The Secular Fret in New Tunisia

November 26, 2012 by

Global Geopolitics & Political Economy / IPS

Justin Hyatt

TUNIS, Nov 26 (IPS) – A year has passed since the provisional government assumed power in Tunisia. Following in the wake of the revolutionary changes brought on by the Arab Spring, the moderate Islamic Ennahda party won the majority and formed a coalition with the two secular parties Congress for the Republic (CPR) and Ettakatol in October last year.With the promise to hold new elections a year later, the country waited as Oct. 23 approached.

The day came and went, without the ruling government stepping down. Small protests erupted in the streets of the capital and later elsewhere but there were no large-scale rallies.

“I experienced the greatest deception of my life, "a young psychologist and actress from Tunis who gave her name only as Meriem told IPS. Even if the ruling government did not immediately step down, she said, people were hoping for some sign that change was in the works.

"I don’t care who is in power, but I want to see action, see something happening," she said. "But after such a let-down, I was crying like a fool."

The ruling coalition has claimed that more time is needed to prepare elections, and has instead pegged Jun. 23, 2013 as the next election date.

Usama Zekri, a blogger, stressed that more time is indeed needed to fully prepare for the elections that will usher in the first four-year political cycle.

"While the National Assembly is perhaps slow," Zekri told IPS, "Tunisians are not used to open debates and talking with each other, thus we need time to learn and also to make mistakes."

Nidaa Tounes (‘Call of Tunisia’) has generated some of the strongest opposition support recently. The party is led by octogenarian former prime minister Beji Caid Essebsi, and holds to a strict secular line.

Nesrine Dridi, a dentist, claims that the best solution for Tunisia would be a secular power structure as envisioned by Nidaa Tounes, leaving religion as a matter of choice.

"We used to be a tolerant society, but now religion is forming dividing lines," says Dridi. "What we need is for people of all stripes to work hand in hand to promote our country and establish a free society."

Many in the opposition are worried that while Ennahda espouses moderate Islam, it is actually keen on promoting religion throughout all areas of government and public life.

The Salafist movement represents the hardline ultraconservative branch of Islam, but Ennahda can position itself as a moderate strain, needed by all to preserve a balance in the style of governance.

In forming the new constitution, Ennahda seemed open to Salafist demands for greater inclusion of Sharia law. But this was quelled by opposition groups and secular parties.

This was seen as a warning sign for those who are worried that liberal democratic values might draw the shorter straw. Yet, according to Zekri, the opposition has been too preoccupied attacking Ennahda on the religious front, and could do more to propose an alternative economic programme.

In order to fully reassure the country that the democratic evolution is on the right track, the ruling coalition will have to prove that proper steps are being taken.

The establishment of the independent Committee on Elections is seen as such a sign, but many have still to be convinced of its impartiality and readiness to get to work.

Beyond this, serious progress will need to become evident elsewhere. Among the greatest tasks facing the government are high unemployment and the rising cost of living.

In October the Swiss government and the International Finance Corporation granted Tunisia a million dollars to implement business procedural reform. An Austrian trade delegation has visited Tunisia to explore possibilities for Tunisian-Austrian relations.

These are just a few of many overtures currently, but it is not clear how all this will translate into jobs and putting more people to work.

Tunisians remain in a state of uncertainty, eager for signs that the country is headed in the right direction, and that the blood and sweat of the Jasmine revolution will help cement Tunisia’s place as the best-transitioned democracy in North Africa.

For now, the streets remain relatively calm, without large-scale protests taking place, yet President Moncef Marzouki recently admitted to having nightmares of a second revolution.

Activists like Meriem are poised to jump into action, if the need arises.

"I don’t want to be an activist, I’d like to get on with my life," stresses the actress, "but if I feel like my voice needs to be heard again, I won’t wait for a minute to get out on the street."

All rights reserved, IPS – Inter Press Service, 2012.

This article may not be republished, broadcast, framed, or redistributed without the written permission of IPS – Inter Press Service. Republication of this material without permission from IPS, the copyright holder, constitutes a violation of United States and international copyright laws and may result in legal action.


Filed Under: Africa, Featured, Politics, Religion Tagged With: , ,

Kazakhstan Restricts Faith in the Name of Tackling Extremism

November 13, 2012 by

Global Geopolitics & Political Economy / IPS

Joanna Lillis

ASTANA, Nov 13 (IPS) – Religious life in Kazakhstan features a glaring dichotomy these days. Officials in Astana tout the country as a bastion of toleration, yet they are making it harder for those practicing what are deemed non-traditional faiths to worship openly.In late October, Kayrat Lama Sharif, chairman of the government’s Religious Affairs Agency, announced the outcome of a year-long process set in motion by the adoption of a controversial religion law last fall. The legislation gave religious denominations and faith-based civic associations one year to re-register under stringent new criteria, or face closure.

The results were stark: President Nursultan Nazarbayev used to proudly proclaim that Kazakhstan welcomed over 40 officially-recognised faiths, but that number has been slashed by about 60 percent, from 46 to 17. Meanwhile, roughly one-third of all faith-based civic organisations face elimination, leaving 3,088 against the previous total of 4,551.

In an interview with the Kazakhstanskaya Pravda daily, Lama Sharif said the law aimed to increase Astana’s sway over religious matters. He also insisted that Kazakhstan – where about 70 percent of the population identifies itself as Muslim, and another 25 percent as Orthodox Christian – “is for the entire world an example of interfaith harmony.”

State media have published letters from religious leaders to Nazarbayev (who hosts regular congresses of clerics from around the world to promote interfaith dialogue and tolerance) hailing the reform and lauding Kazakhstan’s credentials as a haven of religious freedom.

Yet, leaders of religious minority groups endured a nail-biting few months as they waited to hear if their respective groups would survive the re-registration process.

Speaking to EurasiaNet.org after a lively Sunday morning service at Almaty’s Sun Bok Ym Pentecostal Church, Pastor Vasiliy Shegay said his group had its registration application turned down initially, but gained approval on a second attempt. At the same time, its sister church faces closure.

He said his reservations that the law would “infringe our rights” had not been borne out. “We Christians are treated well,” he said.

