Pakistan during the Soviet war in the mid-eighties, he returned after the Taliban regime fell in 2001. There he found a strange businessman in a new house built on the 450-square metre tract that Assadullah purchased from the government before he left.

Moving his family into an old dwelling along the edge of the plot, Assadullah showed the newcomer his official land deed and receipt as proof the land was his. He says the man, flush with cash from a timber business, was friends with powerful politicians and in turn produced a "fake" customary deed.

Since then the neighbours have been locked in an acrimonious battle for ownership of the residential land, which has soared in value over the years. The men only see each other now in court.

After two failed attempts to solve the case through a Jirga – a traditional community decision-making body – Assadullah filed his claim in a government court. He won the case, but the court of appeals overturned the ruling.

Assadullah’s case now lies in the Supreme Court for a final verdict. "I am not sure if the court decision will take place soon," he says. "I don’t believe the government; the system is complicated and the courts are corrupt."

Nangarhar is the agricultural breadbasket of Afghanistan’s east. Its rich natural resources and major transportation route connecting Kabul to Pakistan attracts returning Afghan refugees and migrants from the more volatile surrounding provinces, as well as nomadic tribes for grazing grounds.

This huge population influx has transformed the majority Pashtun province into one of the most crowded corners of the country and hiked up the value of the land.

Almost 90 percent of Afghanistan’s mostly rural and agricultural land belongs to the government. Land allocations are classified and documented under a 2008 land law, and managed by the Afghanistan Land Authority (Arazi).

Since the U.S.-led invasion in 2001, the threat of violence over land disputes has increased dramatically. Land grabbing by corrupt government officials and warlords is endemic throughout the country, and absentee land is often resold or occupied, without the original owner’s knowledge.

In Kabul, makeshift dwellings snake up the sides of mountains, while power brokers grab prime central real estate for themselves. Last summer, Ghulam Haider Hamidi, mayor of Kandahar City, was assassinated in supposed retaliation for tearing down illegal structures built on government land.

"It is part of our culture that people kill each other over two issues," explains Dr. Rafiullah Bidar, the Jalalabad programme manager for the governmental Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC). "One is for land, and the second is women."

"Big issues like tribes fighting the government over land is what we have problems with because there are a lot of politics involved, and if we share it with a minister, maybe that minister is involved," Bidar says. "The price of land is getting very high, and there is a lot of corruption."

Land disputes are most commonly fought between individuals, including family inheritance claims. Others pit the government against individuals or tribes, or tribes versus tribes.

The majority of landowners prefer to abide by customary law and resolve disputes using traditional mechanisms because it takes less time. The courts are regarded as time consuming – always an expensive undertaking for those involved – and are suspected of corruption.

The Liaison Office, an Afghan NGO that has researched land disputes, says roughly 30 percent of land ownership deeds are registered in the east, and although 85 percent are registered in the south, the documentation is out of date.

On a warm morning, local legal advisors for the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) in Nangarhar travelled to the fertile northern district of Kus Kunar, bordering volatile Kunar province. They are consulting on the formation of a Jirga that will decide a female inheritance case.

Ten men sip tea in a circle inside a small, carpeted room. Outside is a small plot of land with livestock and bundles of hay enclosed by a high mud compound wall. The property owner’s father had died, leaving his three sons portions of land, but not the daughters. By law, one son gets twice a share as two daughters. The Jirga was called by a middle-aged daughter deciding to fight for her inheritance claim.

Town representatives, called Maliks, approved by the district judge and the Jirga, listen to all sides and then make a decision. The customary outcome will be drawn up in a document, fingerprinted, and submitted to the local court.

Chief Justice Arhamullah Nafi, in the dingy district court nearby, says they solve land disputes by both Jirga and in the court. "We face a lot of problems," he says. "We have no transportation or electricity. Security is the main problem. The police are here, but they say they don’t belong to us."

The most controversial and violent land dispute in Nangarhar this year has been between two Shinwari sub- tribes in the southern Achin district, and is illustrative how interwoven land disputes are with Afghanistan’s complex politics and violence.

