BOLIVIA: Congress Approves Date for Vote on New Constitution

Global Geopolitics Net Sites / IPS
Tuesday, October 21, 2008

All rights reserved, IPS – Inter Press Service, 2008.

Franz Chávez

LA PAZ, Oct 21 (IPS) – The Bolivian Congress ratified on Tuesday the new constitution drafted by a constituent assembly, as demanded by 100,000 government supporters who converged on the capital to demand that it be sent to a Jan. 25 referendum.

On Monday, Bolivian President Evo Morales had agreed to cut short his term by one year and stand for election only once again, on Dec. 6, 2009, when the vice president, 157 legislators, 327 mayors and nine provincial governors will also run for reelection.

The agreement containing this and other points emerged from complex negotiations between the governing Movement to Socialism (MAS) and three opposition parties and was announced Monday by Morales himself to a huge crowd of government supporters at the end of their week-long march from Oruro to La Paz.
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CHINA in Hu’s Colours—Part VII and Last

Global Geopolitics Net
Thursday, November 01, 2007

Copyright © B. Raman – South Asia Analysis Group
www.saag.org

By B. Raman

Economic and military strength go together. Without economic prosperity, there can be no military strength and without military strength, there can be no economic prosperity.

2. That was, in short, the theme of the observations of President Mr. Hu Jintao on China’s defence policy in the report presented by him, in his capacity as the Party Secretary, to the recently-concluded 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC). He described the responsibility of the armed forces as to obey the party and serve the people. He called for national defence with Chinese characteristics and the continued implementation of the concept of Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) with Chinese characteristics. However, he did not explain what those Chinese characteristics are or should be.

3. He called for an integrated attempt to make the Armed Forces more revolutionary, modernised and standardised. He also called for the acceleration of the mechanisation and computerisation of the Armed Forces and said they should be made capable of winning IT-based warfare.

4. Mr. Hu said: "We are determined to safeguard China’s sovereignty, security and territorial integrity and help maintain world peace." No one can object to this formulation provided the term territorial integrity means the integrity of the territory which constitutes China today. The problem which India faces in its relations with China arises from the fact that the Chinese speak of territorial integrity in the historical and not contemporary sense. Their concept of defence of territorial integrity includes not only the territory which is part of China today, but also which was, according to them, part of China historically and had been taken away from China by colonial powers. Under this category come India’s Arunachal Pradesh and certain other territory in the Western sector of the Indian border.

5. While there was no reference to the not-forward-moving Sino-Indian border talks during and in the margins of the Party Congress, Indian media reported just before the Congress, recurring instances of innumerable border intrusions by the Chinese troops. Two of these incidents are of worrisome significance. The first was an intrusion into Bhutan and the second was about the Chinese raising a pro forma objection to the Indian construction of two military bunkers inside Indian territory in Sikkim.

6. Apparently in its ill-advised anxiety to avoid any public airing of concerns before the visit of Mrs. Sonia Gandhi, the President of the Congress (I), to China and the expected visit of the Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, to China later this year, the Government of India has sought to play down the implications of these intrusions and to project them as unintended consequences of the differing perceptions about the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

7. One lesson which India learnt from its experience of dealing with China before the Sino-Indian war of 1962 was the folly of treating Chinese transgressions as unintended. There has always been a method in China’s transgressions, which are meant to assert periodically its territorial claims and exercise pressure on India to make territorial concessions.

8. Despite the positive spins put out by the Govt. of India from time to time about the progress supposedly being made in the border talks between the two countries, it is clear that the Chinese are determined to get satisfaction on their claims to what they project as southern Tibetan territory in Arunachal Pradesh. In fact, they look upon the entire Arunachal Pradesh as southern Tibet.

9. Their troops objecting to our Army constructing two bunkers in our territory in Sikkim cannot be dismissed as a minor incident of no consequence. The Chinese have de facto conceded Sikkim as a part of India by saying in 2005 that "Sikkim no longer constitutes a problem between the two countries." A de jure formalisation of this position will come only when the border talks lead to a settlement. Their renewed activism — even if verbal— on the border in the Sikkim area is an indicator that they might reverse their de facto concession on the status of Sikkim, if India does not transfer at least the Tawang Tract in Arunachal Pradesh to them. The Government of India will be repeating the pre-1962 follies if it relapses into the pre-1962 practice of playing down Chinese transgressions and volunteering to provide to the Chinese rationalisations of their transgressions.

