LEBANON: Another Rupture Sealed, For Now

Global Geopolitics Net Sites / IPS
Tuesday, November 04, 2008

All rights reserved, IPS – Inter Press Service, 2008.

By Mona Alami

BEIRUT, Nov 3 (IPS) – Over the past few months, Tripoli, a large harbour city sitting on Lebanon’s northern shores, known for its mazy souks, century-old mansions and oriental sweets, has made front page headlines, falling prey to a series of deadly security threats. Following the recent political reconciliation between warring politicians, however, the army made headway towards establishing stability by infiltrating a terrorist cell accused of orchestrating attacks against the Lebanese army.

In the presence of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, leaders of Tripoli’s various factions last month agreed a reconciliation agreement at the residence of Sheikh Malek Chaar, Mufti of Tripoli and North Lebanon. The document’s ratification put an end to four months of spiralling violence between the Alawite minority living in the Baal Mohsen area, also known as Jabal Mohsen, and Sunni communities from the adjacent impoverished neighbourhood of Bab el-Tebbaneh. The Alawites are a Shia sect.

The agreement was signed by Sunni and Future movement leader Saad Hariri, son of slain premier Rafik Hariri who was killed in a bomb blast in 2005 that is largely attributed to Syria. It was endorsed by pro-Syrian Alawite leader Rifaat Al-Assad and his son, Ali Eid. Siniora declared while signing the document that “Tripoli should be a demilitarised city, free of gunmen and any military presence.”

He went on to underline that the army and security forces have been ordered to enforce law and order. Hariri also attempted to reassure the public by pledging that the state will meet the needs of victims of the violence.

An army source interviewed by IPS, who chose to remain anonymous because of the sensitivity of the issue, admitted that “power struggles among the different factions in the north have temporarily ebbed since the reconciliation.” But he said that while money flowing into Tripoli will help relieve pressure in the shanty towns sprawling around the city, the issue of weapons, which abound in the northern capital, remains unresolved. The source said the Alawites are still in possession of large stockpiles of weapons received from Syria, while weapons are also found in many Sunni households.

The fractured Lebanese government has yet to address the issue of weapons, and restoring the peace in Tripoli has proved a complex exercise in cooperation. The Lebanese pro-Western and Arab parliamentary majority — comprised of the Future movement, the Druze Progressive Socialist party as well as the Christian Phalangists and Lebanese Forces — has been engaged in intense rivalry since the death of Rafik Hariri with the pro-Iranian and Syrian minority dominated by the Shia Hezbollah and Amal parties, which are allied to the Christian Free Patriotic movement.

In spite of both blocks forming a unity government in July, and Tripoli’s allegiance to the majority leadership, the dissention between the two factions, though condemned officially by all sides, has translated into intermittent eruptions of violence in the northern city. The area was shaken by two terrorist attacks that targeted the army on Aug. 13 and Sep. 29, resulting in 21 deaths.

“There was a definite breakdown of power in the North, with every small faction taking over a neighbourhood and imposing its own law, with individual feuds being exploited by various political factions and taking on a sectarian dimension,” said the army source.

However, political factions seem to have finally reached a consensus. “The resulting collaboration between the various intelligence services has allowed the crackdown on a terrorist cell accused of the bombings, which, according to information provided to me, was operating independently,” said Future movement MP Moustapha Allouch.

Islamist factions close to the minority added, however, that fear of possible Syrian intervention in the north under the banner of support to the Alawite community, or a possible quelling of the Salafist movements (a radical faction of Islam) as well as pressure from foreign countries allowed for the crackdown. Syria, Lebanon’s immediate neighbour to the north, ruled by an Alawite minority, has historically suppressed Islamic movements, and Tripoli is known to be home to various fundamentalist factions.

On Oct. 13, members of the terrorist group allegedly involved in the recent bombings targeting the army in northern Lebanon were arrested, according to a statement released by the Lebanese army.

“Tensions have been diffused to a certain extent since the intervention of the High Relief Commission (HCR), which is handling the compensation of victims of violence in Tripoli and has beefed up its staff working on the relief effort from four to ten committees. However, the lengthy process has frustrated some citizens,” said Allouch.

The MP pointed out that the fragile reconciliation process could still be jeopardised by the activity of foreign intelligence services — namely, Syria. But for now, the decrease in the number of men in fatigues roaming the streets is a refreshing sight.

POLITICS-US: Analysts Question Timing of Syria Raid

Global Geopolitics Net Sites / IPS
Tuesday, October 28, 2008

All rights reserved, IPS – Inter Press Service, 2008.

Ali Gharib

WASHINGTON, Oct 28 (IPS) – A cross-border raid into Syria by U.S. forces in Iraq, and a subsequent stonewalling by U.S. officials unwilling to divulge details, has led to rampant speculation among U.S. analysts about the origins and meaning of the attack.

”So the question is: Why?” wrote geo-strategic analyst and journalist Helena Cobban on her blog, wondering if the raid could have been pulled off without explicit permission from the highest levels of the President George W. Bush administration.

”So why now at the end of the Bush administration, with Washington trying to play nice with Damascus and tensions easing throughout the region, would U.S. forces stage such a gambit?” echoed Borzou Daragahi on the Babylon and Beyond blog at the Los Angeles Times website.
[Read more...]

