XI JINPING ON SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS

Global Geopolitics & Political Economy

B.RAMAN

In his first visit abroad as the President of China since assuming office on March 14,2013, Mr.Xi Jinping is scheduled to visit Russia, Tanzania, South Africa and the Republic of Congo from March 22-30 and attend the fifth BRICS( Brazil,Russia,India,China and South Africa) summit on March 26-27 in Durban, South Africa. In the margins of the summit, he is scheduled to have bilateral talks with Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh.

2. The PLA Daily of March 21 has carried a report disseminated by the official Xinhua news agency the previous day on an interaction which Xi had before his visit with representatives of the Chinese media as well as media representatives of the BRICS countries based in Beijing.

3.In addition to Xi’s views on the importance of BRICs as an economic co-operation organization, the Xinhua report as published by the PLA Daily highlights the views expressed by Xi on Sino-Indian relations.

4. To quote from the Xinhua report as published by the PLA Daily:

“On Sino-Indian ties, Xi said, to jointly follow a path of peaceful development and development through cooperation not only meets the common interests of China and India, the two largest developing countries in the world, but also does a great service to Asia and the world at large.

“Speaking highly of the important headway in bilateral ties in recent years thanks to concerted efforts of the two sides, Xi urged both countries that are pursuing development at a faster pace to seize the opportunities and take solid steps to bolster cooperation and exchanges in all fields, accommodate each other’s core concerns and properly handle their problems and differences.

“On the boundary problem, Xi said it is a complex issue left from history, and solving the issue won’t be easy. But he said he believes “as long as we keep up our friendly consultations, we can eventually arrive at a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable settlement.”

“Pending the final settlement of the boundary question, the two sides should work together to maintain peace and tranquility in border areas and prevent the boundary question from affecting the overall development of bilateral relations,” the President added.”

5. Two significant points in his observations need to be underlined. Firstly, he talks of China’s “core concerns” vis-à-vis India and not core interests. Xi and other Chinese leaders talk of “core interests and major concerns” when they talk of China’s relations with the US, Japan and the ASEAN countries. When they talk of core interests and major concerns, they have in mind Taiwan and sovereignty issues relating to the islands in the South and East China Seas.

6. While Xi has not spelt out what are the core concerns of China vis-à-vis India, one could assess that these probably relate to the activities of the Government-in-exile of His Holiness the Dalai Lama from Indian territory, China’s sovereignty claims relating to Arunachal Pradesh and India’s strategic relations with Vietnam and Japan.

7. Of late, the Chinese have been accusing the Dalai Lama’s set-up of orchestrating the self-immolations

English: Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh,...

English: Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, left, and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao shake hands after a signing ceremony held at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing Monday, Jan. 14, 2008. Singh called for expanding business opportunities with China in construction, education, financial services, and tourism in a speech Monday to business executives at the start of a state visit (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

in the Tibetan areas of China. It is likely that the reported revival of the activities of the Tibetan Youth League (TYC) and other pro-independence elements in the Tibetan diaspora in the West could be interpreted by Beijing as adding to its concerns.

8.Even though the Chinese have not openly taken up these issues, the likely impact of the Chinese concerns on this subject on our bilateral relations with China has to be continuously monitored and assessed.

9. As I had pointed out in the past, the Chinese attitude on the border dispute with India has been less confrontational than their territorial sovereignty-related disputes with Japan and the ASEAN countries, particularly Vietnam. In the case of India, they have accepted over the years “mutual accommodation” as one of the principles that should be followed in any border settlement. While they are prepared for mutual accommodation in a border settlement with India, they never talk of mutual accommodation in their disputes with Japan and the ASEAN countries. It is this Chinese acceptance of mutual accommodation with India that should explain the absence of rhetoric when they talk of the border dispute with India as contrasted with the rhetoric in their statements on the South and East China Seas.

10.China’s nuanced policy in matters relating to sovereignty disputes with India is evident from Xi’s recognition of the border issue as a complex problem on which the two countries should keep negotiating while maintaining peace and tranquility across the border and without allowing the dispute to affect the over-all development of the bilateral relations.

11. This is a formulation with` which India need have no quarrel. Neither India nor China has been transparent on the progress in the border talks. As a result, one does not know where the two countries are stuck up. The conventional belief is that the lack of progress is due to India’s opposition to China’s demand for the transfer of Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh to China.

12. In the absence of details regarding the present stage of the talks, there has been no contribution by the non-governmental community of analysts to the search for options to find a compromise solution. There is a need for the two Governments to be more forthcoming on the border talks so that the search for a compromise solution could be intensified. Ultimately, public and political opinion in India has to accept a border settlement .Keeping them in the picture will facilitate this. Since India too has accepted the principle of mutual accommodation, a compromise has to be found which will not seriously affect the national interests of the two countries. Why not the two Governments appoint a small core group of non-Governmental experts from the two countries to come up with alternate ideas that could be mutually acceptable?

13. On the question of China’s core concerns regarding India’s strategic relations with Vietnam and Japan, there is no reason for India to be defensive or apologetic about them. India’s relations with Vietnam and Japan do not pose a threat to China whereas the increasing presence of the Chinese Army in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) and Gilgit-Baltistan and of the Chinese Navy in Gwadar in Balochistan do pose a threat to India’s security. The Chinese have been indifferent to India’s core concerns on this. There is no reason for India to be sensitive to Chinese concerns regarding its relations with Vietnam and Japan. (21-3-13)

( The writer is Additional Secretary ( retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre for China Studies. Twitter: @SORBONNE75)

Copyright © 2013 B. Raman.

This article may not be republished, broadcast, framed, or redistributed without the permission of the original author or copyright holder.

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Obama Administration Reveals Deep Divisions on Syria Policy

Global Geopolitics & Political Economy / IPS

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A resident of Aleppo in the midst of buildings damaged by an airstrike from President Bashar al-Assad’s forces. Credit: Zak Brophy/IPS

By Samer Araabi

WASHINGTON, Feb 14 (IPS) – Though President Barack Obama has been reticent to involve his administration too deeply in the Syrian uprising, revelations over the past week have shown near-unanimous agreement among the president’s top national security advisors for greater military intervention.A New York Times story last week uncovered a strategy by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and CIA Director David Petraeus to directly involve the U.S. in arming and supporting the Syrian rebels, in order to have a more direct influence on the course of events in the war-torn country.

The following week, during congressional testimony on the Benghazi embassy attacks, former Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey both professed similar support for the idea of arming Syrian rebels. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper is also said to have backed the plan.

The revelations paint a very different picture from the official narrative of the Obama administration, which has remained publicly sceptical of the idea of providing weapons to unknown militant groups operating in Syria.[pullquote]3[/pullquote]

“The U.S. long ago accepted the strategy of supporting insurgents as a way to counter the Assad regime or at least to appear to be doing something about Syria,” Leila Hilal, director of the Middle East Task Force for the New America Foundation, told IPS.

“Even if full-scale military support was not mobilised earlier, steps were taken to allow others to arm rebels. The indirect approach failed to turn the conflict and undermined the revolution.”

Foreign policy analysts have jumped to widely different conclusions about the disparate opinions of the president on one hand, his senior national security staff – the secretary of state, the secretary of defence, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, and director of the CIA – on the other.

Writing for the Council on Foreign Relations, Elliott Abrams refers to the president’s decision as “tragically wrong", and states that “one cannot escape the conclusion that electoral politics played a role” in ignoring the advice of his national security team.

Joshua Landis, associate professor at the University of Oklahoma and proprietor of the widely-read blog Syria Comment, disagrees.

“Obama doesn’t seem to agree with the prevailing interests in Washington, and the way they want to formulate our Middle East policy,” he told IPS.