The Sepai and Alisherkhel sub-tribes are fighting over a 15 square-kilometre strip of desert land. Although worthless as agricultural land, the influx of migrants and increasing population makes it ideal for construction.

Two years ago the Sepai were armed by the U.S. as part of a local policing programme to maintain stability. These weapons have since been used in violent clashes against the Alisherkhel instead, who complained U.S. forces and the Afghan government had taken sides in the dispute.

After a realignment of coalition and government support for the Alisherkhel, and three high profile Jirgas to resolve the dispute, the Sepai mounted an attack on Nangarhar Governor Gul Agha Sherzai in October. Coalition forces retaliated by bombing the Sepai which resulted in multiple casualties.

"I am concerned with people fighting with each other using weapons in land disputes," says the AIHRC’s Dr. Bitar. "But there is no clear process which deters people not to use weapons."

All rights reserved, IPS – Inter Press Service, 2011.

This article may not be republished, broadcast, framed, or redistributed without the written permission of IPS – Inter Press Service. Republication of this material without permission from IPS, the copyright holder, constitutes a violation of United States and international copyright laws and may result in legal action.


Afghan Women’s Rights ‘Under Threat’

Global Geopolitics & Political Economy / IPS

By Correspondents*

DOHA, Qatar, Oct 3, 2011 (IPS/Al Jazeera) – Women’s rights in Afghanistan are once again under threat after 10 years of progress, two leading British aid agencies have said.

Oxfam and Action Aid said on Monday many Afghan women were worried that the impending international troop withdrawal, coupled with an ongoing effort to secure a political deal with the Taliban, could undermine their future.

Louise Hancock, the co-author of the Oxfam report, told Al Jazeera that women’s rights in Afghanistan had made some gains in the 10 years since the Taliban was deposed. But, she said, it was now "time to take stock of what has happened and what still needs to be done".

At 2.7 million, half of the nation’s school-aged girls have gained access to education. For Oxfam, this increased access to education is seen as marked improvement over the five-year period under the Taliban when education of girls was outlawed entirely.

Politically, nearly 28 percent of seats in the nation’s parliament have gone to women. Though it may be the result of a quota, that figure puts Afghanistan near the top in terms of worldwide female parliamentary representation.

‘Sacrificing’ women’s rights

However, the Oxfam report sees increasing violence in the nation as a sign of trouble ahead for women’s rights. Hancock, who says "women are particularly vulnerable to insecurity", sees increased violence as particularly troubling to the nation’s more than 15 million women.

"What is life going to be like for us in the next 10 years? Already life is getting tougher for Afghan women," said Oxfam report co-author Orzala Ashraf Nemat.

From a legal standpoint, the group sees a dangerous precedent in the implementation of a law against honour killings and child marriage.

Though the report finds that 87 percent of women have suffered "physical, sexual or psychological violence or forced marriage", the law will only be implemented in 10 of the nation’s 34 provinces. This outcome is indicative of a sharp contrast in the experience of women in larger cities and rural areas highlighted in the report.

The report also points to "willingness to sacrifice women’s rights for political ends" among the administration of Hamid Karzai, the Afghan president, as a sign of potential trouble.

In 2009, Karzai faced international scrutiny for signing the Shi’a Family Law, which included a controversial provision that human rights groups said amounted to legalised rape.

Facing pressure domestically and abroad, Karzai would later revise the law, saying he was not aware of the provision in question.

As girls’ schools continue to face attack, and the movement of women is still heavily restricted in Taliban-controlled areas, rights workers fear the Karzai government may be too willing to concede women’s rights in negotiations with the insurgent group.

"Afghan women want peace, not a stitch-up deal that will confine us to our homes again," says Nemat.

*Published under an agreement with Al-Jazeera.

All rights reserved, IPS – Inter Press Service, 2011.

This article may not be republished, broadcast, framed, or redistributed without the written permission of IPS – Inter Press Service. Republication of this material without permission from IPS, the copyright holder, constitutes a violation of United States and international copyright laws and may result in legal action.