YEMEN: Govt Holding More Than 1,000 Political Prisoners

Global Geopolitics Net Sites / IPS
Friday, October 24, 2008

All rights reserved, IPS – Inter Press Service, 2008.

Zainab Mineeia

WASHINGTON, Oct 24 (IPS) – A new report by Human Rights Watch (HRW) urges Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh to launch an independent commission to investigate arbitrary arrests and disappearances and to hold those responsible to account.

In the 50-page report released Friday, HRW investigated 62 cases of disappearances and arbitrary arrests linked to the Huthi rebellion. Huthis are a religious Shia group that is part of the Zaidi sect that comprises 45 percent of the population in Yemen.

Al-Huthi Zaidis, who take their name from their leader, Hussein Badraddin Al-Huthi, are estimated to be about 30 percent of the Yemeni population, according to Hassan Zaid, secretary-general of the al-Haq opposition party.

A second subset of Zaidis — a Hashemite group — is also the alleged target of arbitrary arrests.
[Read more...]

MIDEAST: Pressure Piling Up on Hamas Ahead of Unity Meet

Global Geopolitics Net Sites / IPS
Friday, October 17, 2008

All rights reserved, IPS – Inter Press Service, 2008.

Analysis by Adam Morrow and Khaled Moussa al-Omrani

CAIRO, Oct 17 (IPS) – Egypt recently re-opened its border with the Gaza Strip to limited traffic in advance of an upcoming Palestinian reconciliation conference to be held in Cairo next month. But some independent commentators say Egypt is merely using the border as a means of pressuring resistance faction Hamas into accepting its proposals for a Palestinian national unity government.

”Cairo is playing the border card to coerce Hamas into accepting its terms for reconciliation with Fatah,” local journalist and political activist Hatem al-Bulk told IPS.

For three days last month, Egypt opened the border — sealed since Hamas took power in Gaza last year — to limited traffic. The decision came despite claims from Israeli security officials that Palestinian ”terrorists” would take advantage of the move to launch attacks on Israeli vacationers in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula.

From Sep. 20 to 22, the Rafah border crossing was opened to some 2,500 Palestinian students, medical patients and religious pilgrims en route to Saudi Arabia. ”On the first day, about 1,200 pilgrims and 150 medical patients made the crossing with relative ease,” said al-Bulk, a resident of north-western Sinai.

Al-Bulk added, however, that repeated Israeli objections to the move hampered cross-border traffic the following day. ”After renewed Israeli objections, there was a noticeable increase in bureaucratic delays, while a number of students were denied permission to make the crossing,” al-Bulk said.

The border was reopened again last week to allow returning pilgrims back into the embattled territory. According to reports, roughly 700 pilgrims have since returned to Gaza by way of Rafah, although another 500 Palestinians, including students and medical patients, remain stuck on the Egyptian side.

”The crossing is only open to pilgrims returning from Saudi Arabia,” said al-Bulk. ”Hundreds of others are still stranded in Egypt.”

The spate of limited border openings comes amid stepped up Egyptian efforts to broker an agreement for national reconciliation between Hamas in Gaza and the U.S.-backed Fatah movement of Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas, based in the West Bank. Since Hamas seized control of Gaza from the PA in a pre-emptive coup last year, the two factions have pursued a bitter rivalry — featuring mass arrests and intermittent fighting — that has led to dire consequences for the Palestinian national cause.

While Hamas follows a policy of resistance to Israeli occupation, Fatah maintains a strategy of negotiation with the Jewish state, despite the failure of peace talks until now to realise any gains for the Palestinian side.

In recent weeks, Egyptian officials have held separate talks in Cairo with a dozen different Palestinian factions — including both Hamas and Fatah — in hopes of reaching a ”comprehensive dialogue” agreement, expected to be signed by all the factions at a major reconciliation conference in Cairo early next month. Egypt hopes the pact will eventually lead to a Palestinian government of national unity.

Along with Palestinian agreement on the terms of a unity government, the Egyptian proposal also calls for a broad prisoner-exchange deal between Hamas and Israel. It also calls on Hamas to relinquish exclusive control of the Gaza Strip and on Israel to permanently open Gaza’s border crossings to human and material traffic.

After voicing initial reservations, Hamas officials reportedly agreed to the terms of the proposal following a series of meetings with Egyptian officials in Cairo last week. ”The Egyptians told me personally that Hamas accepted the plan,” PA negotiator Nabil Shaath was quoted as saying in the state press Oct. 12.

Hamas also reportedly confirmed its intention to attend bilateral Hamas-Fatah talks in Cairo on Oct. 25 in advance of the Nov. 3 ”comprehensive dialogue” conference. If they are not derailed by political wrangling, these talks will represent the first official meeting between the two rivals since Hamas’s seizure of Gaza in the summer of last year, after winning elections there in 2006.

”When Hamas makes concessions in its conditions for participating, Egypt opens the border; when Hamas stands firm, Egypt closes it,” said al-Bulk. ”With Hamas now firmly ensconced in Gaza, this is Egypt’s only means of exerting pressure on it.”

Abdelaziz Shadi, coordinator of Cairo University’s Israeli studies programme, agreed for the most part, saying Egypt’s recent moves to open the border were based on strategic — in addition to humanitarian — concerns.