Landis claims that instead of being influenced by the cabinet’s push for more involvement, “that’s a driver for him for staying out of Syria, because he knows powerful interests will quickly weigh in if we get involved there. He doesn’t seem to trust our Middle East policy-making apparatus.”

Pressed further on the question, General Dempsey clarified later in the week that he supported arming the Syrian opposition “conceptually", noting that “there were enormous complexities involved that we still haven’t resolved.”

The interventionists’ plan was further undermined by a study within the CIA itself, where a team of intelligence analysts concluded that the influx of U.S. arms would not “materially” affect the situation on the ground.

Landis also cautioned that “the proposals put in front of (Obama) don’t have a plan about how to get out, or if things don’t go according to plan. They don’t outline in any way how America is going to win, or achieve its goals.”

Little is known about the current state of U.S. involvement in the two-year Syrian uprising, which may have claimed the lives of over 60,000 Syrians. Senior White House officials have repeatedly expressed concern that increasing the arms supply to the Syrian rebels may result in weapons falling into the “wrong hands", a concern exacerbated by the influx of foreign fighters in Syria.

As Al-Qaeda-affiliated militants have risen in the ranks of the armed Syrian opposition – partially due to better financial backing, equipment, training, and experience in Iraq/Afghanistan – it has become increasingly difficult to disentangle such groups from other opposition elements.

Even the very same cabinet members who have vocally supported arming the Syrian opposition have expressed grave reservations about the increasingly extremist inclinations of the rebels. Hillary Clinton herself has warned that “the opposition is increasingly being represented by Al-Qaeda extremist elements,” a development she considers “deeply distressing".

“You can always vet, but can you make the people you like win?” asked Landis. “I’m sure we know people we like, but the problem is, can you make them winners?”

Thus far, Washington’s efforts to marginalise militant Al-Qaeda groups have largely backfired. After the U.S. designation of Jubhat Al-Nusra, the largest Al-Qaeda-linked fighting group in Syria, as a foreign terrorist organisation, most of the Syrian opposition leadership jumped to their defence.

Moaz Al-Khatib, the titular head of the Syrian opposition’s main coalition, the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, immediately defended Jabhat Al-Nusra’s role in the uprising as “essential for victory".

Nevertheless, Washington has been covertly supporting rebel groups for well over a year, with “non-lethal aid", intelligence, and other unknown means.

The recent statements by Clinton and Panetta, therefore, still reveal little about the actual relationship between the White House and the Syrian rebels.

President Obama openly criticises the idea of armed assistance but has been silently supporting the rebels, while his administration’s liberal interventionists who have openly called for a more militant role have also expressed grave reservations about the ideology and direction of the very people they hope to arm.

These varied opinions and perspectives leave the door open for any number of policies toward Syria."No one has taken any option off the table in any conversation in which I’ve been involved," said Dempsey.

Nevertheless, Landis thinks a more militaristic approach in Syria in unlikely.

“Clearly…the people Obama has tried to put forward, all of his appointees, are not in favour of a muscle-bound Middle East policy and are not in favour of more military involvement," he said. "They’re consistent with his overall plan, which is not to get involved with Syria, not to start a war with Iran.”

All rights reserved, IPS – Inter Press Service, 2013.

This article may not be republished, broadcast, framed, or redistributed without the written permission of IPS – Inter Press Service. Republication of this material without permission from IPS, the copyright holder, constitutes a violation of United States and international copyright laws and may result in legal action.


Think Tank Urges “More Ambitious” U.S.-Mexican Agenda

Global Geopolitics & Political Economy / IPS

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Border leading into the desert at the Mariposa port-of-entry. Credit: Jeb Sprague/IPS

Jim Lobe

WASHINGTON, Feb 06 (IPS) – The electoral and political stars are aligning in ways that offer the United States and Mexico major opportunities to substantially deepen their cooperation, particularly on trade, energy, and immigration, according to a report released here Wednesday by a special commission of the Inter-American Dialogue (IAD).With Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto taking office at virtually the same time as Barack Obama begins his second presidential term, the two leaders have four years to address some of the most difficult and longstanding bilateral challenges, according to the report, entitled “A More Ambitious Agenda”.

Like a longer one on the same subject released two weeks ago by the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars here, the IAD report comes at a particularly auspicious moment, given both the strong performance of the Mexican economy and the apparent willingness of long-resistant Republicans in Congress to make key compromises on immigration reform.

These include finding ways to legalise the status of the estimated 11 million undocumented immigrants living in the U.S., more than half of whom are believed to be Mexican.

“There is an enormous amount of optimism right now in the bilateral relationship, and the reason of that is because there’s an idea that this is a new beginning,” said Duncan Wood, co-author of the Wilson Center report, entitled “New Ideas for a New Era”.

“There’s optimism about the Mexican economy and the real potential for immigration reform in the United States,” he told IPS.

“So you have the opportunity for a much more positive dialogue, particularly when you compare it with what we saw during the (Felipe) Calderon administration, when the primary focus was on security, violence and death. There’s now an opportunity to reframe the relationship, and I would say the economic issues lead that.”

The IAD report highlights Pena Nieto’s proposed reforms of Mexico’s energy sector which, among other things, could result in the exploitation of its huge deposits of shale gas and oil. This would not only assure the country’s status as a major oil producer, but also “bring North America closer than ever to energy independence".

In addition, the “decisive role” played by the Latino vote in the November elections here has propelled immigration reform to the top of the U.S. political agenda for the first time in a generation, according to the commission which was co-chaired by former Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo and former U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills.

Hills also serves as IAD’s co-chair, along with former Chilean President Michelle Bachelet.

“(T)he prospects are better than they have been in decades for a sensible reform of U.S. immigration policy – which should produce significant economic gains for both nations while easing a long-standing source of bilateral tension and mistrust,” the report concluded.

While opportunities for breakthroughs may be less obvious with respect to their approaches to fighting drug cartels and the violence that has killed an estimated 60,000 people in Mexico over the last six years, the cooperation between their security and police agencies has reached unprecedented levels.

“This is the right time to reassess the (U.S.-backed) Merida Initiative, reinforce efforts to shrink U.S. drug use, and stop the flood of weapons (from the U.S.) into Mexico,” according to the report.

It also noted the Obama administration’s willingness to discuss alternative approaches to the “war on drugs”, as well as recent initiatives, both within the U.S. and Latin America to consider legalising the production, sale and use of marijuana.

Since the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1992, bilateral trade has expanded by some 500 percent, making Mexico Washington’s third largest trading partner amid predictions it could overtake Canada for the top position within a decade. At the same time, Mexican-Americans now make up more than 10 percent of the U.S. population and seven percent of its electorate.

The report calls for the two nations to pursue three “high-priority goals. On the economic side, the two countries should work to make their shared labour markets more efficient and equitable; create a more-coherent North American energy market; and co-ordinating with Canada in negotiating the Trans-Pacific Partnership with selected South American and East Asian nations.

“There’s a perception that the Pena Nieto government can get things done,” said Wood, who noted that his Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which ruled the country for 71 years, “knows how to reach a consensus” in contrast to Cardenas’s National Action Party (PAN), whose 12-year reign ended in December.

On the immigration front, the U.S. should implement an expanded and predictable temporary labour programme for both professional and low-income workers, ensuring a larger flow of legal migrants whose homes would remain in Mexico.

In addition, immigration legislation must include a pathway for undocumented immigrants here to legalise their status. Such a step, according to the report, “could hugely benefit both the U.S. and Mexican economies,” in part by increasing both tax payments to local, state and federal governments and remittances sent to Mexico.

Given the results of the November elections and the pressure on Republicans to ease their opposition to any such “amnesty” scheme, such reforms are considered more likely to pass the Congress than at any time since the last major immigration reform in the mid-1980s.