10. In my previous articles, I had referred to the projected good behaviour of the Chinese in the months running up to the Olympics, but this has not prevented them from maintaining their campaign against the Dalai Lama and continuing with their policy of calculated border incursions to assert their claims. This underlines the need for our pressing ahead with our policy of military modernisation, improving our infrastructure in the border areas and revamping our intelligence apparatus so that it recovers the China-dedicated capabilities imparted to it after 1962, which have been allowed to rust since 2000.

11. One does not wish for a military confrontation with China. It will not be in the interest of either country. However, if a confrontation comes about, it will be on the land and in the air across the land border and not in the seas. In our eagerness to give a power projection capability to our Navy in the seas to the East of India, the Government should not be remiss in the exercise of its responsibility for giving the Army, the Air Force and the intelligence agencies the required capability for the protection of our territorial integrity. Concluded

(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)

CHINA in Hu’s Colours—Part VI

Global Geopolitics News
Thursday, November 01, 2007

Copyright © B. Raman – South Asia Analysis Group
www.saag.org

By B. Raman

In the Chinese perspective, a major success of China’s international relations during the first tenure of President Hu Jintao as the Party Secretary was the close relations established with African countries in order to tap their energy resources and markets for Chinese goods and the China-Africa summit held in 2006.

2. Two more international events of even greater significance in their eyes are scheduled to take place during his second tenure. The first will be the Beijing Olympics of August, 2008, and the second will be Expo–2010, an ambitious international trade fair, which is to be held in Shanghai in 2010. Presently, much of the energy of the Party and the Government is devoted to making the Olympics a spectacular success, which, they hope, will enhance the image of China in the eyes of the international community and the image of the party leadership in the eyes of their people. Any mishap in the handling of the Olympics could damage the standing of not only Mr.Hu and Mr. Wen Jiabo, the Prime Minister, but also the entire Standing Committee of the Party Politburo, which was elected at the recent 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC),

3. Even while working with determination for making a success of the Olympics, the Chinese have already started thinking of ways of making Expo 2010 an equally spectacular success. As they go ahead with the preparations for the Olympics, three concerns keep bothering them:

* Will Western human rights activists try to organise a boycott of the Olympics similar to the boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics by the Western countries in protest over the intervention of Soviet troops in Afghanistan? It is in this context that the human rights situations in Darfur in Sudan and Myanmar keep worrying them, because of their close involvement in both countries. While there is little likelihood of the Darfur situation providing a handle to the critics of China in the Western world, if the situation in Myanmar deteriorates badly in the months before the Olympics, this would definitely provide a handle to the critics of China interested in spoiling the Olympics. The Chinese were rattled by the recent demonstration of Buddhist monk power in Myanmar and the dissemination of dramatic images of that power through the Internet and world TV channels. Worried over its possible copy-cat effect on the monks of Tibet, they quickly nudged the military junta in Myanmar to come out of its diplomatic isolation and be more responsive to the concerns of the international community. They should have been relieved when the Junta effectively closed its Internet servers and prevented images of monk power being flashed across the world. The Chinese would be closely monitoring the situation in Myanmar in order to make sure it does not come in the way of a grand Olympics of their dreams.
* Would there be threats to the Olympics not only from Al Qaeda and its associates, but also from the Tibetan activists, the Uighurs, the Falun Gong and others?
* Could China face a situation similar to what South Korea faced after the 1988 Seoul Olympics when the relaxation of restrictions on the political freedoms of the people by the then dictatorship set in motion a train of events, which led to the end of dictatorship?

4. The Chinese are very keen to avoid any frictions in their relations with the US in the months before the Olympics. The co-operation of the US would facilitate the success of the Olympics. The US has the equipment, technology and know-how to prevent any threats from terrorism. The Chinese are aware of the role played by the US and other NATO countries in ensuring the security of the Athens Olympics of 2004. The Americans are already fully co-operating with the organisers of the Olympics in this regard. The Chinese have also reportedly enlisted the services of big names in Hollywood to choreograph a spectacular closing function, which would bring the best of Hollywood before the eyes of the Chinese spectators. They would not like this co-operation from the US to be affected by any misunderstanding.