Ex-PM Says Taliban Offer Talks For Pullout Date

Global Geopolitics & Political Economy / IPS

By Gareth Porter*

KABUL, Jul 28, 2011 (IPS) – The Taliban leadership is ready to negotiate peace with the United States right now if Washington indicates its willingness to provide a timetable for complete withdrawal, according to a former Afghan prime minister who set up a secret meeting between a senior Taliban official and a U.S. general two years ago.

They also have no problem with meeting the oft-repeated U.S. demand that the Taliban cut ties completely with Al-Qaeda.

Ahmad Shah Ahmadzai, who was acting prime minister of Afghanistan in 1995-96, told IPS in an interview that a group of Taliban officials conveyed the organisation’s position on starting peace negotiations to him in a meeting in Kabul a few days ago.

"They said once the Americans say ‘we are ready to withdraw’, they will sit with them," said Ahmadzai.

The former prime minister said Taliban officials made it clear that they were not insisting on any specific date for final withdrawal. "The timetable is up to the Americans," he said.

Ahmadzai contradicted a favourite theme of media coverage of the issue of peace negotiations on the war – that Mullah Mohammed Omar, head of the Taliban leadership council, has not been on board with contacts by Taliban officials with the administration of Afghan President Hamid Karzai and the U.S.

He confirmed that Mullah Baradar, then second in command to Mullah Omar, had indeed had high-level contacts with officials in the Karzai government in 2009, as claimed by Karzai aides, before being detained by Pakistani intelligence in early 2010.

And contrary to speculation that Baradar’s relationship with Mullah Omar had been terminated either by those contacts or by his detention, Ahmadzai said, "Baradar is still the top man," and "Mullah Omar’s position on him hasn’t changed."

Ahmadzai, who studied engineering at Colorado State University before joining the U.S.-sponsored mujahideen fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan, maintains close ties with Quetta Shura officials but has also enjoyed personal contacts with the U.S. military. He brokered a meeting between a senior Taliban leader and Brig. Gen. Edward M. Reeder, then commander of the Combined Special Forces Special Operations Army Component Command in Kabul in summer 2009.

The former prime minister’s account of that meeting in the interview with IPS further documents the Taliban leadership’s interest in entering into peace negotiations with the United States prior to the Barack Obama administration’s decision to escalate U.S. military involvement sharply in 2009.

A senior Taliban leader told Reeder at the meeting that the insurgents had no problem with severing their ties to Al-Qaeda, but could not agree to U.S. demands for access to military bases.

Ahmadzai said he negotiated the meeting with the Taliban leadership in the spring of 2009, at the request of Reeder, who had just arrived in Kabul a few weeks earlier. The process took four months, he recalled, because the Taliban leadership had so many questions that had to be addressed.

The main question, of course, was what arrangements would be made for the Taliban representative’s safety. In the end, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) command facilitated the Taliban representative’s travel into Kabul, Ahmadzai recalled.

The Taliban official who met with Reeder and Ahmadzai in Kabul was a member of the Taliban Quetta Shura (leadership council) who called himself Mullah Min Mohammed for security reasons, according to Ahmadzai.

The Quetta Shura representative complained to Reeder about the failure of the United States to follow up on a previous contact with a senior Taliban representative, according to Ahmadzai’s account.

"Mullah Mohammed" recalled to Reeder that the Taliban had met two years earlier in southern Kandahar province with an unnamed U.S. official who had made two demands as the price for U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan: an end to the Taliban’s relations with Al-Qaeda and U.S. long-term access to three airbases in the country.

"We agreed to one but not to the other," the senior Taliban official was quoted by Ahmadzai as saying.

The Taliban leader explained that it had no trouble with the demand for cutting ties with Al-Qaeda, but that it would not agree to the U.S. retaining any military bases in Afghanistan – "not one metre", according to Ahmadzai’s account.

The Quetta Shura representative then reproached the U.S. for having failed to make any response to the Taliban offer to cut the organisation’s ties with Al-Qaeda.

"You haven’t responded to us," he is said to have told Reeder. "You never told us yes or no."

The Taliban complaint suggested that the Quetta Shura leadership had been prepared to move into more substantive talks if the U.S. had indicated its interest in doing so.