The challenges posed by public insecurity, organised crime, and drug trafficking and abuse “may be the most harrowing test” for both governments, according to the report, which recommended that they should jointly review Washington’s policies toward illicit drugs and firearms, whose export to Mexico has fuelled the violence there.

Pena Nieto should follow through on campaign pledges to create an elite federal police force that would sharply reduce the role of Mexico’s military in the anti-crime campaign, while Obama should allocate significantly more resources to prevention and treatment programmes that help reduce demand for illicit drugs, it says.

The report’s recommendations to consider U.S. drug policy reform and legalisation of marijuana – as well as reassessing the five-year-old security-assistance programme, the Merida Initiative – were welcomed by Laura Carlson, director of the Mexico City-based Americas Program of the Center for International Policy as “bright spots” in the report.

But she expressed disappointment that the commission “repeats the formulas that have led to increased poverty under NAFTA and made Mexico one of the most unequal nations in the world.”

“That this group would come out with a recommendation of …more free trade, more privatisation, more guest workers, more oil drilling is not surprising,” she told IPS in an email. “But it’s particularly hard to swallow when no mention is made of poverty alleviation, shared environmental crisis, human rights or corruption on both sides of the border.”

*Jim Lobe’s blog on U.S. foreign policy can be read at http://www.lobelog.com.

All rights reserved, IPS – Inter Press Service, 2013.

This article may not be republished, broadcast, framed, or redistributed without the written permission of IPS – Inter Press Service. Republication of this material without permission from IPS, the copyright holder, constitutes a violation of United States and international copyright laws and may result in legal action.


It’s All About Israel

Global Geopolitics & Political Economy / IPS

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Senator Chuck Hagel at his confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Service Committee Jan. 31, 2013. Credit: DoD Photo by Erin A. Kirk-Cuomo

Jim Lobe

WASHINGTON, Feb 02 (IPS) – If former Defence Secretary-designate Sen. Chuck Hagel’s lacklustre performance at his confirmation hearing Thursday heartened neo-conservatives and other hawks opposed to his nomination, those who argued that the Israel lobby has been exerting too great an influence on U.S. foreign policy were ecstatic.Indeed, Stephen Walt, the Harvard international relations professor who co-authored the "The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy", issued a special thanks to the Senate Armed Services Committee that held the hearing on his foreignpolicy.com blog Friday, suggesting that controversial 2007 book should sell like hotcakes after what he called “the Hagel circus".

“I want to thank the Emergency Committee for Israel, Sheldon Adelson, and the Senate Armed Services Committee for providing such a compelling vindication of our views,” wrote Walt, who, among other things, has been accused of anti-Semitism for writing a book that criticised the allegedly excessive influence the Israel lobby wields over U.S. foreign policy and the public debate that surrounds it.

As evidence, Walt cited the number of mentions of Israel and its most powerful regional foe, Iran, received in the course of Hagel’s eight-hour ordeal – 166 and 144, respectively, according to a compilation by the Internet publication, Buzzfeed.

By comparison, he noted, the epidemic of suicides among U.S. troops – a necessary concern for any incoming Pentagon chief – was addressed only twice.

In fact, the degree to which Israel and the threat posed to it by Iran dominated the hearing was somewhat understated by Buzzfeed. The full transcript revealed that Israel was brought up no less than 178 times, followed closely by Iran with 171 mentions.

Those numbers compared with a grand total of five mentions of China, the central focus of the Obama administration’s much ballyhooed “pivot” from the Middle East to the Asia/Pacific; one mention (by Hagel himself) of Japan, Washington’s closest Asian ally whose territorial dispute with China has recently escalated to dangerous levels; and one mention of South Korea, Washington’s other major treaty ally in Northeast Asia.

Similarly, NATO, Washington’s historically most important military alliance – and one with which it fought a successful air war in Libya last year and is currently fighting its 12th year in Afghanistan – warranted a total of five mentions.

“It is extraordinary that, in an eight-hour hearing, as little attention was devoted as it was to issues such as China and NATO, which ought to be near the top of the concerns for any secretary of defence of the United States,” said Paul Pillar, a former top CIA analyst who served as the National Intelligence Officer for the Near and South Asia from 2000 to 2005.

“The emphasis on Israel and Iran – which, in American politics, has become for the most part an Israel issue – demonstrates that the senators were far less concerned with the strategic questions that the secretary of defence should be focused on and much more interested in trying to defeat a nominee who has strayed from political orthodoxy, especially on issues related to Israel,” he told IPS.

Hagel, a decorated Vietnam War veteran and former Republican senator from Nebraska, has come under sustained attack from neo-conservatives – who still exercise a preponderant influence on the Republican Party’s foreign policy views despite the general unpopularity of the Iraq war which they championed – since he was first rumoured to be Obama’s top choice to succeed Leon Panetta as Pentagon chief in mid-December.

The anti-Hagel attacks have been carried out by a number of groups, such as the Emergency Committee for Israel (ECI), that have refused to disclose the identity of their donors.

The New York Times reported Sunday that billionaire Sheldon Adelson, the single biggest contributor to the Republican presidential campaign last year and a staunch supporter of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, was involved in the campaign, by far the most expensive and organised ever mounted against a cabinet nominee.

Initially joined in their attacks by some leaders of the more-mainstream and bipartisan Israel lobby, they charged, among other things, that Hagel was anti-Semitic (in part because he had used the phrase “Jewish lobby” on one occasion) and hostile to Israel.

Conversely, they complained, he has been too sympathetic toward Palestinians, too eager to engage Iran and other Israeli foes diplomatically, and too averse to using military force, particularly against Iran if negotiations over its nuclear programme fail.

On these issues, they argued in a mantra subsequently adopted by half a dozen Republican senators, Hagel was “out of the mainstream” or even “far to the left of” Obama himself.

In fact, Hagel’s views on the Middle East and the use of military force, in particular, not only largely reflect those of the administration and, according to public-opinion polls, of a war-weary electorate, but also of most of the foreign-policy elite. Dozens of retired top-ranked diplomatic, intelligence, and military officials, as well as former Cabinet officers from both Republican and Democratic administration have rallied to Hagel’s defence in recent weeks.

But those “mainstream” views are not reflected in Congress, where the Israel lobby has long wielded its greatest influence.

While its main institutions, such as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), declared their neutrality on the nominee after his formal nomination by Obama earlier this month, they worked with sympathetic senators from both parties and their staffers to ensure that particular questions would be asked that would elicit reassuring answers with respect to both supporting Israel and preventing Iran from achieving a nuclear bomb by any means necessary.

The effort – which was supplemented by angry prosecutorial performances by several senators, notably John McCain, Lindsay Graham, and Ted Cruz, closely associated with neo-conservatives – largely worked, as Hagel recanted or softened some of his more-provocative previous statements to the disappointment of many of his supporters.

But, in some respects, the effort, as suggested by Walt, succeeded too well, simply because it demonstrated quite dramatically to the interested public how completely Israel dominates the foreign-policy agenda, at least on Capitol Hill.

After all, the U.S. remains the world’s one superpower with interests in every country. Its defence budget – at well over half a trillion dollars this year — is greater than the combined budgets of the 10 next-most powerful militaries.

Yet Israel was mentioned more often in the hearing, according to IPS’s tally, than the following countries or entities combined: Iraq (30), Afghanistan (27), Russia (23), Palestine or Palestinian (22), Syria (18), North Korea (11), Pakistan (10), Egypt (9), China (5), NATO (5), Libya (2), Bahrain (2), Somalia (2), Al-Qaeda (2), and Mali, Jordan, Turkey, Japan, and South Korea (once each).

Several key regional powers with which Washington has been trying hard to build or already enjoys strong defence relationships – notably India, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia – were not mentioned even a single time. Vietnam was mentioned 41 times but exclusively in relation to Hagel’s wartime service there or his work as a senior official in the Veterans Administration.