5. While the US Government and its security agencies have been helping the Chinese in whatever way they can, Beijing is worried over the possible machinations of die-hard anti-China elements among right-wing American intellectuals, Christian missionaries and others. The Chinese do not want to underestimate their capacity for a political sabotage of the Olympics.

6. For the present, the present leadership under Mr.Hu is confident that nothing can come in the way of a successful and spectacular Olympics. Will their confidence be belied? If it is, Mr. Hu could face serious embarrassment, if not trouble, in the party. To be continued.

(The writer is Additional secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. e-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)

CHINA IN HU’S COLOURS—PART V

Global Geopolitics Net
Monday, October 29, 2007

Copyright © B. Raman – South Asia Analysis Group
www.saag.org

By B.Raman

1. In the days preceding the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the State Council Information Office and the party offices had organised a series of briefings for the local media to explain what they projected as the important role played by the party in facilitating international diplomacy by the State. Some of the interesting points from these briefings are given below:

Mr. Zhang Zhijun, deputy head in the International Department of the Party Central Committee: "The Foreign Ministry might be the symbol of Chinese diplomacy for many, but the International Department of the Communist Party of China (CPC) is playing an equally important role on the global diplomatic stage. The Party is becoming more active in developing relations with overseas political parties through the CPC Central Committee International Department. The CPC’s diplomatic work is an important component of the country’s diplomacy. The Party has forged relations with about 400 political parties or organizations in more than 160 countries and regions. Those parties include Communist or socialist parties as well as right-wing or centrist organizations; and some are in countries that do not have diplomatic relations with China. The CPC does not take into account differences in ideologies or political systems in party diplomacy while striving to establish and develop exchanges and cooperation with foreign parties. When Sino-Japanese ties hit a nadir in 2004 due to Japan’s whitewashing of atrocities committed during World War II, the CPC initiated a ruling party exchange mechanism with two rounds of meetings to tackle those thorny problems. The exchanges between the CPC and the Workers’ Party of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) facilitated the settlement of the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue. The two parties had regular exchanges in various areas and through diversified channels, and held in-depth discussions on international and regional issues, which have helped maintain peace and stability in Northeast Asia and properly settle the nuclear issue. The CPC will become more active in party diplomacy after the 17th National Congress. The CPC should not be blamed for failing to develop ties with the two major U.S. political parties. The CPC always handles the relations with American political parties with an open mind and is willing to establish exchanges and promote ties with the U.S. political parties, including the Democratic Party and the Republican Party based on CPC’s four basic principles for party relations."

Mr. Liu Jiangyong, Dean of the Institute of International Studies at Tsinghua University: "Such a broad relationship between the CPC and overseas parties helps the country settle some problems where government diplomacy faces challenges. It also helps promote a better understanding of China and maintain long-term contacts despite frequent power changes."

2. In the last week of September,2007, a delegation of the US Foreign Policy Council headed by Mr. Robert McFarlane, who was National Security Adviser to President Ronald Reagan in the 1980s, had visited Beijing and met Government and party officials to discuss Sino-US relations on the eve of the Party Congress. Mr. Wang Jiarui, the head of the International Department of the CPC Central Committee, said after a meeting with the visiting US delegation: " China is ready to enhance mutual understanding and strengthen cooperation with the United States. China attaches great importance to China-U.S. relationship and is ready to make joint efforts with the U.S. to enhance mutual understanding and strengthen cooperation. The two held positive views towards the steady development of the China-U.S. relations in recent years. Both sides should implement the consensus reached by the two Heads of State on comprehensively promoting China-U.S. constructive and cooperative ties in the 21st century, and to respect the concerns of each other and stick to peaceful diplomatic manner in promoting the settlement of international and regional issues."

3. The Chinese media quoted Mr. McFarlane as saying as follows after the meeting: "China is emerging as a world power with increasing international influence and has played an active role in international and regional disputes. The U.S. political parties, no matter which will win the election, will all strategically attach great importance to the relationship with China and continue to maintain, deepen and expand the U.S.-China relationship." The Xinhua news agency reported that the two also exchanged views on such questions as the Iranian nuclear issue, the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue and energy security.