”Egypt opened Rafah in order to ease the ongoing siege of Gaza,” Shadi told IPS. ”But Egypt also wants to foster a suitable environment for successful dialogue by sending a message to the Palestinian factions that Egypt is the only real ‘strategic depth’ available to them.”

Since assuming power in Gaza, Hamas has demanded that Egypt open the Rafah crossing to people and goods on a permanent basis. Egypt, however — along with the PA, Israel and the U.S. — maintains that Rafah can only be opened according to a 2005 U.S.-backed agreement granting the PA and Israel de facto control over the crossing.

In late January, some half million Palestinians flocked into the northern Sinai Peninsula from Gaza to stock up on essential supplies following the partial destruction of the border fence. The frontier was re-sealed ten days later amid limited clashes between Palestinians and Egyptian authorities.

Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul-Gheit infamously declared at the time that anyone approaching the sensitive border without permission ”would have his legs broken.”

Since then, security on the Egyptian side has increased dramatically, including the construction of a new security wall along the entire length of the country’s 14 kilometre border with the Gaza Strip.

”Border security has been tightened substantially in recent months,” said al-Bulk. ”The authorities are searching for smuggling tunnels on a daily basis and they have just finished building a separation wall — four meters tall and two meters thick — between Egypt and Gaza.”

Hamas won an outright majority in 2006 Palestinian legislative elections. Nevertheless, its authority in Gaza is not recognised by the international community, while the Gaza Strip remains subject to an internationally sanctioned embargo that has effectively deprived its roughly 1.5 million inhabitants of desperately needed food, medicine and fuel.

LEBANON: In an Uneasy Togetherness with Syria

Global Geopolitics Net Sites / IPS
October 8, 2008

All rights reserved, IPS – Inter Press Service, 2008.

Analysis by Mona Alami

BEIRUT, Oct 8 (IPS) – Small countries right next to one another, Syria and Lebanon seem light years apart. The two countries have shared a rocky relationship for decades, characterised mainly by Syrian dominance. Once again this relationship appears to be put to test as reports of Syrian deployment on Lebanon’s borders abound.

Both were together under French mandate for more than 20 years, and achieved independence in 1943. Since then, Syria has considered its neighbour an artificial creation — an accident of history born of the whims of colonial countries.

Syrian troops entered Lebanon as peacekeepers in 1976, in the midst of the 15-year civil war. They stayed on after the war ended in 1990, with the signing of the Taef Agreement which divided power equally between Muslims and Christians. Syria ended up in effect occupying the country for some 30 years until 2005. They had to leave after former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri was assassinated in a powerful bomb blast on Feb. 14 that year, that was widely blamed on the Damascus regime.

In recent months, much changed in the strained relationship between the two countries, at least on the surface. A landmark summit between President Michel Suleiman and his Syrian counterpart Bashar al-Assad in Damascus Aug. 14 concluded with an agreement to establish diplomatic relations. For the first time in Lebanon’s history, a Lebanese president was officially received by a Syrian president on the Damascus airport tarmac. Previously, Lebanon’s heads of state had to drive to the Syrian capital and await reception in the corridors of the presidential Syrian palaces. The summit was followed by a decision to establish an embassy in Damascus.

But these changes have not ended Syria’s influence in Lebanon, they only heralded a change in appearances. Damascus still pulls its weight around the Land of the Cedars. Following a week-long civil conflict in May, an agreement was reached in Doha on May 21 only after the Syrian Socialist National Party (SSNP) and the Shia Hezbollah and Amal acquired veto power in a unity cabinet. An agreement was also reached over the presidency, which had been vacant for six months, with the election of Suleiman, a consensus figure approved by Syria.

Syrian sway in Lebanon was also seen in a surprising statement by Suleiman that ”the international community must open up to Syria, following the example set by France, as it plays a fundamental role at the regional level.” The announcement was made following a meeting with U.S. officials in Baabda, the presidential palace.

Matters of crucial importance remained hanging in the air, with the Syrian-Lebanese Higher Council playing an integral role in solving the issues. ”The Syrian Lebanese Higher Council Council is at the centre of the architectural agreements linking Syria to Lebanon, dubbed the Fraternity, Cooperation and Coordination treaty. The council plays a diplomatic role, which is in contradiction to the establishment of diplomatic ties,” said lawyer and constitutionalist Majed Fayad.

The Syrian Lebanese Higher Council, which is comprised of the Syrian and Lebanese presidents, prime ministers and speakers of the house, breaches the principle of separation of power. In addition, the Fraternity, Cooperation and Coordination treaty between the two countries ties Lebanon’s fate to Syria’s, especially in matters of security, defence and foreign policy.

Other vital matters that need to be addressed by both countries include weapons supply to Hezbollah from Syria, the demarcation of Syrian borders with Lebanon, and the return of Lebanese detainees in Syrian prisons, thought by some to correspond to 600 missing persons.

Oussam Safa, managing director of the Lebanese Centre for Political Studies, interpreted Suleiman’s visit to Syria as a partial success. ”It was Fawzi Salloukh (Lebanon’s foreign minister) who dampened the excitement related to the detainee issue by admitting to only 100 or so Lebanese prisoners in Syrian jails. There is a lack of seriousness from the political establishment in opening the detainees file.”