Reeder, who has been commander of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command at Fort Bragg since July 2010, did not respond to an e-mail from IPS to the command’s Public Affairs Office for comment on Ahmadzai’s account of the meeting.

After the announcement of the major increase in troop deployment in Afghanistan, the Obama administration adopted a public posture that suggested the Taliban leadership had no reason to negotiate unless put under severe military pressure.

In light of the contacts between senior Taliban leaders and U.S. officials in 2007 and 2009, the Taliban clearly concluded that the United States would not negotiate with the Taliban except on the basis of accepting U.S. permanent military presence in Afghanistan.

After the 2009 meeting between Reeder and the Taliban leader, a number of reports indicated the Taliban leadership was not interested in negotiations with Washington.

Despite the apparent policy shift against seeking peace talks, the Taliban continued to signal to Washington that it was willing to exclude any presence for Al-Qaeda or other groups that might target the United States from Afghan territory.

Mullah Omar suggested that willingness in an unusual statement on the occasion of the Islamic holiday Eid in September 2009.

Then in early December, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan – the official title adopted by the Quetta Shura leadership for its political-military organisation – said in a statement posted on its website and circulated to Western news agencies that it was prepared to offer "legal guarantees" against any aggressive actions against other countries from its soil as part of a settlement with the United States.

*Gareth Porter is an investigative historian and journalist specialising in U.S. national security policy. The paperback edition of his latest book, "Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam", was published in 2006.

All rights reserved, IPS – Inter Press Service, 2011.

This article may not be republished, broadcast, framed, or redistributed without the written permission of IPS – Inter Press Service. Republication of this material without permission from IPS, the copyright holder, constitutes a violation of United States and international copyright laws and may result in legal action.


225,000 Killed – But Democracy Eludes Afghanistan and Iraq

Global Geopolitics & Political Economy / IDN

By S. Chandler

IDN-InDepth NewsReport     
    
TORONTO (IDN) – At least 225,000 civilians and men and women in uniform have been killed in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, which also involved Pakistan, and will cost the U.S. up to $4 trillion, albeit without any significant gains for democracy, says a new report that stands out for its first comprehensive analysis some ten years after George W. Bush junior declared the ‘War on Terror’.

This exceptional analysis of the horrendous human, economic and social and political costs of the three wars has been published by the Eisenhower Research Project based at Brown University’s Watson Institute for International Studies. It warns that "if the wars continue, they are on track to require at least another $450 billion in Pentagon spending by 2020."

The Institute’s ‘Costs of War’ project, which involved more than 20 economists, anthropologists, lawyers, humanitarian personnel, and political scientists, provides new estimates of the total war cost as well as other direct and indirect human and economic costs of the U.S. military response to the 9/11 attacks.

The project is the first comprehensive analysis of all U.S., coalition, and civilian casualties, including U.S. contractors. It also assesses many of the wars’ hidden costs, such as interest on war-related debt and veterans’ benefits.

Catherine Lutz, the Thomas J. Watson Jr. Family Professor of Anthropology and International Studies at Brown University, co-directs the Eisenhower Research Project with Neta Crawford, a 1985 Brown graduate and professor of political science at Boston University.

The report’s main findings are:

- The U.S. wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan will cost between $3.2 and $4 trillion, including medical care and disability for current and future war veterans. This figure does not include substantial probable future interest on war-related debt.

- More than 31,000 people in uniform and military contractors have died, including the Iraqi and Afghan security forces and other military forces allied with the United States.

- By a very conservative estimate, 137,000 civilians have been killed in Iraq and Afghanistan by all parties to these conflicts.

- The wars have created more than 7.8 million refugees among Iraqis, Afghans, and Pakistanis.

- Pentagon bills account for half of the budgetary costs incurred and are a fraction of the full economic cost of the wars.

- Because the war has been financed almost entirely by borrowing, $185 billion in interest has already been paid on war spending, and another $1 trillion could accrue in interest alone through 2020.

- Federal obligations to care for past and future veterans of these wars will likely total between $600-$950 billion. This number is not included in most analyses of the costs of war and will not peak until mid-century.