Astana divides religions into “traditional” (including Islam, Orthodox Christianity, Roman Catholicism, Judaism, and Buddhism) and “non-traditional” – which includes a broad spectrum of smaller denominations, some with strong missionary elements, including Jehovah’s Witnesses, Baptists, Hare Krishnas, Ahmadi Muslims and Sufis.

“Non-traditional” religious groups were under pressure well before the adoption of the religion law – but raids on places of worship are now being stepped up. At a Protestant church in Astana in October, pastors were accused of driving a member insane, harbouring extremist literature and giving worshippers a red drink containing “hallucinogenic ingredients inducing euphoria". Worshippers deemed in breach of the law are usually fined.

Critics believe disproportionate police efforts are being directed against religious communities with no known extremist agenda, and worry that punitive measures will push some pious Muslims underground.

“One of the problems is that when people have an interest in hiding their activities from the state because the state is being very intrusive, then it does become more difficult for the government to know what they’re up to,” Felix Corley of the Oslo-based Forum 18 religious freedoms watchdog told EurasiaNet.org.

The new law sets what critics see as a much higher bar for religious groups on membership requirements, calling for minimum membership of 5,000 nationally, 500 regionally, and 50 locally. The law also contains provisions covering the vetting of religious literature and tightens guidelines for the training of clergy.

It contains no ban on wearing the hijab, although it is officially discouraged (Nazarbayev says it is not a Kazakh tradition). Controversially, it prohibits prayer in state buildings, including government offices, educational establishments, and military facilities.

Some critics say the religion law can be used as a tool for Astana to exercise control over what should be private choices about faith. They also contend the law contravenes Kazakhstan’s international commitments to uphold freedom of conscience.

“Formally, under the law, there is freedom (of conscience), but in effect it is hard to exercise it in our realities,” said one young member of a Protestant church in Almaty (which did receive registration), speaking on condition of anonymity. The closure of religious groups is a “purge", he suggested, intended “to abolish religions that are inconvenient to the state".

Moving forward, the law gives officials a powerful tool to enforce a state-designed religious orthodoxy. “Waves of pressure are continuing on religious communities, and the government is trying to funnel religion into channels that it can control,” Corley said.

Astana is seeking “a completely controlled religious environment,” he added, “but history shows that it just doesn’t work like that.”

*Editor’s note: Joanna Lillis is a freelance writer who specialises in Central Asia.

This story originally appeared on Eurasianet.org.

All rights reserved, IPS – Inter Press Service, 2012.

This article may not be republished, broadcast, framed, or redistributed without the written permission of IPS – Inter Press Service. Republication of this material without permission from IPS, the copyright holder, constitutes a violation of United States and international copyright laws and may result in legal action.


Filed Under: Asia, Politics, Religion, Security, Terrorism Tagged With:

NIGERIA: Islamic Sect’s Siege on Nation Borne Out of Frustration

June 24, 2011 by

Global Geopolitics & Political Economy / IPS

By Toluwa Olusegun

LAGOS, Jun 24, 2011 (IPS) – The sectarian crisis and recent violence by extremist groups, like the Jun. 16 bomb blast on the Nigerian Police Headquarters, are borne out of anger at prevailing economic conditions rather than religion, analysts say.

The latest spate of violence was the bomb blast on the Police Headquarters in Abuja. Four people died and more than 40 cars parked on the premises were destroyed. Three days later police arrested 58 members of the Boko Haram Islamic sect in a crackdown on the group’s hideout in Maiduguri, capital of the northeastern state of Borno. The group had claimed responsibility for the blast.

In the past year the group has killed dozens of police officers, politicians, Christian preachers and clerics from other Muslim groups within Borno. The extremist group has also claimed that it planted several bombs in Nigeria’s capital Abuja and other states after President Goodluck Jonathan’s inauguration in May.

Boko Haram accused Nigeria’s government of being corrupted by Western ideas and wants to overthrow Borno’s government and impose Islamic Sharia Law.

But Professor Murtalal Muhibbu-Din, head of the Department of Religion at Lagos State University, believes that most of the sectarian crises, especially in northern Nigeria, are borne out of anger and frustration rather than religious faith.

Muhibbu-Din says that claims by the group that they were fighting against Western education and Western values were just smokescreens to vent their anger at government. He believes the attacks on the police and the police headquarters were carried out by Boko Haram because they perceived the police as a threat to their cause.

More than 70 percent of Nigeria’s population of over 140 million people live below the poverty line of one dollar per day. Illiteracy is high and jobless youths roam the streets.

The national coordinator of the Civil Society Club of Nigeria, Babatunde Ashafa, says that politicians have used members of Boko Haram to intimidate their opposition.

"They (politicians) consult these boys and throw them away after they get into office without thinking of the consequences to the nation. The boys are acting out of frustration, neglect and disappointment with the system," he says.

"Their journey into criminality, starting with the kidnapping in the Niger Delta to Boko Haram, were initiated by politicians who arm them to intimidate the opposition," he says.

The Abuja bombing on Jun. 16 came less than a week after the Inspector General of Police, Hafiz Ringim, visited Borno and vowed to crush the Boko Haram group.

As the police begin a crackdown on the group, the country’s main opposition, the Action Congress of Nigeria, has cautioned against the use of force.

Lai Mohammed, publicity secretary of the party, advises government to engage the group in dialogue.

Mohammed urged Jonathan to take the lead in engaging with the group as his predecessor, the late Umaru Yardua, did when he took charge of the amnesty programme for the Niger Delta militants.

"Our stand is based on the fact that Boko Haram is a product of politics awry, as a former governor allegedly used the sect to further his political career only to dump it unceremoniously.

"This is just like some governors in the Niger Delta who allegedly helped to create monsters of militancy by arming youths for political ends. That militancy has now been largely curtailed through a political solution," Mohammed says.

The Pro National Conference, which is also in support of dialogue, says that the use force is not likely to solve the situation.

The group says that the success of the amnesty for the Niger Delta militants was a clear indication that dialogue might be the answer to the ongoing violence.