“They were not asking questions that had any relevance to the tasks facing the secretary of defence, in terms of either the military or budgetary challenges we face,” noted Amb. Chas. Freeman (ret.), whose appointment early in the Obama administration to head the National Intelligence Council (NIC) provoked such a furious campaign by neo-conservatives and key Israel lobby figures that he felt compelled to withdraw his name from consideration.

“So there was no serious discussion of defence or larger strategic issues,” he told IPS. What was there was a lot of grandstanding about whether or not the nominee was politically correct.”

*Jim Lobe’s blog on U.S. foreign policy can be read at http://www.lobelog.com.

All rights reserved, IPS – Inter Press Service, 2013.

This article may not be republished, broadcast, framed, or redistributed without the written permission of IPS – Inter Press Service. Republication of this material without permission from IPS, the copyright holder, constitutes a violation of United States and international copyright laws and may result in legal action.


INDIA-CHINA TIES UNDER NEW CHINESE LEADERSHIP

Global Geopolitics & Political Economy

B.RAMAN

China, which already has a new party leadership since the Party Congress in November last, will be having a new State leadership from next month.

2.Mr.Xi Jinping, who took over as the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Chairman of its Central Military Commission (CMC) in November last, will be taking over as the State President from Mr.Hu Jintao at the end of the National People’s Congress (NPC) next month. Mr.Li Kekiyang will be taking over as the Prime Minister from Mr.Wen Jiabao.

3. One does not know much about the personal leadership style of Li , but from what one had seen since November, Xi will not be a carbon copy of Hu. He is more smiling and relaxed, more forthcoming, less bureaucratic and less formal in his interactions with his colleagues and juniors.

4. He believes that military strength comes out of economic strength and that further developing the Chinese economy should have the primacy of attention. He also realises that China’s economic gains might be diluted if corruption is not controlled and that corruption among public servants comes not only out of greed, but also out of an unhealthy desire for status. Austerity in personal and public life is, therefore, stressed by him..

5. During his first visit to Guangdong after taking over, many noticed the conscious lack of ostentation in his travels and interactions. Lack of ostentation is emerging as a defining characteristic of his leadership style. It remains to be seen whether he is able to retain it as the State President.

6.In China, the leadership transition takes different routes in the Centre at Beijing and in the provinces. At Beijing, it takes place first in the party and then in the State. In the provinces, it often takes place first in the provincial administration and then in the Party. As a result, one can err in assessments.

7. In Tibet, for example, hardliners owing loyalty to Hu and his policies, have moved into new leadership positions in the administration. From this, it will be wrong to conclude that the hardline policies of Hu will be followed by Xi too. In the provinces as in Beijing it is the party that exercises the command and control over the administration. We have to wait to see what kind of party leadership emerges in Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia before assessing whether we might see new minority policies with Xi characteristics.

8. Under the leaderships of Mr.Jiang Zemin and Hu for nearly two decades, one had seen two constants in Chinese foreign policy—- the anxiety to keep in step with the US and the EU in economic matters sans allowing nationalistic urges to distort its economic policies and to keep testing the waters for a more assertive role in the region without needlessly provoking the US. These constants, which are adjudged by the CPC as in its national interests, are likely to continue under Xi too.

9. Four other constants are also likely to continue—- the strengthening of strategic and economic relations with Russia and India, keeping a wary eye on Japan and slowly expanding its interests in Pakistan. Pakistan will continue to be an important factor in China’s South Asia policy and we have to keep a wary eye on it. It will be suicidal to think that China’s interest in Pakistan will ultimately decline. It won’t.

10. The new Party leadership has already made it clear that there will be no dilution of its territorial sovereignty claims vis-à-vis Japan in the East China Sea, some ASEAN countries in the South China Sea and India across the Himalayan border. It will follow nuanced approaches in relation to Japan, the ASEAN countries and India. While it has not hesitated to make vigorous policy moves in relation to its claims in East and South China Sea, it has avoided a confrontational posture towards India.

11. China, under the new leadership, will continue to maintain peace and tranquility across the Sino-Indian border without making any unilateral concessions in the Arunachal Pradesh sector. Keeping the issue alive without letting it become a tinder-box will be the policy.

12.China does not have a policy of countering India by developing a foothold in South Asia. Rather South Asian countries have a policy of countering India by inviting China to their lands. China has no policy of a necklace of pearls in the region, but the countries of the region have separately and independently been following a policy of putting a Chinese shackle on Indian hegemonistic urges. How are we going to deal with it?

13.It is in our interest to keep the Tibetan heart beating in this region. Decades of suppressive policy from the days Hu was posted as the party in charge for Tibet have not been able to crush the independent spirit of the Tibetan youth and monks and their desire for the return of His Holiness the Dalai Lama to Lhasa. The self-immolations since 2009, which have reached the figure of 99, are an indication of the total failure of the Chinese suppressive policy in the Tibetan areas. Suppressive policies towards the Uighurs in the Xinjiang province have also failed to produce results. One hears reports of stirrings of ethnic/Buddhist separatism in Inner Mongolia.

14. Under the leaderships of Jiang and Hu which came to power after Deng Xiao-Ping, China has emerged as a major economic and military power of the region, but the suppressive minority policies inspired and fashioned by Hu with his experience of association with Tibet have made China’s peripheral areas inhabited by ethnic, religious and cultural minorities, despite their economic development, pockets of increasing anti-Han alienation. Hu’s rigid line on talks with the representatives of His Holiness has led to an indefinite suspension of these talks.

15. Without more liberal and empathetic minority policies China’s periphery will continue to be its Achilles Heel. Now that Hu will no longer be there, can one expect a policy change in a positive direction? Xi has not given an indication on this subject so far either at the November Party Congress or subsequently. He seems to believe like other Han leaders that rapid economic development and integration will weaken separatist sentiments. Tibet has shown that this is unlikely to happen.

16. Without showing an open interest in developments in the Tibetan areas, India has to find ways of quietly working for more empathetic policies by the new Chinese leadership.

17.There have to be two constants in India’s relations with China. We must continue to expand and strengthen the economic bridges with China and the regional co-operation mechanisms with which both countries are associated. Secondly, taking advantage of the more nuanced Chinese attitude to India in relation to the border dispute, which is less contentious as compared to its attitude to its sovereignty disputes in the East and South China Seas, we should be exploring the possibility of mutually acceptable border adjustments in the Arunachal Pradesh Sector instead of depending on an eternal status quo.

18.China prefers the status quo presently because its military position in Tibet, while steadily improving, does not give it overwhelming superiority against us. It should be the objective of our military policies that China, either on its own or through its increasing presence in Pakistan, is not able to achieve such overwhelming superiority. China’s interest in the status quo and in peace and tranquility across the Himalayan border will remain only so long as it has no asymmetric advantage over India. To deny it such an asymmetric advantage should be the aim of our quest for new dimensions of strategic relations with the US, Vietnam, Japan, and Australia. Our head-start over China in the Indian Ocean Region has to be maintained in co-operation with the US and Australia.

19. How to achieve a new web of strategic relationships without weakening the present momentum towards better bilateral relations is the challenge before our diplomacy and military strategists as we seek to engage the new Chinese leadership. (3-2-13)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd),Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )

Copyright © 2013 B. Raman – South Asia Analysis Group (SAAG).

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Close Kyrgyz-Turkish Ties Stall and Sputter

Global Geopolitics & Political Economy / IDN

By Bernhard Schell

IDN-InDepth NewsAnalysis

BISHKEK (IDN) – Kyrgyz President Almazbek Sharshenovich Atambayev and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo?an are leaving no stone unturned to intensify and deepen cultural, political, economic and military relations between the two countries based on vision of a Turkic peoples’ identity. But both at home and abroad they do not always come across undiluted approval.