"This project’s accounting is important because information is vital for the public’s democratic deliberation on questions of foreign policy," said Lutz. "Knowing the actual costs of war is essential as the public, Congress and the President weigh the drawdown of troops in Afghanistan, and other areas including the deficit, security, public investments, and reconstruction."

"There are many costs and consequences of war that cannot be quantified, and the consequences of wars don’t end when the fighting stops," Crawford said. "The Eisenhower study group has made a start at counting and estimating the costs in blood, treasure, and lost opportunities that are both immediately visible and those which are less visible and likely to grow even when the fighting winds down."

The Eisenhower Research Project is a new, nonpartisan, non-profit, scholarly initiative that derives its purpose from President Eisenhower’s 1961 farewell address, in which he warned of the "unwarranted influence" of the military-industrial complex and appealed for an "alert and knowledgeable citizenry" as the only force able to balance the often contrasting demands of security and liberty in the democratic state.

The report says: "The President of the United States has told the American people and the rest of the world that even as the U.S. withdraws some troops from Afghanistan and continues to withdraw from Iraq, the wars will continue for some years," adding: "The debate over why each war was begun and whether either or both should have been fought continues."

"While we know how many U.S. soldiers have died in the wars (just over 6000), what is startling is what we don’t know about the levels of injury and illness in those who have returned from the wars. New disability claims continue to pour into the VA, with 550,000 just through last fall. Many deaths and injuries among U.S. contractors have not been identified," notes the report.

At least 137,000 civilians have died and more will die in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan as a result of the fighting at the hands of all parties to the conflict, the report adds. It points out that the armed conflict in Pakistan, which the U.S. helps the Pakistani military fight by funding, equipping and training them, has taken as many lives as the conflict in neighbouring Afghanistan.

Putting together the conservative numbers of war dead, in uniform and out, brings the total to 225,000, says the report.

In addition, millions of people have been displaced indefinitely and are living in grossly inadequate conditions. The current number of war refugees and displaced persons — 7,800,000 — is equivalent to all of the people of Connecticut and Kentucky fleeing their homes, informs the report.

EROSION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES

The report further notes that the wars have been accompanied by erosions in civil liberties at home and human rights violations abroad.

"The human and economic costs of these wars will continue for decades, some costs not peaking until mid-century. Many of the wars’ costs are invisible to Americans, buried in a variety of budgets, and so have not been counted or assessed," the report says.

"For example," it adds, "while most people think the Pentagon war appropriations are equivalent to the wars’ budgetary costs, the true numbers are twice that, and the full economic cost of the wars much larger yet. Conservatively estimated, the war bills already paid and obligated to be paid are $3.2 trillion in constant dollars. A more reasonable estimate puts the number at nearly $4 trillion."

As with former U.S. wars, the costs of paying for veterans’ care into the future will be a sizable portion of the full costs of the war, warns the report.

The ripple effects on the U.S. economy have also been significant, including job loss and interest rate increases, and those effects have been underappreciated, notes the report.

While it was promised that the U.S. invasions would bring democracy to both countries, Afghanistan and Iraq, both continue to rank low in global rankings of political freedom, with warlords continuing to hold power in Afghanistan with U.S. support, and Iraqi communities more segregated today than before by gender and ethnicity as a result of the war.

The report confirms the widespread view that "serious and compelling alternatives to war were scarcely considered in the aftermath of 9/11 or in the discussion about war against Iraq." Though, some of those alternatives are still available to the U.S.

The report points out: "There are many costs of these wars that we have not yet been able to quantify and assess. With our limited resources, we focused on U.S. spending, U.S. and allied deaths, and the human toll in the major war zones, Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan. There is still much more to know and understand about how all those affected by the wars have had their health, economies, and communities altered by the decade of war, and what solutions exist for the problems they face as a result of the wars’ destruction." (IDN-InDepthNews/30.06.2011)

2011 IDN-InDepthNews | Analysis That Matters

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AFGHANISTAN: Obama Takes the Centrist Option on Withdrawal

Global Geopolitics & Political Economy / IPS

By Jim Lobe

WASHINGTON, Jun 23, 2011 (IPS) – In a much-anticipated decision, U.S. President Barack Obama announced here Wednesday evening that he will withdraw 10,000 of the 100,000 U.S. troops currently deployed in Afghanistan by the end of this year and a total of 33,000 by some time next summer.