In a country where political assassinations and ethnic cleansing prevailed during 15 years of civil war, the detainee file is viewed by many as a Pandora’s box, especially if Syria chooses to retaliate by unveiling embarrassing truths such as the details of massacres committed by the Lebanese leadership during the war, or the location of mass graves.

”The drawing of the border between the two countries, especially in the area of the Shebaa farm, is unlikely to occur as long as Israel occupies the Golan Heights,” said Safa. The ownership of the Shebaa farm, a land currently occupied by Israel, has long been disputed. Syria has made clear numerous times that it links the matter of the occupation of the Golan to drawing its borders with Lebanon in the disputed area.

More pressing concerns will have to be addressed, however, by the Lebanese government as tensions mount between Lebanon and its Syrian neighbour. On Sep. 22, Syrian troops were reported to have deployed about 10,000 special forces in the northern region along the border between Lebanon and Syria, according to AFP. This military presence has been further beefed up, according to pan-Arab daily al-Hayat, quoting eyewitnesses saying that Syria had deployed tanks along the border facing the northern Bekaa town of al-Qaa. They added that the deployment was dovetailed with the digging of trenches and setting up of encampments.

The relative quiet that had characterised Syrian-Lebanese relations in recent months has certainly taken an unexpected turn, as belligerence appears, once again, on the rise.

Man of Peace Swimming against the Current

Global Geopolitics – Global News Blog – Global Analyst Online
Tuesday, September 16, 2008

© Copyright 2008 Nicola Nasser. All rights reserved.

By Nicola Nasser*

For the first time, since the U.S.-hosted Annapolis conference on November 27 last year re-launched the Palestinian – Israeli negotiations, which were interrupted by the Al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000 after the collapse of the Camp David trilateral summit, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas came out for the first time on record in Cairo on September 6 to “doubt” striking a peace deal with Israel “by the end of the year because very little time is left;” on September 10 he reiterated his skepticism in an interview with the Israeli daily Haaretz.

Accordingly he dispelled U.S. President George W. Bush’s pledge to reach such a deal before his term ends and at the same time practically announced that peace talks have now been frozen for at least a year by the government changes in Washington and Tel Aviv. Abbas was reportedly scheduled to hold his last meeting with the Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert, in Jerusalem on September 16, one day before Kadima, Olmert’s ruling party elects his successor, ahead of his scheduled meeting with U.S. President George W. Bush at the White House on September 25. It seems all the partners to the Annapolis process are trying to strike a last minute impossible deal or simply saying good by to each other.

Nonetheless Abbas shows all evidence that he is determined to swim against an overwhelming current to prove that he is the persistent unrelenting Palestinian partner who will never despair in his pursuit of peace, even he would pay the price with his own life, despite all the internal and external odds, nor will he be deterred by the undelivered U.S. promises to loose trust in Washington.

On September 10 he told Haaretz that, “Even today, I’m convinced that I would have signed the Oslo Accords. I risked my life for peace and if I have to pay for it with my life, that’s a negligible price. I don’t regret the Oslo Accords. Twenty years before the agreement I believed in peace with the Israelis, and I still believe in it.”

He is still desperately determined to remain committed to his “strategic option” of a negotiated peace deal with Israel in pursuit of a life-long hope that would make or break his political career as well as a Palestinian leadership team, led by him, that has bet everything on a mirage-like U.S. promises to deliver a Palestinian state on the part of historic Palestine which Israel occupied in 1967, although Bush’s pledges to former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon on April 14, 2004 have so far proved much more stronger strategic commitments than the U.S. vague promises to Palestinians, and despite the fact that the overall Israeli policy and every single tactic of that policy indicate a strategy that clashes head-to-head with the minimum Palestinian national aspiration for an independent, viable and contiguous state as the basis for a just and lasting peace.

Not deterred by all indications to the contrary, his determination, it seems, would never loose hope to agree with those, like King Abdullah II of Jordan, who believe that the Annapolis opportunity was the last chance for the Palestinian – Israeli peace process to deliver. He is determined too not to be held responsible for any collapse of the peace talks; therefore he ignores Israeli non-commitment and clings to his own commitments to the letter and soul of the Annapolis understandings.

He is similarly determined not to loose his hope that the United States could still deliver on its promises. “We are determined to continue accelerated diplomatic negotiations concurrently with the change of administration in the United States,” Abbas was quoted as saying in Cernobbio, Italy, on Friday. He appealed to the upcoming U.S. administration not to waste “seven more years” to resume its peace efforts. “The new administration should not wait seven years for us to start negotiations. It should begin immediately as soon as a new president is in the White House.” However, with nothing on the record to prove the U.S. would be forthcoming, a Palestinian semi-consensus is ruling out such a possibility as wishful thinking, and Abbas is similarly swimming against this strong internal current, which has all throughout opposed the Annapolis initiative as a non-starter.

Peace-making seems so absurd now as to defy all logic and belief, at least to the majority of the Palestinian people, according to Palestinian polls, the most recent of which was released on September 7 by the Near East Consulting Company to show that 86% of Palestinians are frustrated, 43% believed that the conflict with Israel will continue and a Palestinian state will not be established, 24% of respondents believed that a Palestinian state will be established within 10-20 years, 18% within 5-10 years 16% within a year to five years.