Until the 2009 amnesty, militancy groups in the Niger Delta attacked oil refineries and smashed pipelines for oil. About 85 percent of Nigeria’s revenue comes from oil.

Gunmen who accepted amnesty were each given 65,000 naira (about 433 dollars) a month for living expenses during a rehabilitation programme. More than 20,000 former members of militant groups participated in the demobilisation and integration process.

Danmole Abdulhameed, director of the Movement for Islamic Culture and Awareness, a non- governmental organisation, says the Boko Haram concept is alien to Islam.

"As far as we are concerned, Boko Haram is not Islamic. We do not know if it is a creation of politics or the media, but most of those getting into such crimes like this are not educated,’’ Abdulhameed tells IPS in Lagos.

He said that the youth needed to be educated in order to stem the sectarian crises. "With access to education, these problems will be solved," he says.

Ashafa agrees. "The only thing that will serve as a catalyst to the myriads of criminal activities confronting Nigeria is addressing the issues confronting the Nigerian masses, which are poverty, unemployment and illiteracy.’’

All rights reserved, IPS – Inter Press Service, 2011.

This article may not be republished, broadcast, framed, or redistributed without the written permission of IPS – Inter Press Service. Republication of this material without permission from IPS, the copyright holder, constitutes a violation of United States and international copyright laws and may result in legal action.


Filed Under: Africa, Featured, Politics, Religion, Report, Terrorism Tagged With: ,

EGYPT: Political Punch with a Religious Thrust

May 26, 2011 by

Global Geopolitics & Political Economy / IPS

By Adam Morrow and Khaled Moussa al-Omrani

CAIRO, May 26, 2011 (IPS) – More than three months since the fall of the Mubarak regime, Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood movement is well on its way to forming its first official political party since its inception in 1928. But while the nascent party is to be based on "the principles of Islamic Law and respect for freedom of belief," some critics see this as a contradiction.

"The Brotherhood can’t seem to decide if it’s a religious group or a political one," Gamal Fahmi, political analyst and managing editor of Nasserist weekly Al-Arabi Al-Nassiri told IPS.

Last week, Brotherhood officials formally applied to establish a party with Egypt’s recently-formed Political Parties Affairs Committee. The would-be party, dubbed "Freedom and Justice" is expected to be granted official party status 30 days after its initial application, barring objections by the committee.

"The party will officially begin its activities in one month’s time," Mohamed Saad al-Kitatni, prominent member of the Brotherhood’s authoritative Guidance Bureau, told reporters last week.

Late last month, the group’s Shura Council – in its first open assembly since 1995 – named the party’s three leading officials (all culled from the Guidance Bureau): Mohamed Mursi as party president; Essam al-Arian as vice-president; and al-Kitatni as secretary-general. The rest of the party’s leading appointments are expected to be announced within the next month.

While the new party will be financially and administratively independent of its parent organisation, the two entities plan to closely coordinate their activities. ?"The Brotherhood will cooperate with the party on certain occasions, especially during elections," said group spokesman Walid Shalabi.

Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood was formally outlawed in 1954 and remained so throughout Mubarak’s 30- year rule, during which group members were subject to frequent arrest and harassment. The last open meeting of the group’s Shura Council in 1995, for example, ended with most attendees being hauled before military tribunals.

Nevertheless, the group – which has long espoused a policy of non-violence – maintained its position as Egypt’s largest, most popular and best-organised opposition force. This was due in large part to its extensive social welfare network, which includes hospitals, orphanages and charitable assistance programmes in low-income areas.

Despite the Brotherhood’s outlawed status under the former regime, the group was permitted to field parliamentary candidates so long as they ran as nominal independents. In 2005, the group captured some 20 percent of the national assembly, otherwise dominated by Mubarak’s since-dismantled National Democratic Party (NDP).

Following Mubarak’s February ouster, Egypt’s Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) assumed executive authority, allowing the Brotherhood to operate openly. Within days of Mubarak’s departure, the group had announced its intention to establish a legal political party.

Justice and Freedom boasts some 9,000 founding members, almost 1,000 of whom are women and almost 100 Coptic Christians. Coptic philosophy professor Rafiq Habib has been selected as the party’s vice-president for foreign affairs.

"We didn’t appoint Habib simply because he’s a Christian, but because of the intellectual weight he brings to the party," said al-Kitatni. The appointment, he added, "confirms that the Brotherhood has no objection to Christians assuming ranking positions within the party."

In line with a newly enacted law that expressly prohibits political parties based on religion, Brotherhood officials are adamant that Freedom and Justice is not a religious party per se. Rather, they say, the party will merely "use the principles of Islamic Law as a chief reference" – not unlike Egypt’s constitution, they note, which declares Islamic jurisprudence to be "the principle source of legislation."

"All parties have their respective systems and ?mindsets: some are liberal, socialist or leftist," party president-to-be Mohamed Mursi said on May 17. "The Freedom and Justice ?Party is a civic party led by Islamic principles."

He added: "Any Egyptian ?can join except those who belonged to the dismantled NDP."?

Tellingly, the party plans to scrap the Brotherhood’s traditional motto, "Islam is the solution" in favour of "Freedom is the solution and justice the application (of freedom)."

Some critics, however, accuse the Brotherhood of exploiting its religious aura to score political gains in Egypt’s newly-liberated electoral process, at the possible expense of minority groups such as Egypt’s Christian community (estimated at roughly 10 percent of the country’s population of 85 million).

"The Brotherhood is using religion to promote a political agenda," said Fahmi. "This contradicts the basic tenets of democracy and could lead to sectarian dissension."

The presence of a Coptic-Christian in the Freedom and Justice Party’s upper echelons, he added, was "merely cosmetic."

Abdel Menaam Mounib, prominent Egyptian journalist and expert in Islamist movements, disagreed.

"The application of Islamic principles would provide Egypt’s Christian minority with more rights than they had during the Mubarak era," Mounib told IPS. "Aggression against churches, for example, or any place of worship, is completely proscribed under Islamic Law."

In an effort to allay fears that the group aimed at sweeping upcoming elections, Brotherhood officials have said the new party would only field candidates for half of the seats in parliament. The group has also vowed to refrain from fielding a candidate in upcoming presidential elections.