In a nationally televised address, Obama said U.S. troops will continue coming home at a "steady pace" so that "by 2014, this process of transition will be complete, and the Afghan people will be responsible for their own security."

And he strongly suggested that his plan marked a decisive turning point in the conflicts in which Washington has been embroiled in the nearly ten years since the 9/11 terrorist attacks on New York and the Pentagon.

"Tonight, we take comfort in knowing that the tide of war is receding," he said. "Fewer or our sons and daughters are serving in harm’s way. We have ended our combat mission in Iraq, with 100,000 American troops already out of that country," he said.

"And even as there will be dark days ahead in Afghanistan, the light of a secure peace can been seen in the distance. These long wars will come to a responsible end," he stressed, adding with special emphasis several minutes later: "America, it is time to focus on nation building here at home."

The 15-minute prime-time address – and the timetable it set forth – appeared to be a compromise between the faction led by outgoing Pentagon chief Robert Gates and the Afghanistan commander, Gen. David Petraeus, that favoured a slower drawdown, and another administration faction, led by Vice President Joe Biden, that has long argued for a "counter-terrorist" (CT) strategy that would require many fewer U.S. and NATO forces deployed to Afghanistan.

Petraeus, who will take over the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) later this summer, had let it be known that he wanted to withdraw only a nominal number of troops – no more than 5,000 – by the end of this year and only a few of thousand more in 2012 in order to continue carrying out an ambitious "counter- insurgency" (COIN) strategy through a second "fighting season" against the Taliban focused primarily on eastern Afghanistan, close to the Pakistani border, where the insurgency remains strongest.

The CT faction, whose position has been significantly strengthened since the May 2 killing by CIA- directed U.S. Special Operations Forces of Al-Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan, and by concerns among a growing number of Republicans about the 10-billion-dollar-a-month cost of the Afghanistan campaign, reportedly favoured a much more rapid drawdown – as much as 30,000 troops by the end of this year and an equal number, if not more, in 2012.

Those differences were reflected in reactions to Wednesday’s speech. While the more hawkish Republican leaders, whose influence on the party has appeared to wane in the past couple of weeks, charged that Obama’s timetable risked undoing the gains made by Petraeus’ COIN strategy, many Democrats expressed disappointment that the president had not opted for a more sizeable withdrawal this year and a more decisive shift to a CT strategy.

Thus, the influential Democratic chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Carl Levin, called the plan a "positive development, although in my view the conditions on the ground justify an even larger drawdown of U.S. troops," while Republican Sen. Lindsay Graham, a long-time hawk, complained to CNN that "we’ve undercut a strategy that was working, (and) …may eventually have doomed it fail. We’re going to a counter-terrorism strategy too soon," he warned.

Mindful of the growing conflict within the party between neo-conservatives and aggressive nationalists who have dominated it since 9/11 and an ascendant coalition of "realists", "isolationists", and fiscal conservatives, other Republicans were more circumspect.

The normally highly partisan speaker of the House of Representatives, John Boehner, for example, issued a mild criticism, arguing that degrading Al-Qaeda’s capabilities in the region "must take priority over any calendar dates" and urging Obama "to continue to listen to our commanders on the ground as we move forward."

Similarly, former Massachusetts Gov. Mitt Romney, the current front-runner in the race for the 2012 Republican nomination, asserted that the timetable for withdrawal "should not be based on politics or economics" while the newest entry in the race, former Utah Gov. Jon Huntsman, representing the party’s realist faction, came out strongly for a CT strategy and expressed disappointment that the president had not announced a larger withdrawal.

Under Obama’s timetable, the same number of U.S. troops will be deployed in Afghanistan in September 2012 as in December 2009 when he accepted – to the great frustration of most Democrats – Petraeus’s recommendation to "surge" 33,000 troops into Afghanistan over the following nine months in order to wrest control from the Taliban of the southern part of the country around Afghanistan’s second-largest city, Kandahar.