The optimistic fanfare Abbas and his team raised following the Annapolis conference has now boiled down to publicly voiced bitter disappointment and disillusion; his earlier insistence on time tables and deadlines as preconditions have now been forgone for the sake of not dooming the talking process; his threatening repeated warnings that the continued expansion of the illegal Israeli colonial settlements would spell the end of negotiations have been replaced by lenient appeals to the same effect.

Abbas’ preconditioning a deal with the Israelis on reaching an agreement on all and every issue of the final status issues, a precondition which was recently revived with stress, was met by a cold shower with Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s proposal for a partial deal agreement that rules out Jerusalem, ostensibly temporarily until a later stage, but detrimentally excluding the issue of refugees for good, a deal not to be implemented but to be presented to Bush then to the United Nations General Assembly in November, which would bestow on the proposal a UN legitimacy that would in turn legitimize Ariel Sharon’s original draft of an interim, transitional and long-term temporary Palestinian state on (42) percent of the West Bank, demarcated by the more than 700km-long wall Israel is building on the occupied Palestinian territory, termed by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the Wall of Expansion and Annexation, by Israelis as the “security barrier” and by everyday media as simply the Apartheid Wall, which the International Court of Justice in the Hague ruled as “illegal” in July 2004.

Abbas, the PLO and the Palestinian Authority (PA) have officially on record rejected both Israeli proposals of the transitional state and the partial agreement. “Jerusalem and the right of return are inalienable Palestinian rights, too,” he confirmed during his recent visit to Cairo. However this official rejection is defying the Israeli-created facts on the ground of more than 200 Jewish settlements and outposts, home to slightly less than half a million settlers, living among two and a half million Palestinians, but exclusively controlling (37) percent and restricting the free movement of Palestinians on (21) percent of the land, all tied inextricably into Israel proper by a massive network of Israeli-only highways and, ultimately, the “Security Barrier,” which all indicate that the Occupation is no longer “a temporary military situation” as defined by international law. These facts, together with the U.S. collusion with the Israeli determination to annex most of them, especially in Jerusalem, to Israel proper, sweep away whatever credibility is left to whatever remains of the peace process.

Bush’s letter to Sharon was an old proof of the U.S. collusion; the latest proof was revealed on September 7 by Tayseer Khaled, a member of the Executive Committee of the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s (PLO), that the U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, in her last visit to Ramallah, tried to get the PLO’s OK for a statehood with temporary borders and the postponement of negotiating the outstanding final-status issues.

While rejecting out of hand the notion that peace-making would ever have a “last chance,” Abbas however would accept a “last chance” to resolve peacefully the inter-Palestinian conflict with Hamas in the Gaza Strip. If the ongoing Egyptian mediation fails to reconcile the Palestinian rivals, Abbas will “take all steps and measures to restore Gaza before the end of this year,” he said in Egypt. This impatience with Hamas is another manifestation of his determination to use the break in negotiations, brought about by the U.S. and Israeli government changes, to put his Palestinian house in order ahead of any possible resumption of talks thereafter.

Within this context Abbas is battling political foes on two fronts, declaring the Hamas – Gaza front as being his first priority. He is also involved in a power struggle within his own Fatah party on another front. Abbas here is allying himself with a U.S. – backed and Israeli – okayed diverse spectrum of Fatah and non-Fatah politicians who share his strategy and tactics, with the government of Prime Minister Salam Fayyad in the forefront. The battle ground revolves now on the renewal of Abbas’ mandate, which terminates on January 9.

This spectrum is evolving as a “third power” between Fatah and Hamas and is fueling the rivalry between them in the hope of establishing itself as the alternative to both, but has yet to officially take shape as a unified party. Both Abbas and this “third” power are mutually exploiting each other to gain the upper hand both within the ranks of the Palestinian Authority and the PLO, where there is still very strong opposition to the strategy of both. This evolving force is fomenting the power struggle between Abbas and that opposition as much as it is exacerbating his rivalry with Hamas, cornering him in a very sensitive but critical showdown with his own party, Fatah. Abbas’ bitter battle with Hamas is smoke-screening the power struggle within Fatah, which currently evolve around convening both the PLO National Council (parliament-in-exile) and the sixth Congress of Fatah, both overdue.

However Abbas shows all the determination necessary to put his house in order, with his sight unwaveringly focused on his peace prize, an independent, viable and contiguous state, no matter what!

Nicola Nasser is a veteran Arab journalist based in Bir Zeit, West Bank of the Israeli – occupied Palestinian territories.

TRADE: UAE Takes Part in ITB Asia 2008

Global Geopolitics – Global News Blog – Global Politics Online – IPS
Wednesday, September 10, 2008

All rights reserved, IPS – Inter Press Service, 2008.

Att.Editors: The following item is from the Emirates News Agency (WAM)

ABU DHABI, Sep. 10 (IPS) – The United Arab Emirates will be participating in the world’s largest travel trade show, ITB Asia, a three day B2B trade show and convention which will bring together more 5000 travel and tourism experts from more than 50 countries.

The Oct. 22-24 event is set to feature the full range of travel products, services and goods, while at the same time functioning as a knowledge platform for the industry with the concurrently held ITB Asia Convention and events by partners.

Top officials from the UAE tourism and travel industry will also engage in talks at the event on challenges facing travel industry worldwide.