"There is quite a cautious and negative attitude towards the Turkish presence and influence in Kyrgyz society," says Valentin Bogatyriev, co-author of a new study published by the German Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) close to the Social Democratic Party. He refers to a recent sociological survey which finds that Turkey comes last among the countries cooperation with which is considered important for the national interests of Kyrgyzstan.

Turkey was the very first country to recognize its independence in 1991. More than 100 agreements and cooperation protocols including communication and military issues have been signed over the last two decades. The official dialogue between top political leaders of both countries is vivid. Turkish Airlines are providing a very important gateway to the world for numerous destinations.

Besides, as Katja Meyer, Resident Director of FES in Kyrgyzstan points out, Turkey’s secular democracy within a predominantly Muslim population is "an interesting model" for many people in the modern Kyrgyz state. Both languages have the same Turkic origin. Turkey itself demonstrates a strong interest of reviving and revitalizing the ties between Turkic nations and cultures. In 2012, Kyrgyzstan took over the chairmanship of the Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic nations.

But despite the breadth of its activities, says Bogatyriev, Turkey has had "no significant impact on Kyrgyzstan’s economic development" and there is no strengthening of its political influence due to it in recent years. In fact, the presence of Turkish capital and business in Kyrgyzstan has a mixed public and political reception in the country. "Nationalist groups and political parties claim that Turks, who have obtained the opportunity to freely conduct their business in Kyrgyzstan, are guilty of misbehaviour: they humiliate Kyrgyz people, look down on them and deceive them," states Bogatyriev.

This section of the public believes that as Prime Minister (from December 17, 2010 to December 1, 2011, and earlier from March 29, 2007 until November 28, 2007) President Atambaev "strengthened relations with Turkey and opened wider the gate of Kyrgyzstan for Turkish entrepreneurs willing to do business in the country, but that Turkish ‘entrepreneurs’ have exploited this not only to carry out economic activities, but also to spread their influence – that some people see as a policy of Pan-Turkism".

Bogatyriev adds: Atambaev is interested in boosting ties with Turkey because of his good relations with Turkish leaders, "and his own personal ties, business and assets in the Republic of Turkey". But these preferences are viewed with suspicion by Russia and are forcing Atambaev to tread carefully in his relations with the Turkish side.

"The warming of relations with Turkey is not well received by the Chinese leadership (either), which reacted very negatively to the speeches of Erdogan in support of the Chinese Uigurs during the disturbances in Urumqi," says the study. "During his visit to Kyrgyzstan in February 2011, Erdogan suggested a trilateral meeting with the Prime Minister of Russia, as both countries Kyrgyzstan and Turkey actively cooperate with the country and a number of issues of concern to them could be addressed within trilateral talks. However, such a meeting has not been held so far, because the format seems unacceptable for the Russian side."

The study adds: "Besides, regular statements by the Kyrgyz leadership about the formation of a parliamentary republic following the example of Turkey are also perceived negatively by Russia, which considers the transition to parliamentary rule in Kyrgyzstan as a serious mistake.

"The Prime Minister Atambaev in April 2011, concluding his visit to Ankara, stated that Kyrgyzstan plans to establish a joint economic zone with Turkey. He called Turkey a strategic partner of Kyrgyzstan. He explained that Turkey, just like Russia, ‘is a brotherly country for us’. He added: In 2011 we want to sign an agreement to access to the Customs Union. And then to create a single space with Russia and Turkey, with its centre in Bishkek."

Solid contractual legal framework

Two policy documents – a ‘Treaty for Eternal Friendship and Cooperation between the Kyrgyz Republic and the Turkish Republic’, dated October 24, 1997, and a Joint Declaration of the Heads of the two countries ‘Kyrgyzstan and Turkey together in the XXI century’, made on July 1, 1999, are the fundamental documents reflecting the internal content and spirit of relationships between the two countries.

Apart from these fundamental treaties and declarations, Kyrgyz-Turkish relations have a solid contractual legal framework consisting of more than 100 treaties, agreements and protocols governing issues of the current and future cooperation in various spheres, including political, economic, trade, cultural and humanitarian, scientific, educational, military, technical and others.

Among these are: the Agreement on Cooperation in the Public Health sector, Memorandum on the fundamentals of Customs Relations, Agreement on Trade and Economic cooperation, and Military Cooperation Agreement.

Economic cooperation between Kyrgyzstan and Turkey has developed within the framework of the main provisions of about 50 agreements and contracts signed over the years. Providing each other most favoured nation treatment in respect to customs duties and other advantages for import and export of goods are envisaged by the fundamental Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation.

It was in order to implement this agreement and further expand trade and economic cooperation that the Joint Kyrgyz-Turkish Intergovernmental Economic Commission was established. Turkey ranks second in terms of the volume of investments (more than $450 million) invested in the Kyrgyz economy from abroad. The general trends in trade relations have not radically changed and Turkish supplies still dominate in trade between the two countries.

TIKA (Turkish Agency for Cooperation and Development under the Office of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey) is one of the key channels for Turkey’s participation in providing assistance to Kyrgyzstan.

The Kyrgyz Republic ranks second in Eurasia for the number of projects implemented jointly with TIKA. The total financial resources allocated by TIKA to Kyrgyzstan for the period from 1992-2011 exceed $18 million.

TIKA opened its headquarters in the brotherly Kyrgyz Republic in 1992. Among the Eurasian countries, the Kyrgyz Republic was one of the first countries to join the activities of TIKA. The Bishkek Coordination Office of TICA programs was opened in Kyrgyzstan in September 1993 within the ‘Protocol of Cooperation’ signed on April 8, 1993 between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic, and was one of the first offices of TICA established abroad.

TIKA projects cover a variety of areas, including improvement of public administration and local self-government, law enforcement system, educational projects and projects in health, culture and science sectors. TIKA assisted participation of Kyrgyz specialists in many international conferences, training courses, congresses, workshops, working meetings and exhibitions.

Cultural and humanitarian cooperation is another important sphere through which Turkish influence has been advanced, says the study. This is one of the most advanced sectors of the Kyrgyz-Turkish cooperation. Currently, there are about 1700 students from Kyrgyzstan studying in educational establishments in Turkey, more than 750 of them funded by the Turkish government and the rest studying privately. More than 1500 Turkish students are studying in universities in Kyrgyzstan.

At the same time, the study adds, Turkey’s educational policy in Kyrgyzstan has caused some concern in the Kyrgyz society. Many people believe that young people studying in Turkish educational institutions could get isolated from their own education system and this could lead to the creation of a generation more at home with Turkish language, customs and traditions; and that Kyrgyz youth educated in secondary and higher educational establishments in Turkey, when returning home, might represent a big threat for Kyrgyzstan.

Military cooperation

"Military cooperation is another high profile area in Kyrgyz-Turkish relations. It should be noted that during incursions by international terrorist groups in the southern regions of the country, Turkey has been one of the first countries to provide assistance," says Bogatyriev, co-author of the study.

Military agencies from both parties have been cooperating since 1993. The military cooperation agreement signed between the two states covers cooperation in: military education and training; exchange of military delegations and observers during exercises; organization of visits, exchange of experiences and information on common issues; joint preparation for peacekeeping operations; organization of training, exchange of information and experience to counter international terrorist activity; exchange and secure storage of information; defence industry, and technical military cooperation; co-operation in the area of military history, archives, military publications, military museums; and cultural exchange for the armed forces of the two countries.

Other activities are carried out within the framework of NATO’s ‘Partnership for Peace’ program. Each year about 100 cadets from the Kyrgyzstan are educated and trained in the leading military educational establishments in the Republic of Turkey, among them the Higher Military Academy ‘Gülhane’ Military Medical Academy, Higher Combined Arms Military College, Supreme School of the gendarmerie and several military lyceums.