Since taking office in January, 2009, Obama, who had described Afghanistan as a "necessary war" during the 2008 presidential election campaign, has more than tripled U.S. troop strength there.

In his address, Obama stressed that, having "inflicted serious losses on the Taliban," and "taken out more than half of Al-Qaeda’s leadership," including bin Laden, he will start the drawdown "from a position of strength."

He also stressed that a political settlement was the only way to end the conflict and that "America will join initiatives that reconcile the Afghan people, including the Taliban," so long as the latter break with Al-Qaeda, renounce violence, and accept the country’s constitution.

Washington’s goal, he said, "can be expressed simply: no safe haven from which Al-Qaeda or its affiliates can launch attacks against our homeland, or our allies. We will not try to make Afghanistan a perfect place."

He added that terrorist safe havens in Pakistan must also be addressed, although he did not elaborate on how this will be done. Counter-terrorist co-operation between the U.S. and Pakistan, already strained before the U.S. strike against bin Laden, appears to have deteriorated over the past six weeks.

In addition to splitting the difference between the COIN and CT advocates and anti-war Democrats and hawkish Republicans, Obama quite explicitly depicted himself as a pragmatic centrist in the broader contemporary foreign-policy debate, noting that the past "decade of war has caused many to question the nature of America’s engagement around the world.

"Some would have America retreat from our responsibility as an anchor of global security, and embrace an isolation that ignores the very real threats that we face," he said. "others would have America over- extend ourselves, confronting every evil that can be found abroad.

"We must chart a centred course," he went on. "Like generations before, we must embrace America’s singular role in the course of human events. But we must be as pragmatic as we are passionate; as strategic as we are resolute. When threatened, we must respond with force – but when that force can be targeted, we need not deploy large armies overseas," he argued.

All rights reserved, IPS – Inter Press Service, 2011.

This article may not be republished, broadcast, framed, or redistributed without the written permission of IPS – Inter Press Service. Republication of this material without permission from IPS, the copyright holder, constitutes a violation of United States and international copyright laws and may result in legal action.


AFGHANISTAN: Debate Rages over U.S. Withdrawal

Global Geopolitics & Political Economy / IPS

By Jim Lobe*

WASHINGTON, Jun 8, 2011 (IPS) – With only three weeks left before U.S. military forces are scheduled to begin withdrawing from Afghanistan, the debate over the size and pace of that withdrawal has become increasingly intense.

On one hand, the Pentagon, backed by prominent neo-conservatives and other hawks, insists that the 18-month-old "surge" of 30,000 U.S. troops has turned the strategic tide against the Taliban.

Anything more than a "modest" drawdown of a few thousand of the nearly 100,000 soldiers and marines there through the end of the year, they argue, risks losing all that has been gained.

"I would hope that (the withdrawal) is very small," the 2008 Republican presidential candidate, Sen. John McCain, told the Financial Times this week. "I would hope that it is 3,000. We need another fighting season (against the Taliban)."

On the other hand, President Barack Obama’s political advisers, backed by a strong majority of Democrats and a small but growing minority of Republicans in Congress, are arguing for a much more substantial withdrawal.

In the clearest marker so far, the influential chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Carl Levin, said this week that at least 15,000 troops should be withdrawn between July and the end of the year.

His appeal came just days after the ranking Democrat on the House subcommittee that oversees the Pentagon’s budget, Rep. Norm Dicks, shocked Washington by calling for an end to the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan before 2014. Current plans call for the U.S. and its NATO allies, which have sent more than 40,000 troops, to withdraw all their combat forces by the end of that year.

"We need to start seeing if we can do this (withdrawal) a little faster," Dicks, a veteran Democratic hawk, told Politico.

"I think the American people would overwhelmingly like to see this brought to a conclusion sooner than 2014," he said, citing growing "war fatigue" in Congress.

Obama, who has promised that the initial withdrawal will be "significant", has otherwise kept his cards close to his chest. The White House said he was still waiting to receive formal recommendations from the outgoing defence secretary, Robert Gates, who met with military commanders during a three-day farewell visit of Afghanistan that began on the weekend.