Messe Berlin, organizer of the world’s largest travel trade show, of ITB Asia 2008 told WAM that companies and agencies that have ambitions and take advantage of the available opportunities will achieve success in today’s tourism and travel landscape.

ITB Asia will feature the full range of travel products, services and goods, while at the same time functioning as a knowledge platform for the industry with the concurrently held ITB Asia Convention and events by partners.

Technological and intellectual changes (such as virtual travel and tourism) are faster in Asia than in other parts of the world and are driven by increasing demand in India and China.

President Assad wants a Cold War

Global Geopolitics – Global News Blog
Wednesday, August 27, 2008

© Copyright 2008 Meir Javedanfar – Middle East Analyst. All rights reserved.

This article was originally published on Middle East Analyst. Read the article in its original form.

By Meir Javedanfar

The guns have barely fallen silent in the conflict between Georgia and Russia. The two sides are still squabbling over the implementation of the ceasefire agreement. Yet that didn’t stop President Bashar Al Assad of Syria from becoming the first head of state to visit Russia, where he declared his unyielding support for Moscow’s position regarding Georgia. “We understand Russia’s stance regarding the breakaway regions and understand that it came in retaliation to Georgian provocation,” he said.

Even more interesting was his follow-up statement: “We oppose any attempt to harm Russia’s position.” He even went as far as to generously offer to host Russian ground-to-ground missiles in his country.

Assad could see that Western demands for Russia to withdraw its forces from South Ossetia – and the recent agreement between Poland and the U.S. to place an anti -missile shield on Polish territory – are worrying Russia.

Moscow is concerned that the West, especially the U.S., is using every opportunity to undermine its position. Some Russians have gone as far as to view Georgia’s provocative decision to send its forces into South Ossetia as a Western-sponsored trap, meant to lure Russia into a conflict. The West would then use Russia’s response as justification for the expansion of NATO in the Caucasus, as well as in Eastern Europe, especially Ukraine. Both are very sensitive points for Moscow.

By throwing in his lot completely with Russia, Assad obviously hoped that he could use the current anti-Western sentiment in Moscow as capital to finance Russia’s support – both militarily and politically – for Syria and its position.
The purpose of his visit and supporting statement was clear. He was basically insinuating to the Russians:

Like it or not, the West has declared a new Cold War against you, and you must respond. I am willing to help you, if you are willing to reciprocate, by giving me the weapons I need, and by using your presence in the Middle East to scare the Americans and the Israelis who are undermining my position.

The motivations of his strategy are understandable. Unlike his father, when Bashar became president he did not have the support of the Soviet superpower. This made the job of purchasing sophisticated weaponry to counter that of Israel much more difficult. The loss of the Soviet Union as a backer also meant that Damascus lost a powerful ally on the international stage, especially in the UN. Although Syria consolidated power in the Middle East through its alliance with Hezbollah and Iran, on a global scale the country remains isolated, with no prospect of the U.S. or the EU giving their support as the USSR once did. Furthermore, the country’s present economic situation under Bashar is far worse than when his father was in charge. Back then, Syria was earning 80% of its income from oil. Now, due to dwindling resources, this figure is down to 20%. The same goes for water resources. There are reports from Damascus that repeated, lengthy cuts in water supply are making life for its citizens extremely difficult, especially in the summer heat.

Despite his efforts, it is unlikely that Assad can get the Cold War revival that he seeks. First and foremost, Russia of 2008 is far more different than Russia of 1988. Its economy is far more intertwined and dependent on Western capital and trade.

This was demonstrated recently when foreign investors pulled their money out of Russia in the wake of the Georgia conflict at the fastest rate since the 1998 ruble crisis. According to the Financial Times, Russian foreign currency reserves dropped by $16.4 billion in the fist week of the conflict with Georgia. This was one of the largest absolute weekly drops in ten years, which put pressure on the ruble and on foreign confidence in the Russian economy.
These days, thanks to trade with the West and high energy prices, Russians are used to the good life. “If the Georgians were smart, instead of attacking South Ossetia, all they needed to do was to threaten to bomb the Gucci shop in Moscow,” quipped a Russian businessman I know, who travels regularly between Israel and Russia. “Russians would have agreed to their annexation of South Ossetia in no time.”

Joking aside, Russia’s leadership is all too aware that economic misery could cost them votes and popularity at home. This is why they will not allow their relations with the EU and the U.S. to deteriorate too drastically by entering into another Cold War.

Unfortunately for Assad, the same goes for Russia’s relations with Israel. Level of trade and diplomatic relations between Russia and Israel, compared to the days of the USSR, have increased astronomically. Russia now hosts hundreds of thousands of its citizens who lived in Israel, have Israeli passports, and are now back living in their land of birth. Many more of its citizens live in Israel. Israeli companies have offices and have invested in the Russian economy,. They have also been instrumental in the high tech and jewelery industry. Today, Russians visit Israel in record numbers. The level of bilateral trade between them is estimated to stand at more than $2 billion – and is rising. Russia would have very little to gain by supporting Syria, at the cost of making Israel into its enemy.

Furthermore, with the emergence of China as a superpower, maintaining relations with as many sides as possible is considered crucial to Moscow’s foreign policy.