Fahmi, for his part, says such fears are unfounded. He believes both the Brotherhood’s power and popularity have been widely exaggerated, particularly by the media.

"I can’t see the Freedom and Justice Party capturing more than a quarter of the seats in parliament," he said. "I doubt that all of Egypt’s Islamist parties combined could manage to win an outright majority."

Mounib, however, again disagreed, predicting that newly established Islamist-oriented parties would register historic gains in Egypt’s first-ever free parliamentary races.

"Six Islamist movements, including the Brotherhood, are currently in the process of establishing parties," he said. "Given their strong grassroots support and ability to mobilise, they could together capture as much as 70 percent of the seats in parliament."

Elections for Egypt’s 518-seat parliament are slated for September. Presidential elections are expected to be held four months later at most, according to the ruling SCAF.

All rights reserved, IPS – Inter Press Service, 2011.

This article may not be republished, broadcast, framed, or redistributed without the written permission of IPS – Inter Press Service. Republication of this material without permission from IPS, the copyright holder, constitutes a violation of United States and international copyright laws and may result in legal action.


Filed Under: Middle East, Politics, Religion, Report Tagged With:

OP-ED: The Sacred and the Secular – Promoting Muslim Democracy

May 26, 2011 by

Global Geopolitics & Political Economy / IPS

By Asef Bayat*

CHICAGO, May 26, 2011 (IPS) – The presence of religion in public space challenges our ideas about the roles of faith in our lives and politics. Over the last centuries, proponents of secularisation have claimed that as societies modernise, the role of religion in public and private life diminishes. For them, modern rationality, science, and the ideal of representative governments as sovereign replace religion as a source of authority, regulation, and security.

But a new claim is that religion is necessary for us today, not despite modernity, but precisely because of it. Religion is required in the public space, it is argued, because only faith can amend the deficits and alleviate the pain caused by modern life.

Since the 1970s, the secularisation thesis has been forced onto the defensive as a tide of religiosity – often "fundamentalist" in nature – gained renewed influence in the major traditions, including Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, and Judaism. Religion has thus returned to overtly public and political matters.

But how closely can sacred teachings inform politics and governance? The prism of the Muslim Middle East shows how the public role of religion has varied over time. In the late 19th century Middle East, several religious movements emerged in response to Islam’s encounter with the European colonial conquest and modernity. Traditionalists such as Wahabis sought to preserve their culturally specific Islamic heritage.

The modernist trend, spearheaded by cosmopolitan leaders such as Jamal eddin Afghani and Mohammad Abdou, advocated an evolving Islam that would coexist and flourish within this emerging modernity. And some people demanded separating Islam from the state entirely.

Middle East Muslim public life has for over a century been the site of rivalry between a minority wanting to entirely secularise their societies, and Islamic traditionalist or fundamentalists, who oppose many modern ideas and civil institutions. Meanwhile, the majority of ordinary people have tried in their daily lives to marry their modern aspirations for basic rights and better material lives with their religious traditions.

The 1970s brought revived and aggressive religious engagement in society and politics. Iran’s Islamic Revolution of 1979 bolstered a new global era of religious politics in the Middle East and beyond by offering a tangible model of Islamic rule. That same year, Islamic militants seized the Grand Mosque of Mecca in a failed effort to dislodge the Saudi rulers.

The shocking assault spurred radicalisation and accelerated the rivalry between Wahabi and Salafi trends. By the mid-1990s, the public space in the Middle East was dominated by Islamic movements, institutions, and sensibilities – in mosques, media, NGOs, education apparatus, judiciary, and in the streets. More concretely, religious groups in the Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, and Iran ruled through Islamic states.

But the realisation of an Islamic state carries within it contradictory seeds of its own decline. History has shown that religious states of any faith inevitably lead to the secularisation of theology, for leaders, religious or not, must respond to day-to- day exigencies of governance. Sacred injunctions are bent, revised, or cast aside to accommodate the requisites of governance or merely to justify power.

As in Iran, authorities will ignore laws, including the constitution, or proscribe people’s religious obligations, if such is deemed necessary to secure the "religious" state. Religion thus descends from the height of devotion and spirituality to be a pliable instrument to serve secular objectives.

Cynical secularisation of the sacred by the "Islamic" states is alienating many Muslim citizens. Secular, faithful, and even many members of the ulema (Muslim spiritual leaders) have pleaded for the separation of religion from the state, in order to restore both the sanctity of religion and the rationality of the state. Most of them are seeking a post-Islamist trajectory where faith is merged with freedom and Islam with democracy, in which a civil democratic state can work within a pious society.

Examples in the Muslim world, from Indonesia’s Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) to Morocco’s Justice and Development Party, as well as the current "Arab Spring," are pointing toward post-Islamist polities.

For Muslim societies, not modernizing is no longer an option. Only a secular democratic state respecting basic human rights for all can provide good and modern governance for the faithful and the secular alike. Under a secular democratic state religion can flourish while non-religious people and religious minorities remain secure.

*Asef Bayat is a Professor of Sociology and Middle East Studies, University of Illinois. His latest book, "Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East" (2010), is published by Stanford University Press.

This article is part of the series "Religion, Politics & the Public Space" in collaboration with the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations and its Global Experts project (www.theglobalexperts.org) .

The views expressed in these articles are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect those of the United Nation Alliance of Civilizations or of the institutions to which the authors are affiliated.

All rights reserved, IPS – Inter Press Service, 2011.

This article may not be republished, broadcast, framed, or redistributed without the written permission of IPS – Inter Press Service. Republication of this material without permission from IPS, the copyright holder, constitutes a violation of United States and international copyright laws and may result in legal action.


Filed Under: Middle East, Opinion, Politics, Religion Tagged With:

OP-ED: Iran’s Greatest Spiritual Leader

May 23, 2011 by

Global Geopolitics & Political Economy / IPS

By Melody Moezzi*

ATLANTA, Georgia, May 23, 2011 (IPS) – Iran’s officially recognised "spiritual leader" today may be Ayatollah Khamenei, but for hundreds of years before the current establishment of mullahs and ayatollahs, Iranians of all creeds have looked to another spiritual leader: Jalal ad- Din Rumi.