The withdrawal debate has intensified steadily since the May 2 killing by U.S. Special Forces of Al-Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden at a compound in the Pakistani resort town of Abbottabad where he had apparently been living for six years. Until then, it appeared that the Pentagon and its civilian allies would prevail upon Obama to withdraw only a "modest" – if not token – number of troops in July and through the end of the year.

But bin Laden’s demise gave new momentum to the war’s critics who have long argued that Al-Qaeda had, for all practical purposes, left Afghanistan in 2001 and that Washington’s military-led counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy there was overly ambitious and largely ineffective, if not counter-productive.

"We’ve gone from being waist- to chest-deep in quicksand," noted Matthew Hoh, who directs the Afghanistan Study Group and served in Afghanistan as both a Marine captain and a State Department adviser.

At the same time, the growing focus in Congress about the yawning government deficit has cast a harsher light on the war’s enormous cost – some 10 billion dollars a month, not including another 300 million dollars a month for civilian-led aid projects.

It was these considerations, as well as unhappiness with U.S. military operations in Libya, that led late last month to near- passage by the House of Representatives of an amendment to the 690- billion-dollar 2011 defence authorisation bill that required Obama to submit a plan for withdrawing U.S. troops and "an accelerated transition" of U.S. operations there to the Afghan government.

The amendment, which was defeated 204-215, gained the votes of all but eight Democrats and 26 Republicans – a total of nearly 42 more votes than a similar measure last year.

The vote, which was taken as a strong indication of war weariness, appears to have tilted the balance in the debate, as the Pentagon and its backers stepped up their public campaign for a "modest" withdrawal of just a few thousand troops beginning in July.

Thus, a Washington Post/ABC poll released earlier this week that showed a sharp increase – from 31 percent last March to 43 percent after bin Laden’s death – in the percentage of people who believe that the war in Afghanistan has been worth the costs was seized on by one former Bush administration adviser as evidence that Obama "probably has the political breathing room" to choose a "measured withdrawal" as opposed to a "rapid retreat".

The same survey, however, showed found that three out of four respondents favoured withdrawing "a substantial number of U.S. combat forces from Afghanistan this summer".

At the same time, Kimberly and Frederick Kagan, neo-conservative military analysts close to the outgoing U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. David Petraeus, published an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal arguing that "nothing about conditions on the ground justifies the withdrawal of any U.S. or coalition forces".

Moreover, they warned, if Obama withdraws all 30,000 "surge" forces by the end of 2012, "the war will likely be lost."

Gates, who has called for a "modest" drawdown, has not offered a specific number, but, since the House vote, in particular, he has made clear that he wants as few combat troops as possible to leave.

"I think we shouldn’t let up on the gas too much, at least for the next few months," he said over the weekend. He has also hinted that he will speak out publicly in support of the current strategy after he steps down at the end of the month.

Whether this will be enough to sway Obama, who has been criticised by his fellow-Democrats for deferring too much to the military, remains to be seen.

But it is clear that disillusionment with the war is spreading in both parties.

Releasing a highly critical staff report on the effectiveness and sustainability of U.S. aid programmes in Afghanistan Wednesday, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry expressed strong doubts about the current strategy.

"While the United States has genuine national security interests in Afghanistan," said Kerry, a key foreign policy ally of the White House, "our current commitment, in troops and dollars, is neither proportional to our interests nor sustainable."

His remarks were seconded by the Committee’s ranking Republican, Sen. Richard Lugar. "Despite 10 years of investment and attempts to better understand the culture and the region’s actors, we remain in a cycle that produces relative progress but fails to deliver a secure political or military resolution," he said.

"Undoubtedly, we will make some progress when we are spending more than 100 billion dollars per year in that country. The more important question is whether we have an efficient strategy for protecting our vital interests that does not involve massive open-ended expenditures and does not require us to have more faith than is justified in Afghan institutions," he said.

*Jim Lobe’s blog on U.S. foreign policy can be read at http://www.lobelog.com.

All rights reserved, IPS – Inter Press Service, 2011.

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