Russia’s cold shoulder to Syria’s hopes for a new Cold War should not worry Iran too much. Its case is different than that of Damascus. Tehran has much larger gas and oil reserves. For now, its economic situations is not dire as Syria’s is. Furthermore, China supports Russia’s stance in the UN vis a vis the Iranian nuclear program. This means that Russia does not have to make any dramatic changes in its relations with Tehran. Even though they would prefer it, Iran’s leadership can live without a Cold War between Russia and the West. For Syria’s leader, it will be much more difficult.

Meir Javedanfar
Middle East Analyst
www.meepas.com
The Middle East. Analysed.

MIDEAST: Israel Pushes Ahead with Settlement Expansion

Global Geopolitics – Global News Blog – IPS
Wednesday, August 27, 2008

All rights reserved, IPS – Inter Press Service, 2008.

Mel Frykberg

JERUSALEM, Aug 27  (IPS)  – Israel has published tenders for the construction of 1,761 illegal housing units for Israeli settlers in occupied east Jerusalem alone, according to the Israeli rights group Peace Now.

The expansion plans come despite promises by the Israeli government at last year’s peace summit at Annapolis, Maryland (in the U.S.) to freeze all settlement growth.

”Once again this government has shown that its words and commitments are meaningless, and they have no intention of keeping to their word,” says Peace Now.

United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has stressed repeatedly that settlement construction or expansion in the West Bank is contrary to international law and Israel’s commitments under the ‘road map’ peace process.

The road map was a series of peace-building measures proposed by U.S. President George W. Bush in 2002 and subsequently developed by the diplomatic Quartet of the European Union, the United Nations, Russia and the United States.

Ban Ki-moon further urged Israel to freeze all settlement activity and to dismantle outposts erected since March of 2001.

U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, normally a diehard supporter of Israel, also expressed her concern about the settlement building during her last visit to Israel several months ago.

”It’s important to have an atmosphere of confidence and trust,” Rice said following talks she held with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas in Ramallah. ”The United States believes that the (settlement) actions and the announcements that are taking place are indeed having a negative effect on the atmosphere for negotiation.”

The new construction should not be allowed to shape future Israeli-Palestinian borders, which remain under negotiation, Rice said. ”The United States will not let these activities have any effect on final status negotiations, including final borders.”

The Geneva Conventions specifically forbid the transfer of a civilian population into occupied territory.

But even as Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert was meeting with Abbas in Jerusalem last week in an endeavour to further the peace process, plans for further settlement construction were already under way.

At the beginning of the month, prior to Peace Now’s statement, the Israel Lands Authority published tenders for the construction of 130 new housing units in Har Homa, East Jerusalem.

The Har Homa neighbourhood and all east Jerusalem settlements were built on land Israel occupied in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Israel subsequently incorporated the areas into Jerusalem’s boundaries in a move not recognised internationally.

In addition to the public announcement of the tenders, there are currently 500 houses already under construction in Har Homa, and 240 in the settlement of Maaleh Adumim in East Jerusalem.

At the same time as the Har Homa tenders were being published, Israeli officials also called for bids from construction companies to build more than 300 apartments in the West Bank settlement of Beitar Illit near Bethlehem, and about 20 minutes drive from Jerusalem.

This came on top of Olmert’s approval at the beginning of the year to build 750 new houses in the Givat Zeev settlement northwest of Jerusalem, and 100 in the Ariel settlement in the northern West Bank.

There are approximately 430,000 Israeli settlers residing illegally in the West Bank.

According to Israeli advocacy group B’Tselem, Israel has established 135 settlements in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) that have been recognised by the Interior Ministry. Additionally, dozens of outposts of varying size have been established.

Sixteen settlements were established in the Gaza Strip and subsequently dismantled in 2005 during the implementation of the ‘disengagement plan’.

Land expropriation from Palestinian farmers for the building and enlargement of Israeli settlements has caused undue hardship and economic suffering for Palestinians, and some have initiated acts of civil disobedience in a bid to retain the pieces of agricultural land that have not been confiscated.

The villagers of Bil’in and Ni’ilin near Ramallah in the central West Bank, together with international activists and Israeli sympathisers, have staged weekly protests that have resulted in a number of deaths, arrests and injuries. The most infamous incident was the blindfolding, handcuffing and shooting of Ni’ilin resident Ashraf Abu Rahma.

The villagers of Ni’ilin have been protesting land expropriation which has seen the size of their village reduced from 5,700 hectares of land in 1948 to 3,300 hectares in 1967, to the present approximate of 1,000 hectares.

Ni’ilin olives farmer Bahjat Mesleh told IPS he had lost about 75 dunams (10 dunums is one hectare) of land to make way for the building of the separation barrier which divides Israel from the West Bank.

”This has cost me about 25,000 dollars, and I am more fortunate than other farmers as I’ve been able to continue supporting my family by working as a teacher. Not all farmers have been able to continue a livelihood,” said Mesleh.

According to B’Tselem, ”Israel has stolen thousands of dunams of land from the Palestinians. Israel forbids Palestinians to enter and use these lands, and uses the settlements to justify numerous violations of Palestinian rights, such as the right to housing, to earn a living, and freedom of movement.

”The settlers, on the other hand, benefit from all rights given to citizens of Israel who live inside the Green Line, and in some instances, even additional rights.”