While this 13th century Persian Sufi poet is known in much of the West as "Rumi", he is referred to more affectionately in Iran as "Mowlaana", or the Master. Among Iranians, he is a spiritual guide and guru whose words hold unmatched moral authority. Over 700 years after his death, it is nearly impossible to spend a day walking around any Iranian city, suburb or village and not hear his echo.

His words live on in everyday parlance – no matter one’s station, religion or occupation, everyone in Iran knows at least a handful of Rumi’s poems by heart. They are taught in classrooms as an essential part of the basic curriculum, but more than that, they are learned in homes, cafes, bazaars, parks and houses of worship. No place is beyond this poet’s influence.

And there is no better way to understand that influence than through Rumi’s own verse, although it often defies easy translation. Still, English speakers have a wonderful resource in understanding Rumi – and Iran – through the translations of Coleman Barks, including the following:

"Today, like every other day, we wake up empty and frightened. Don’t open the door to the study and begin reading. Take down a musical instrument. Let the beauty we love be what we do. There are hundreds of ways to kneel and kiss the ground."

Understand this poem, and you will understand the soul of Iran – not just the role of religion or dogma, but the spiritual role of faith, love and beauty.

While Iran is a Muslim majority country and Shi’ism is the official state religion, Iran is not defined by Islam. Rather, it is defined by its peoples, who are Muslims, Jews, Baha’is, Christians, Agnostics and Atheists. Iran is the birthplace of two of the world’s great religions: Zoroastrianism and Baha’ism. It is home to millions of Muslims, but also to the largest Jewish population in any Muslim majority country. So, Iranians know very well that there are at least hundreds of ways to kneel and kiss the ground.

Nevertheless, the Iranian regime maintains an intractable identification with its interpretation of Islam, and as such, it has played a strong role in shaping the Iranian people’s view of both Islam and of religion in general. Because of the regime’s use and perversion of Islam for political purposes, many Iranians have been turned off by religion – especially among the youth who represent the vast majority of the population.

As young Iranians, we have seen the government’s persecution of Baha’is and Jews and its failure to provide equal rights to women, and we realise that this regime has forgotten its roots. It has forgotten the words of the great Master, Mowlaana. Instead of taking down a musical instrument to treat the fear, despair and emptiness that have consumed so many young Iranians (particularly since the 2009 elections), Iran’s leaders have brought out batons, bullets and teargas.

As a result, people have continued to turn away from organised religion, particularly from Islam, because they have seen how the regime is manipulating their faith to oppress the populace and suppress dissent.

Nevertheless, there is a spiritual unity in this growing collective repugnance for religion – it is encouraging us to unite as Iranians of all backgrounds and beliefs under the most basic and universal spiritual teachings that Rumi and other Sufi poets captured so brilliantly: the notion that music, art, poetry, and above all, love are our greatest spiritual resources.

In Iran, such resources are more abundant than oil, saffron and pistachios combined, and they represent the truest faith of the masses.

*Melody Moezzi is a lawyer, columnist and activist based in the United States and Iran.

This article is part of the series "Religion, Politics & the Public Space" in collaboration with the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations and its Global Experts project (www.theglobalexperts.org).

The views expressed in these articles are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect those of the United Nation Alliance of Civilizations or of the institutions to which the authors are affiliated.

All rights reserved, IPS – Inter Press Service, 2011.

This article may not be republished, broadcast, framed, or redistributed without the written permission of IPS – Inter Press Service. Republication of this material without permission from IPS, the copyright holder, constitutes a violation of United States and international copyright laws and may result in legal action.


Filed Under: Culture, History, Opinion, Religion Tagged With: , , , , ,

NIGERIA: Uneasy Finale to General Elections

April 26, 2011 by

Global Geopolitics & Political Economy / IPS

By Mustapha Muhammad

KANO, Apr 25 (IPS) – Nigerians will return to the polls Tuesday to elect state legislators and governors. Government at this level plays a key role in delivering services and infrastructure, but in northern states the choice of credible leaders could be overshadowed by lingering anger over the Apr. 16 presidential election.

Tensions boiled over across the north last week following the announcement of results of the presidential poll. The incumbent president, Goodluck Jonathan, won 57 percent of votes cast, against 31 percent for his main rival, Muhammadu Buhari of the Congress for Progressive Change party.

Buhari, a former military ruler who won a majority of votes in the strongly-Muslim north of the country, accused Jonathan’s People’s Democratic Party (PDP) of rigging the elections. Across the north, his supporters took to the streets in protest, attacking candidates and supporters of Jonathan’s People’s Democratic Party.

The 2011 presidential contest, like every one before it, ended up framed as one between Christians and Muslims, and as well as attacking the homes and offices of PDP candidates, rioters in some places also targeted churches and members of southern ethnic groups.

In urban and rural areas alike, people barricaded themselves in their homes for safety. The Kaduna-based NGO Civil Rights Congress put the death toll across the north at 200, with many thousands more injured. The targeting of members of Nigeria’s National Youth Service Corps (a one-year posting of university graduates to serve) who had served as election monitors has become a particularly sore talking point in national media.

A curfew and a heavy military presence imposed an uneasy calm, but fears of further violence have forced the postponement of Apr. 26 state-level elections in two of the country’s 36 states, Bauchi and Kaduna.

The northern state of Kano – the nation’s most populous, with an estimated 10 million inhabitants – was not exempt from post-election violence. Angry mobs barricaded major intersections across the city on Apr. 18, shutting down traffic; presumed PDP supporters were chased through the streets, and extensive property was damaged.

According to Musa Abdullahi, who heads the Red Cross in Kano, seven people died in the state capital alone and over 70 others were injured. A guest house and a factory belonging to Sule Lamido, the governor of neighbouring Jigawa State and a strong supporter of Goodluck Jonathan, were burnt to the ground.

The gubernatorial candidates for the PDP in Kano and other northern states may face stiff opposition from angry supporters of Buhari seeking a revenge vote against defeat in the presidential polls. The party’s candidate in Kano has undertaken a massive campaign in local media to distance himself from personal animosity towards the national party.