Every year Turkey provides grants to Kyrgyzstan for the reorganization of the armed forces, also technical military assistance to strengthen the defence system and train military personnel. Turkish instructors placed in the Armed Forces of the Kyrgyz Republic share their experiences of mountainous terrain and sniper training with local counterparts.

For several years Turkey has been providing at no cost logistics, clothing, medical equipment, food, and means of communication to the Kyrgyzstan army. During this period, Turkey has provided military and technical assistance to Kyrgyzstan’s border service to the value of 4.4 million USD.

The Kyrgyz and the Turkish authorities work together in several international organizations. Turkey helped the Kyrgyz Republic in its accession to the OIC (Organization of Islamic Conference) and ECO (Economic Cooperation Organization). However, Kyrgyzstan has not been particularly active on a number of issues of concern to Turkey, including the Armenian Genocide issue and the Kurdish issue.

It was only in November 2007 at the XI Congress of Friendship, Brotherhood and Cooperation of Turkic states, held in Baku, that participants in the Congress adopted a number of documents refuting the events of the Armenian Genocide and condemning the actions of Armenia and its policy of occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh. [IDN-InDepthNews – December 21, 2012]

2012 IDN-InDepthNews | Analysis That Matters

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Avoiding the Slippery Slope to War with Iran

Global Geopolitics & Political Economy / IPS

Jasmin Ramsey

WASHINGTON, Nov 27 (IPS) – Amidst reports that stalled negotiations with Iran over its controversial nuclear programme may soon be jump-started, many here are arguing that a mutually negotiated settlement remains the most effective option for resolving the dispute and averting the threat of war.“We believe there is time and clearly there is an interest from all parties to reach a diplomatic solution,” said Daryl Kimball, the executive director of the Arms Control Association, co-host with the National Iranian American Council (NIAC) of a conference here today titled, “Making Diplomacy Work”.

“Diplomacy is the obvious option, but it’s not obvious how to make diplomacy succeed,” said NIAC president Trita Parsi, who chaired the event that aired on C-SPAN Monday.

The U.S. and Iran have not had diplomatic relations since the 1979 Iranian revolution. The conflict has been mostly cold, but the threat of war spiked this year following a pressure campaign by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

The Obama administration has set the U.S.’s “red line” at development of a nuclear weapon, but the Israeli red line is Iran’s acquirement of nuclear weapon-building “capability”, or Iran crossing into a so-called “zone of immunity” where it can create a nuclear weapon at Fordow, the underground uranium enrichment facility that’s impenetrable by Israeli air strikes.

Asked how he would advise the president if the Israelis carried out a strike against Iran, keynote speaker Zbigniew Brzezinski, a former National Security Adviser under President Jimmy Carter, said he would have appropriately advised the president before that point and that U.S. national security should not follow that of another country.

“It’s very important for clarity to exist in a relationship between friends. I don’t think there’s any implicit obligation for the United States to follow, like a stupid mule, whatever the Israelis do,” said the famed geostrategist.

Jim Walsh, a nonproliferation expert at MIT, stated that military strikes against Iran would compel it to expel International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) inspectors and dash for a nuclear weapon as a deterrent against future attacks.

“What do we get if there’s war?” asked Walsh. “An Iran with nuclear weapons.”

In contention with the Israeli red line is the notion that Iran already has the ability to create a nuclear weapon, should it make the decision to do so, according to experts.

“Since 2007, Western and U.S. intelligence agencies have assessed that Iran is nuclear capable,” said Kimball, who previously told IPS that the objective should thus be aimed at affecting Iran’s will.

“We must be honest about this, there’s no difference between a centrifuge at Fordow and Natanz, it’s only harder to bomb Fordow,” said Walsh.

Walsh also noted that “mistrust” between the U.S. and Iran and a focus on singular issues are impediments to the diplomatic process.

“They both want to get a deal around issue of 20-percent (enriched uranium), they want to play small ball, get something and push the can down the road. This is a mistake. You are shrinking the negotiating space,” noted Walsh.

Ahmed Sadri, a professor of Islamic World Studies at Wolf University, argued that the next few months provide the perfect window of opportunity for the U.S. and Iran to seriously move the diplomatic process forward.

“Now is the right time, after American elections and right before Iranian elections,” he said, adding that “if there is no relationship (between the U.S. and Iran), negative feelings are reinforced.

“Leader Ali Khamenei has a very conspiratorial and paranoid mind…But just because you’re paranoid that there’s a crocodile under your bed doesn’t mean there isn’t a crocodile under your bed,” said Sadri.

According to Rolf Ekéus, the former head of the United Nation Special Commission on Iraq, sanctions-relief must be on the table to provide Iran with enough incentive to give up its alleged ambitions.

“Iraq was praised by the IAEA…but it turned out they were cheating, that’s why one had to create another arrangement…containing a very important U.N. dimension that respected boundaries and the independence of Iraq,” said the Swedish diplomat.

“This was a functioning system which allowed good behaviour to get sanctions relief; bad behaviour was met with tough language from the Security Council, not individual governments, Israel or anyone,” said Ekéus.

Ekéus also emphasised that “regime change must be taken off the table” as Iranians should be “left to take care of it” and the U.S. should stop “hiding behind the P5+1” and engage Iran on mutual regional interests.

“Iran is huge now, its influence is enormous, but it’s shaky all over. The P5+1 is not the appropriate player if you want to deal with Afghanistan and Iraq,” he said.

Brzezinski emphasised that the diplomatic process is not dead, but listed options the U.S. should consider if negotiations completely fail.

The worst choice would be a U.S. joint or Israeli attack, which would “produce a regional crisis and widespread hatred particularly for the U.S.,” said Brzezinski, dismissing it as an “act of utter irresponsibility and potentially significant immorality of the U.S.”

The least objectionable of the worst options – all of which should be considered only after the U.S. failed to achieve its desired outcome through negotiations – would be a type of containment.

“We combine continued painful, but not strangulating sanctions – and be very careful in that distinction – with clear political support for the emergence of eventual democracy in Iran…and at the same time an explicit security guarantee for U.S.-friendly Middle Eastern states, including Israel, modeled on the very successful, decades-lasting protection of our European allies from an overwhelming Soviet nuclear threat,” he said.

Brzezinski added that Iran has not endured as a sovereign state for centuries because it was motivated by suicidal tendencies like initiating a war that would invite a devastating U.S. attack.

“The sooner we get off the notion that at some point we may strike Iran, the better the chances for the negotiations and the better the chance for stability if we couple it with a clear commitment to the security of the region, designed to neutralise any potential, longer-range, Iranian nuclear threat,” he said.

*Jasmin Ramsey blogs at IPS’s foreign policy blog, www.lobelog.com .

All rights reserved, IPS – Inter Press Service, 2012.

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ASEAN Stumbles Again On South China Sea

Global Geopolitics & Political Economy / IPS

Richard Heydarian

MANILA, Nov 24 (IPS) – Against the backdrop of growing territorial tensions in the South China Sea, inflamed by a more explicit Sino-American rivalry in the Pacific theatre, the recently-concluded ASEAN Summit in Cambodia represented the best chance at bolstering regional security through peaceful, multilateral mechanisms.With the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) gathering coinciding with the pan-regional East Asia and ASEAN+3 Summits, Cambodia, as the current chair of the ASEAN, took centre-stage in a broader international gathering, which brought together leading Pacific powers such as the U.S., China, Japan and India.

Ahead of the ASEAN Summit, many commentators as well as regional leaders expressed their hopes for some form of diplomatic breakthrough to address festering maritime disputes in the South China Sea.

Recent months have also witnessed growing diplomatic pro-activeness by countries such as Indonesia to mend intra-regional rifts, especially between Cambodia and the Philippines, and re-focus diplomatic efforts on a peaceful and rule-based resolution of ongoing disputes. For instance, the Indonesian-proposed “six points of consensus” highlights the commitment of regional states to the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and the adoption of a legally binding regional Code of Conduct (CoC).