The principal tool used to take control of land is to declare it state land. This process began in 1979, and is based on a manipulative implementation of the Ottoman Lands Law of 1858, which applied in the area at the time of occupation.

Other methods employed by Israel to take control of land include seizure for military needs, declaration of land as ”abandoned assets”, and the expropriation of land for public needs.

MIDEAST: Egyptian Kinship with Fatah Hampers Mediation

Global Geopolitics – Global News Blog – IPS
Monday, August 25, 2008

All rights reserved, IPS – Inter Press Service, 2008.

Adam Morrow and Khaled Moussa al-Omrani

CAIRO, Aug 25 (IPS) – Following renewed fighting between rival Palestinian factions Fatah and Hamas, Egypt has stepped up calls for dialogue and reconciliation. But critics say Cairo’s partiality to Fatah — which is backed, like the Egyptian regime itself, by the U.S. — prevents it from mediating fairly in the crisis.

”The Egyptian government is very sympathetic to Fatah,” Magdi Hussein, political analyst and secretary-general of Egypt’s frozen Labour Party, told IPS. ”For that reason, any new Egyptian attempt to mediate the dispute is doomed to failure.”

On Jul. 25, five members of Hamas’s military wing were killed when a bomb exploded on a crowded beach in Gaza. Hamas, currently party to a fragile truce between Israel and resistance factions in the Gaza Strip, blamed elements of the U.S.-backed Fatah movement for the attack.

In the first days of August, Gaza City’s al-Shejaeya district became the scene of open conflict between Hamas security forces and Fatah partisans suspected of involvement in the bombing. Dozens were arrested after a 48-hour battle involving the use of heavy weapons, while scores of Fatah supporters fled to the West Bank by way of Israel.

Ever since, the rival factions have engaged in harsh crackdowns on suspected opponents throughout their respective territories.

In the Gaza Strip, Hamas has arrested scores of Fatah personnel suspected of attempting to destabilise the territory. The Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority (PA), meanwhile, has retaliated in the West Bank by launching wide-ranging arrest campaigns targeting Hamas supporters, opposition figures and journalists.

PA security agencies have also used the occasion to close down a number of Islamic-oriented schools, cultural centres and charitable institutions throughout the West Bank.

In an effort to contain the crisis, Egypt, a traditional mediator of Palestinian infighting, has reiterated calls for reconciliation. Earlier this month, head of general intelligence Omar Suleiman — Cairo’s usual point man for Israel-Palestine security affairs — reportedly invited leaders of both Fatah and Hamas to hold reconciliation talks under Egyptian supervision.

Despite rumours that both groups would soon dispatch delegations to Cairo to discuss their differences, however, these were soon dispelled. ”Until now, we haven’t received any invitation from Cairo,” Hamas spokesman Sallah al-Bardawi was quoted as saying.

Commentators, meanwhile, point out that Egyptian mediation attempts will be sorely undermined by Cairo’s relative closeness to Fatah. ”Egypt openly supports Fatah,” Gamal Zahran, political science professor at Suez Canal University and independent member of parliament, told IPS. ”This is primarily due to the fact that Cairo doesn’t want to see Hamas become a successful example of Islamic governance in the region.”

According to Hussein, Egyptian attempts to arbitrate fairly in the dispute ”cannot possibly succeed” until Egypt assumes the role of a genuinely impartial mediator.

”As it now stands, Egypt is completely biased towards Fatah, which itself has a close relationship with Israel,” he said. Noting that ”both Hamas and (PA President Mahmoud) Abbas were elected by the Palestinian people in 2006,” Hussein added that ”Egypt’s national interest requires neutrality and the avoidance of taking sides.”

Critics point to the government’s refusal to open Egypt’s 14 km border with the Hamas-run Gaza Strip as further proof of official bias against the resistance group.

Since its 2005 withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, Israel has kept its borders with the enclave hermetically sealed. And for more than one year, the Egyptian government, citing the lack of a formal treaty regulating border protocol, has completed the strip’s isolation by sealing its own border with the territory.

Often described by the western media as an ”embargo”, the de facto siege — which enjoys the support of the both the U.S. and the EU — has destroyed the Gaza Strip’s economy and deprived many of its roughly 1.5 million residents of food and medicine.

”The Egyptian government is taking part in the siege and forbidding the entry of material aid into the starving territory,” Hamdi Hassan, prominent MP for the Muslim Brotherhood opposition movement told IPS. Hassan went on to question how Egypt could pose as a neutral mediator in the dispute between Fatah and Hamas while at the same time being ”utterly beholden to U.S. and Zionist dictates.”

Hamas has repeatedly offered to jointly reopen the Egypt-Gaza Rafah border crossing, but Cairo has consistently refused, saying it would deal only with ”official and legitimate” authorities of the PA. Although the two-month-old ceasefire between Israel and Hamas calls for the gradual reopening of the Gaza Strip’s borders, this stipulation has yet to be implemented.

One Hamas official has attributed the ongoing closure of the Rafah crossing to Egypt’s ”unmasked sympathy for the Fatah-run PA.”

But according to Zahran, official partiality towards Fatah is not the only thing hindering effective mediation by Egypt. ”The Egyptian regime itself is facing domestic instability, and this has an impact on the effectiveness of its foreign policy,” he said. ”All things considered, Cairo’s call for inter-Palestinian dialogue will most likely fail.”