“People are now voting for a person not a party,” PDP publicity committee chairman Dan Saran Kano Gambo told IPS. “Voters search for credible leaders not a party.”

One of the key issues on which would-be state governors are seeking to establish credibility is over the provision of adequate supplies of clean water.

According to Nigerian health authorities, last year was the second-worst in two decades for cholera; 38,000 cases and more than 1,500 deaths were recorded nation-wide.

“Shortages and contamination of drinking water as well as poor sanitation are the major causes of disease in our society,” said Nasir Muhammad, an epidemiologist in Kano.

Indications are that 2011 could be another challenging year for Kano State. The incidence of cholera and other waterborne diseases usually peaks towards the end of the rainy season in September or October, but more than 100 cases had been recorded in the capital city alone by February; the state commissioner for health, Aishatu Isyaku Kiru, told reporters a single hospital – the capital’s Infectious Diseases Hospital – had treated 30 cases and urged the public to be diligent over public hygiene.

But this is easier said than done, with evidence of the city’s inadequate water infrastructure visible in the streets every day. Water vendors push heavily-loaded carts through Kano neighbourhoods unreached by pipe-borne water.

Shortages are a major concern for residents of Kano, a commercial hub with a history dating back to the seventh century. A rapidly growing population thanks to an influx of traders and migrants from other northern Nigerian states and neighbouring countries has compounded the water problem.

According to the head of Kano’s water supply agency, Yahaya Bala Karaye, Kano’s two major water works – Chalawa and the newer Tamburawa plant completed in 2010 – have a combined installed production capacity of 350 million litres per day. The city needs an estimated 500 million litres daily, and the water works produce far less than their installed capacity due to frequent power outages.

In the state’s smaller towns and villages, access to water is even worse, and candidates for state governor all promise to make it an urgent priority if elected.

Kano has been governed for nearly eight years by the All Nigeria Peoples Party. On the campaign trail, ANPP candidate Salihu Sagir Takai promised to solve electricity supply problems that limit the output of the City of Kano’s water treatment plants by means of an independent power producer contract.

Water was also on the campaign agenda of the PDP’s gubernatorial candidate, Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso, who governed Kano between 1999 and 2003. “I will definitely revive and improve water supply in Kano tremendously and make the menace [of inadequate water] history if elected the next governor.”

The ANPP did poorly in legislative elections held on Apr. 9, winning eight seats in the National House of Representatives and a single seat in the Senate, against the PDP which elected 12 national representatives and two senators.

A potential backlash against the PDP in the north could reverse this if Kwankwaso faces problems linked to the presidential result.

Regardless of who wins election to state house, the country’s new governors, legislators and president will face a daunting task handling the aftermath of electoral violence, dealing with other violent conflict in the country, and addressing urgent development needs.

All rights reserved, IPS – Inter Press Service, 2011.

This article may not be republished, broadcast, framed, or redistributed without the written permission of IPS – Inter Press Service. Republication of this material without permission from IPS, the copyright holder, constitutes a violation of United States and international copyright laws and may result in legal action.


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ECUADOR: Catholics Demand Removal of Far-Right Bishop

March 26, 2011 by

Global Geopolitics & Political Economy / IPS

By Gonzalo Ortiz

NUEVA LOJA, Ecuador, Mar 25, 2011 (IPS) – The appointment of an ultra-conservative priest as apostolic administrator of the diocese of Sucumbíos, in northeastern Ecuador, triggered open rebellion among a large proportion of the area’s Catholics, with the support of civil society organisations and even of President Rafael Correa himself.

The crisis within the Catholic community, which is numerous and influential in this Amazonian province, has stirred up street demonstrations by detractors and partisans of Rafael Ibarguren Schindler, a leading member of the Heralds of the Gospel, a papally-approved far-right Catholic order.

The priest, born in Argentina in 1952 and ordained in 2005, was appointed apostolic vicar of San Miguel de Sucumbíos Oct. 30, 2010, as a temporary replacement for outgoing bishop Gonzalo López Marañón, who was highly respected for the social projects he carried out locally for over 40 years until he resigned at 75, the mandatory retirement age under Church rules.

The Vatican’s decision added fresh controversy to the buzzing provincial capital, Nueva Loja, which is not only the centre of the Ecuadorian oil industry but also a strategic crossover point for refugees and even undercover guerrillas from civil war-torn Colombia, as it is only 18 kilometres from the Colombian border.

The city had already drawn international attention because of the historic Feb. 14 verdict by judge Nicolás Zambrano of the Sucumbíos Provincial Court, who ordered multinational oil giant Chevron to pay 9.5 billion dollars for environmental damage, the largest fine ever imposed on an oil company for pollution. Both sides have appealed the decision.

The popular reaction against Ibarguren Schindler led President Correa, a self-declared "leftwing Catholic," to say he might even veto the appointment, under a clause of the Modus Vivendi, the 1937 treaty between Ecuador and the Vatican that regulates relations between the Catholic Church and the state.

"In the months since the Heralds of the Gospel and the new administrator took over, they have shown that they are determined to wipe out the whole pastoral ministry that was built up over 40 years in Sucumbíos," Maritza López, secretary of the ISAMIS Assembly, a body created by López Marañón which is being ignored by the new authorities, told IPS.

The Assembly of the Church of San Miguel de Sucumbíos (ISAMIS) is made up of 120 delegates from basic ecclesial communities (small Christian communities, the cells of the Church), pastoral workers, members of missionary orders, diocesan clergy and provincial social organisations. It operates as a sort of democratic parliament of the region’s Catholic community.

"The founder of the Heralds was an active member and secretary of the ultra-rightwing Tradition, Family and Property, an association formed (in Brazil) to oppose the left and defend private property against the agrarian reform that was making headway throughout Latin America in the 1960s," said Maritza López.

In January, by an 80 percent majority, the ISAMIS Assembly voted to ask for Ibarguren Schindler’s resignation.