“We are hoping and expecting that there will be smooth and very productive results of these meetings as far as our advocacies are concerned,” said Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Raul Hernandez. “What is important here is to underscore the ASEAN centrality and, for ASEAN it has always been our position that any initiatives (such as the CoC) should first be accepted and approved by ASEAN and only then would it be presented to other dialogue partners.” His statements echoed Philippine President Benigno Aquino’s cautious optimism regarding a more unified regional stance on the issue of maritime security.

Interestingly, the Philippines has also been very busy with thawing out increasingly frayed relations with both China and Cambodia in recent months, hoping to build positive momentum ahead of the ASEAN summit in Phnom Penh.

The newly re-elected President Obama also called for easing of tensions among claimant states, warning against an escalation in disputes, while Secretary of State Hillary Clinton earlier identified the territorial conflicts as a ‘critical issue’ in need of urgent resolution.

However, much to the disappointment of some Southeast Asian nations, especially the Philippines and Cambodia – reportedly at the behest of China – once again blocked the inclusion of the South China Sea dispute in the summit’s agenda. After all, China has repeatedly warned against ‘internationalising’ the disputes, while actively sidestepping the issue in all recent regional multilateral forums.

In essence, Cambodia has effectively trammeled any development on the crucial issue of adopting a more binding CoC to not only rein in China’s growing territorial assertiveness in the near future, but to also lay down the foundations of a more robust regional approach to resolve intractable territorial conflicts in the long run.

Far from unprecedented, Cambodia’s recent move mirrored its earlier stance during the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in June, where it blocked the inclusion of maritime disputes in the final communiqué. While Cambodia’s actions during the AMM prompted a flash walkout then by the Filipino Foreign Secretary Albert Del Rosario, this time Manila resorted to a formal protest against Cambodia’s decision to once again block the issue from the ASEAN’s agenda.

“Among the principles that the ASEAN community has pledged to abide by is that of centrality; it should also be foremost in our minds as we address concerns in the East Asian maritime region. Prevailing tensions in the area stand to impact regional peace and stability,” President Aquino shrieked in his formal intervention during the ASEAN+3 Summit. “We reiterate our call on all parties concerned to avoid the threat or use of force, and to adhere to universally recognised principles of international law in settling disputes…because respect for the rule of law remains the great equaliser in the relations among nations.”

Aware of Cambodia’s cosy ties with China, Manila’s strategy during the recently-concluded summits was to rally the support of sympathetic and influential external actors such as the U.S., Japan, India and Australia to push for a binding CoC in the South China Sea and exert more pressure on Beijing against further military fortifications and adventurism in the disputed areas.

Refusing to stand idly by, the Philippine president reiterated his concerns in an intervention during the ASEAN+India Summit, emphasising India’s stake in ensuring regional maritime security. “Since a great deal of our (ASEAN and India) trade and resources flow through our seas, the Philippines views that ASEAN and India will mutually benefit from jointly addressing threats to maritime stability through peaceful means in accordance with international law,” Aquino stated.

During the ASEAN+Japan Summit, Aquino underscored the common interest of both Japan and ASEAN states to uphold the rule of law vis-à-vis ongoing disputes by stating, “The Philippines will continue to uphold this principle in its engagement with ASEAN, Japan, and other stakeholders, as the region strives to resolve overlapping maritime claims.”

Foremost in his mind, Aquino also urged the U.S. to play a more active role to stave off rising Chinese assertiveness.

“Each one of our nations has a stake in the stability of Southeast Asia. The United States understands this and, for this reason, has chosen to work with us to ensure the peace and continuous advancement of our region,” Aquino said during the summit, prodding greater U.S. involvement. “While we are all aware that the U.S. does not take sides in disputes, they do have a strategic stake in the freedom of navigation, unimpeded commerce, and the maintenance of peace and stability in the South China Sea.”

In a veiled criticism of China’s preference for a bilateral approach to the disputes, Aquino argued, “We have long said that if it’s a multilateral problem, you can’t have a bilateral solution.” Most interestingly, he also stated, “The ASEAN route is not the only route for us”, suggesting Manila’s possible recourse to greater military cooperation with the U.S. as well as other regional allies such as Australia and Japan, especially if the ASEAN continues to fail in providing a credible multilateral, rule-based approach to ongoing territorial conflicts.

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Opposition to U.S. Bases Reaches Turning Point

Global Geopolitics & Political Economy / IPS

Suvendrini Kakuchi

TOKYO, Nov 25 (IPS) – Okinawa, the largest of a group of 60 sub-tropical islands forming Japan’s southernmost prefecture, has an equable climate and preferential treatment for United States servicemen under the Mutual Cooperation Security Treaty between the U.S. and Japan.According to Chobin Zukeran, a member of the House of Representatives from Okinawa, the archipelago is the perfect U.S. base because it fans out into the Pacific Ocean towards Taiwan, making it a vital bulwark for U.S. military strategists concerned with containing China.

Here is where the bulk of the U.S.’ 47,000 troops in Japan are based.

But Okinawans, who number roughly 1.4 million, have long opposed U.S. military presence on their homeland, which experienced the only bloody ground battle between Japan and the invading U.S. military at the end of World War II in 1945.

Since the return of the islands to Japan in 1972, over 90 percent of Okinawans – concerned about their personal safety and noise and environmental pollution – have supported the demand for a complete removal of the bases, which occupy 18 percent of their land.

Now, a string of recent incidents involving military personnel has pushed opposition to the bases into outright protest and threatens to foil the U.S.’ plans to beef up its military in the Asia-Pacific region.

On Nov. 7, Christopher Browning and Skyler Dozierwalker were charged with raping and injuring a local woman on Oct. 16, in a case that sparked widespread protest across Okinawa.

“Okinawa’s struggle against the U.S. military bases is reaching a turning point. We are prepared to take our demands all the way to Washington to end the deadlock,” Zukeran said at a press meeting in Tokyo earlier this month.

Frustration with impunity for U.S. troops on the island is nothing new. In 1995, the gang rape of a 12-year-old Okinawan girl by three U.S. servicemen resulted in a U.S.-Japan agreement to reduce U.S. military presence on the Okinawan chain of islands, but this did little to appease the local population.

“The rapes and a skewed sense of justice when these crimes involve U.S. servicemen is the worst form of violence against women,” said Ryuichi Hattori, a member of the Social Democratic Party that has traditionally led political demands to have the bases removed from Okinawa.

Statistics compiled by the police indicate no fewer than 6,000 cases of crime – including violence and rape – since 1972.

Catherine Fisher, an Australian national who was raped in 2002 by a sailor stationed on a ship on the U.S. naval base of Yokosuka, 64 miles south of Tokyo, was among the first women to speak publicly about the latest crime.

Fisher took her own case to the U.S. in September in pursuit of her attacker who had been honourably discharged by the U.S. military, although he was found guilty by the Tokyo district court in 2004 and ordered to pay damages.

“I was determined to receive justice and challenge a system that is totally unfair. Perpetrators, when they are U.S. soldiers, have legal protection and this must be changed,” she told IPS.

Fisher is currently touring Japan to gather support for her demand that perpetrators of crimes remain in Japan to face trial. She is also trying to set up a 24-hour rape crisis centre that can deal specifically with crimes committed by U.S. military servicemen.

Yet another wave of protest is growing over regular crimes committed by U.S. marines who frequent the bustling bars of Okinawa and participate in its vibrant nightlife.

Masayo Hirata, a former counselor for women seeking advice on their problems with U.S. troops – including offspring abandoned by fathers returning to the U.S. – says romantic liaisons with locals are common.