Since then, the controversy has grown steadily. Members of ISAMIS, who have been holding a vigil since January, started a hunger strike on Sunday Mar. 20 to demand the removal of the apostolic administrator. Meanwhile, Ibarguren Schindler and eight other priests of the Heralds order are seeking support from those who question the social projects promoted by bishop López Marañóñ.

"One of the things they do is to go out and celebrate open-air masses for the oil companies, but they won’t agree to carry forward the pastoral plan that has already been approved, nor will they engage in dialogue with the ISAMIS Assembly," Felisa de Moncayo told IPS.

In contrast, bishop López Marañón "was one of us, alongside us, and would subject new initiatives and appointments to discussion," she said.

On Mar. 9, Correa stressed that Ecuador is a secular state, which means it respects religious freedom. But he rejected "wiping out the presence of the Discalced Carmelites in Sucumbíos, at the stroke of a pen, and handing over the province to the Heralds of the Gospel, against the opinion of the Catholic base communities."

He was speaking at a ceremony in Quito where he decorated López Marañón for his distinguished work on behalf of the poor and his defence of human rights during his four decades as bishop of Sucumbíos, as well as his work in education, health and other areas.

The Discalced Carmelites, to which the former bishop of Sucumbíos belongs, has worked in the Amazon jungle region for decades. Among its members are some of Ecuador’s most distinguished progressive church leaders, such as Alberto Luna Tobar, who with others like Leonidas Proaño was actively committed to the cause of the poor in the country.

The president said the missionary work of López Marañón was a lasting contribution, and that he was one of those Christians who would give their life for the gospel. "He fought the oil companies in order to defend life in all its forms," he said.

"We do not want futile confrontations or controversies, still less with the Bishops’ Conference, but I wish to tell you that the treaty regulating relations between the secular state of Ecuador and the Vatican permits us to veto the nomination of any bishop," he said.

"This power has never been used; let us not be obliged to use it now. But if an absurd fundamentalism brings to our Amazonian province orders that emphasise ritual and moral fundamentalism, and wear medieval robes in the middle of the jungle, we will have to use the power vested in us by the Modus Vivendi treaty," he warned.

The "medieval robes" he referred to are the habits worn by the Heralds of the Gospel: knee-length black riding boots, a white cassock with a large brown scapular, bearing a half white, half red cross extending from neck to hem with arms in the shape of fleurs-de-lys. The order, recognised in 2001 by the Pope, lives by a military as well as a religious discipline.

The head of Ecuador’s Bishops’ Conference, Antonio Arregui, responded to the president’s words, indicating it would be a totally unheard-of precedent, in this day and age, for the state to interfere with the appointment of bishops.

Arregui, the archbishop of Guayaquil, said the Modus Vivendi expressly recognised that the appointment of bishops is the Pope’s prerogative.

In what was seen as a conciliatory move, the Vatican announced on Mar. 19 the appointment of the Ecuadorian bishop of Guaranda, Ángel Polibio Sánchez, as apostolic delegate in Sucumbíos, to represent the Vatican in legal matters and government relations.

"We are pleased by this development, but we would like to see the precise scope of this appointment," said the interim Foreign Minister, Kintto Lucas.

He was well advised to be cautious, as it was later clarified that Ibarguren Schindler would not be withdrawn from his apostolic administrator position, and Sánchez’s appointment merely sought to place an Ecuadorian as representative to the Justice Ministry, which also deals with religion and has refused to formally register the appointment of Ibarguren Schindler.

All rights reserved, IPS – Inter Press Service, 2011.

This article may not be republished, broadcast, framed, or redistributed without the written permission of IPS – Inter Press Service. Republication of this material without permission from IPS, the copyright holder, constitutes a violation of United States and international copyright laws and may result in legal action.


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Muslim Brotherhood Goes Mainstream in Egypt

March 20, 2011 by

Global Geopolitics & Political Economy / IPS

By Adam Morrow and Khaled Moussa al-Omrani

CAIRO, Mar 20, 2011 (IPS) – Egyptians voted in a nationwide referendum yesterday on proposed amendments to the constitutional articles that govern the electoral process. But regardless of the outcome, political analysts are certain that the Muslim Brotherhood, outlawed throughout the 30-year rule of ousted president Hosni Mubarak, remains poised to be an electoral force to be reckoned with.

"Despite three decades of repression at the hands of the Mubarak regime, the Muslim Brotherhood represents the primary player in Egypt’s post-revolutionary political arena," Tarek Fahmi, political science professor at Cairo University, told IPS. "For the first time since its establishment, the brotherhood has an opportunity to come to power via a free and fair electoral process."

On February 11, Mubarak handed executive authority over to Egypt’s armed forces. In the five weeks since, the military — which has vowed to run the nation’s affairs until free presidential and parliamentary elections can be held — has met a number of the people’s demands, including the replacement of most Mubarak-appointed government ministers.

Within days of Mubarak’s departure, the Muslim Brotherhood announced plans to establish an official political party. Despite the significant popular support it has traditionally enjoyed, the brotherhood — established in 1928 and formally banned by the state in 1954 — has never existed in Egypt as an official political party.

"As soon as changes are made to Egypt’s Political Parties Law, we plan to apply for the establishment of a political party," Mohamed Saad al-Kitatni, head of the brotherhood’s parliamentary bloc from 2005 to 2010, said on February 18.

In the first-ever appearance by a member of the group on state television, al-Kitatni stressed that the brotherhood stands for a civil, rather than theocratic, system of governance. "We want a civil state based on Islamic Law and principles such as freedom of thought, justice for all, and equality before the law regardless of race, gender or religion," he said.

Al-Kitatni went on to say that the group would not field a candidate in upcoming presidential elections, nor would it seek to capture a large majority in parliament.

"We don’t want to give our domestic rivals or our foreign critics any reason to fear us," he said. "We want to compete fairly with other political movements, which we know were also oppressed under the Mubarak regime."

Three days after al-Kitatni’s televised comments, brotherhood leader Mohamed Badie formally announced plans to found a political party, to be dubbed the Justice and Freedom Party. While sharing many of the same members and political objectives as the brotherhood, he explained, the new party would constitute a separate organisational entity.

Badie has meanwhile mandated leading brotherhood member Khairet al-Shatter with determining the means of coordinating between the brotherhood and the new party. Al-Shatter was recently appointed to the group’s number-two position after finishing a four-year prison sentence at the hands of the Mubarak regime.

But many of the brotherhood’s critics remain concerned by the fact that the group has yet to articulate its official position on a handful of key issues. In early 2008, the brotherhood unveiled a preliminary political programme, but later retracted it following the eruption of controversy over its stance on, among other things, the permissibility of fielding female or non-Muslim presidential candidates.

"Some segments of the Egyptian public remain suspicious of the brotherhood due to its ambiguous position vis-à-vis the role of Christians and women in the political arena," said Fahmi. "Why has it taken the group so long to produce an official party platform? The brotherhood must provide a clear explanation of its stance on major issues and hold open dialogue with opposition figures and church leaders."

Last month, the brotherhood drew up a committee tasked with formulating the proposed Justice and Freedom Party’s official political agenda. On March 16, independent Egyptian daily Al-Shorouk quoted a member of the committee as saying that the new party’s official program "would be issued as soon as it is finalised."

Notably, the same source said the committee had "agreed to drop a number of controversial articles that had been included in the Muslim Brotherhood’s earlier proposed party platform, especially those stipulating that any presidential candidate fielded by the party must be a Muslim man."

Meanwhile, some western critics have also voiced concern that, were the Muslim Brotherhood to eventually assume power, it might be tempted to withdraw from the 1979 Camp David peace agreement between Egypt and Israel.

Muslim Brotherhood spokesman Essam al-Arian, however, insisted that any change in Egyptian foreign policy would reflect the will of the Egyptian people. "The coming parliament, which will be elected by the people, will decide Egypt’s position regarding all international agreements and treaties," al-Arian told IPS.

Fahmi, for his part, believes the brotherhood’s newfound political legitimacy will lead to "the formulation of a new foreign policy that can be expected to reinvigorate Egypt’s historical role as regional leader — a role that was largely destroyed by the Mubarak regime’s close relationship with the US and Israel."

"The Hamas-run Gaza Strip, to cite only one example, was viewed largely by the Mubarak regime as a strategic threat," Fahmi added. "But if the brotherhood is granted political legitimacy, Gaza will come to be seen as Egypt’s first line of defence in the confrontation with Israel."

All rights reserved, IPS – Inter Press Service, 2011.

This article may not be republished, broadcast, framed, or redistributed without the written permission of IPS – Inter Press Service. Republication of this material without permission from IPS, the copyright holder, constitutes a violation of United States and international copyright laws and may result in legal action.


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BAHRAIN: ON THE SECTARIAN RAZOR’S EDGE

March 16, 2011 by

Global Geopolitics & Political Economy

B.RAMAN

Bahrain, a Shia majority State ruled by a Sunni family, is on the sectarian razor’s edge following the entry of about 2000 troops  from the member-States of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) into Bahrain in the early hours of the morning of March 14,2011, to guard the banking district and vital installations. One thousand of these troops with 150 armoured personnel carriers have reportedly  come from Saudi Arabia, about 500 from the United Arab Emirates and the remaining from other GCC States. Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates are the members of the GCC.

2. The pro-reform protesters, largely Shias, who had been demonstrating for the last five weeks mainly in the Pearl Roundabout area, moved for the first time into the banking district on March  13. There were violent clashes between the police and the protesters when the police prevented them from occupying the banking district, resulting in injuries to a large number of persons.

3. The move of the demonstrators to the banking district created nervousness and panic in the Government which saw it as the beginning of an attempt by the demonstrators to attack economic targets and paralyse the economy. The local  security agencies saw it as a move which was not spontaneous, but had been instigated by Iran through its contacts in the local Shia population.

4. An emergency request for help was sent to the GCC Secretariat and there was an immediate positive response. The Government has stated that the troops of the GCC countries would be used mainly for static physical security duties to guard vital installations and the economic infrastructure and that they would not be used for law and order duties which might bring them into a confrontational situation with the Shia population.

5. What would be the nature of the command and control over the GCC troops is not yet clear. Will they operate autonomously and if so, under whose command? Or will they operate under the command of the Bahrain Army?

6. The Shia protesters have projected the GCC troops who have taken up position in Bahrain as an army of occupation. Nabeel Rajab, from the Bahrain Centre for Human Rights, told Al Jazeera that the Saudi troops would be opposed by the protesters. "This is an internal issue and we will consider it as an occupation," he said. "This step is not welcomed by Bahrainis. This move is not acceptable at all. It is a repressive regime supported by another repressive regime." There is limited likelihood of clashes between the GCC troops and the pro-reform protesters so long as the GCC troops keep themselves confined to their static physical security duties.

7. The Shia demonstrators for democracy and political reforms have till now been avoiding a projection of their movement as a confrontation between the Shia population and the Sunni rulers and their security forces. The deployment of the Sunni forces from outside Bahrain for the physical security of vital installations threatens to give it the colour of the Shias of Bahrain being suppressed  by the forces of the Sunni rulers of the region.

8. Calls for regional Shia solidarity with fellow Shias in Bahrain  sought to be suppressed by foreign Sunni forces could lead to a pan-Gulf Shia unrest in the eastern region of Saudi Arabia, in Kuwait and the UAE, with the Shia protesters looking up to Iran even more than till now for guidance and help.

9. There have been only proforma expressions of concern from the US and other Western countries to the entry of the GCC troops into Bahrain. A statement from the White House spokesman Tommy Vietor  said: "We urge our GCC partners to show restraint and respect the rights of the people of Bahrain, and to act in a way that supports dialogue instead of undermining it." At the same time, the Western countries have reasons to be worried that Iran might turn out to be the ultimate beneficiary of any pan-Gulf Shia unrest. If the Shia unrest gets aggravated, what would be the impact on the Shias of Pakistan, who constitute about 20 per cent of the population? ( 15-3-11)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )

Copyright © 2011 B. Raman – South Asia Analysis Group (SAAG).

This article may not be republished, broadcast, framed, or redistributed without the permission of the original author or copyright holder.


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