“Marrying or having relationships with American servicemen has become common these days among younger generation females who meet them in bars,” she said.

These interactions are a big part of the problem, according to protest groups, which include academics, lawyers and local politicians.

Sexual exploitation of local women has also sparked protests in other Asia-Pacific countries hosting U.S. forces, such as in the Philippines, which has a ship repair and recreational facility.

Public protests compelled the Philippine Senate to vote against the renewal of the lease on Clark Base in Angeles City in 1991 – a decision that many Okinawans found encouraging.

South Korea, officially at war with North Korea, hosts 37,000 marines located around the country, but the brutal killing in 1992 of a local woman working in an entertainment area close to the bases triggered demands for an end to the arrangement.

A 2010 survey conducted by the Mainichi Shimbun and Ryukyu Shimpo newspapers found that 71 percent of the Okinawans polled felt that the presence of U.S. troops was not necessary and 41 percent wanted the bases removed.

Campaigns have also focused on environmental degradation caused by the construction of military bases.

Human sit-ins against the construction of a heliport off the northeast coastline of Henoko, a quiet village, were forcibly disbanded. Locals, along with environmentalists on the mainland, claimed the heliport construction endangered coral and the native dugong population.

Okinawans say their daily lives are consumed with gnawing fear of accidents from U.S. fighter airplanes that also create deafening noise as they fly into U.S. bases located in densely crowded areas.

Animosity has recently been aggravated by the deployment on the island of Osprey aircraft, with locals voicing concerns over the poor safety record of the plane, which is capable of taking off and landing vertically.

Prof. Tsuneo Namihara, sociologist at the Okinawa University, explained to IPS that the recent territorial clashes between Japan and China over the Senkaku islands, claimed by both countries, have made it more difficult to get rid of U.S. bases.

“As a result, I fear the anti-base movement will veer away from the traditional pacifism (associated) with the local protests. The younger generation is getting impatient with the heavy hand of the Japanese government that is ignoring the wishes of the local population,” he warned.

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Gaza Assault Shows a New Egypt

Global Geopolitics & Political Economy / IPS

Adam Morrow, Khaled Moussa al-Omrani

CAIRO, Nov 23 (IPS) – The reaction of post-revolution Egypt to Israel’s weeklong onslaught on the next-door Gaza Strip – brought to a halt temporarily at least by a Wednesday night ceasefire – has contrasted sharply with the former regime’s callous approach to the besieged coastal enclave."The Mubarak regime unashamedly participated in Israel’s siege of the Gaza Strip, never missing an opportunity to pressure Hamas," Tarek Fahmi, Israel affairs expert at the Cairo-based National Centre for Middle East Studies told IPS. "Egypt’s new leadership, by contrast, has expressed its unconditional support for Hamas and the people of Gaza, and actively tried to lift the siege."

President Mohamed Mursi became Egypt’s first freely elected head of state this summer, some 16 months after the ouster of longstanding president Hosni Mubarak. Mursi hails from Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, of which the Palestinian resistance faction Hamas – which has governed the Gaza Strip since 2007 – is an ideological offshoot.

Unlike his predecessor, and most Western leaders, Egypt’s new president was quick to denounce the latest round of Israeli bloodletting. In his weekly Friday sermon on Nov. 16, Mursi vowed that Egypt would not leave the Gaza Strip "on its own" to face Israel’s "shameless aggression."

In a clear reference to post-revolution foreign policy changes, he went on to assert: "Egypt today is very different than the Egypt of yesterday."

The latest violence was triggered by Israel’s assassination on Nov. 14 of a top Hamas commander, to which Gaza-based resistance groups responded by firing salvoes of rockets. The subsequent week of unremitting Israeli bombardments – from air, land and sea – left more than 150 Palestinians dead, the vast majority civilians, and hundreds more seriously injured.

In the same period, five Israelis were killed by rocket fire from Gaza. Several more were reported injured.

Following announcement of the ceasefire, Hamas political chief Khaled Meshaal expressed gratitude to Mursi for Egypt’s role in mediating an end to the violence. He also thanked the Egyptian president for the latter’s "decisions and approach to Israel’s latest aggression on Gaza."

Since the crisis first began, Egypt’s reaction has not been confined to strongly worded statements.

On the first day of the onslaught, Cairo announced the withdrawal of its ambassador to Israel, while Mursi called on the UN Security Council and the Cairo-based Arab League to hold emergency meetings. Two days later, Egyptian Prime Minister Hisham Qandil paid a brief visit to the beleaguered territory in a show of solidarity.

Egypt also opened the Rafah border crossing, the strip’s only link to the outside world (since its 2005 ‘unilateral withdrawal’ from the territory, Israel has kept its border with the strip hermetically sealed). Passengers and cargo, including desperately needed medical supplies, are now flowing from Egypt into the strip, while injured Palestinians are being brought into Egypt for medical treatment.

According to Fahmi, the reaction of Egypt’s new Islamist leadership to the latest crisis in Gaza corresponds to Mursi’s – and by extension the Muslim Brotherhood’s – stated positions on the perennial Arab-Israel conflict.

"Mursi’s reaction is in line with his campaign platform and his post-election statements on the issue," Fahmi explained, "in which he said that Egypt under his leadership would directly support the Palestinian people against Israel’s continued occupation of Palestine and work to secure Palestinian national aspirations."

The Egyptian response to the current crisis contrasted starkly with the Mubarak regime’s reaction to Israel’s 2008/09 ‘Cast Lead’ offensive. Over the course of that three-week-long onslaught almost four years ago, in which Israel used internationally banned weapons, some 1,500 Palestinians – mostly civilians – were killed and thousands more injured.

Despite the ferocity of the Cast Lead assault, Mubarak’s Egypt had kept the Rafah border crossing tightly sealed. Not even Palestinians suffering life-threatening injuries had been allowed into Egypt for medical treatment.

"At the behest of the U.S. and Israel, Mubarak completed the Zionist blockade of the strip – even at the height of the Cast Lead massacre – in hopes of destroying Hamas," Magdi Hussein, political analyst and former head of Egypt’s Islamist-leaning Labour Party told IPS.

"Mursi, by contrast, openly supports the resistance in Gaza and began taking steps to open the border even before the latest aggression," added Hussein, who was jailed for two years under Mubarak for crossing into the strip without permission during Israel’s 2008/09 assault.

Notably, Mursi has also shifted Egyptian support from the Palestinian Fatah movement, which leads the West Bank-based Palestinian Authority, to Hamas in Gaza.

"Egypt now supports Hamas, to which the Brotherhood is affiliated ideologically and which espouses a strategy of armed resistance," said Fahmi. "The Mubarak regime had supported Hamas’s bitter rival Fatah, which had insisted on holding fruitless ‘peace talks’ with Israel that utterly failed to improve the Palestinians’ position."

Egyptian support for the people of Gaza – and the resistance based there – has hardly been confined to official circles.

On Sunday, a convoy including hundreds of Egyptian activists of all political stripes briefly visited the strip to express solidarity with their beleaguered Palestinian brethren. Two days earlier, pro-Gaza rallies held across Egypt drew tens of thousands, while Egyptian political groups from across the spectrum are calling for an even bigger mass protest this Friday.

But while Egypt’s Gaza policy has changed fundamentally since last year’s revolution, that of the international community has apparently not. As was the case during Israel’s Cast Lead assault four years ago, the UN Security Council failed to issue a resolution calling for an end to hostilities.

On Tuesday (Nov. 20), one day before the ceasefire announcement, the U.S. blocked a UN Security Council statement condemning the escalating violence.

"Some European capitals appear more sympathetic to Hamas and Gaza this time around," said Fahmi. "Washington’s support for Israel, however, as during Cast Lead, appears to be total."

All rights reserved, IPS – Inter Press Service, 2012.

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