4. The point, which was repeatedly stressed by Party spokesmen and others in the briefings before the Party Congress and in the margins of the Congress was that the CPC plays an important role in foreign policy formulation and often acts as a facilitator of good relations even in times of difficulty through its networking with parties in other countries. They highlighted the examples of North Korea and Japan. A greater freedom of discussion is possible during party-to-party interactions than during diplomatic interactions and this helps the State. In this connection, the visit of a delegation of India’s Congress (I) led by Mrs. Sonia Gandhi immediately after the Party Congress was as important as the visit of an American delegation a fortnight before it.

5. Having said that, it has to be noted that there were specific references to Sino-Indian relations in the briefings before and during the session of the National People’s Congress held in March,2007. There were no such references before and during the Party Congress, but there have been positive references before and during the visits of Mrs. Sonia Gandhi and Shri Pranab Mukherjee, India’s Foreign Minister, to China to participate in the India-China-Russia Foreign Ministers’ meeting.

6. Just as Mr. Hu Jintao, in his dual capacity as the President of China and the Party General Secretary, has been trying to promote a new economic development model with equal attention to the people, the natural resources and the environment, he has been trying to promote a new model of diplomacy, whose characteristics are a non-confrontational approach, avoidance of rhetoric which might create tensions, patience in dealing with long-standing problems and a greater sensitivity to the concerns of the international community on issues such as North Korea’s nuclear capability and human rights in Myanmar and the Sudan. Is this merely a tactical change in order not to foul the atmosphere before next year’s Beijing Olympics or does it indicate a durable change which would continue even after the Olympics? One can find an answer only after the Olympics.

7. Some of the points stressed by Mr. Hu in relation to China’s foreign policy in his report to the Congress are:
China cannot develop in isolation from the rest of the world, nor can the world enjoy prosperity and stability without China. China follows a national defense policy that is defensive in nature, and it does not engage in an arms race or pose a military threat to any other country. China opposes all forms of hegemonism and power politics and will never seek hegemony or engage in expansion. Politically, all countries should respect each other and conduct consultations on an equal footing in a common endeavor to promote democracy in international relations.

8. The importance of the application of the principles of democracy in the conduct of international relations was a point stressed by him. It was a hint to the US to practise democracy in its relations with other countries before it preaches democracy to other countries in the conduct of their internal affairs.

9. While there were no specific references to Sino-Indian relations during the Congress, some points need to be underlined on the basis of informal interactions with non-governmental Chinese scholars:
While these scholars do not rule out a flexible policy by Beijing in relation to support for India at the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group on the question of relaxing restrictions on nuclear commerce with India, they seem skeptic of the likelihood of a similar flexibility on the question of the future of Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh. While Sino-Indian trade continues to gallop towards the target of a bilateral trade value of US $ 30 billion, there could be speed-breakers after the Olympics. Presently, nearly 60 per cent of India’s exports to China consist of iron ore. The Chinese steel industry has been buying a lot of iron ore all over the word to meet the steel requirements for the construction activity related to the Olympics. The demand for iron ore may come down after the Olympics. The small and medium-scale steel enterprises in China, which had mushroomed during the days of Mao Zedong, contribute considerably to the high level of pollution. The Chinese have been thinking of re-structuring their steel industry in order to eliminate these polluters. If and when this happens, this could reduce the Chinese demand for Indian iron ore, since these small and medium enterprises are important buyers of the cheaper-priced Indian ore.

There is some satisfaction in Chinese academic circles over what seems to be a liberalisation in India’s policy regarding students’ visas. Recently, a group of about 100 Chinese students is reported to have arrived in Vellore in Tamil Nadu to study computer technology in a local institution. In the past, Indian IT companies with offices in China were getting IT experts from India to work in their offices in China. Now, to reduce their expenditure, they have reportedly started recruiting young Chinese, getting them trained in India and then employing them in China. Some Chinese analysts have also recommended the adoption of what is described as a "silver hair policy"—- that is, recruit retired Indian IT experts and take them to China to train young Chinese in China itself. (To be continued)

(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)

CHINA IN HU’S COLOURS—PART IV

Global Geopolitics Net
Saturday, October 27, 2007

Copyright © B. Raman – South Asia Analysis Group
www.saag.org

By B.Raman

1. As part of a three-year research project on contemporary Chinese cultural life commissioned by the Education Ministry of the Government of China, the East China Normal University in Shanghai had conducted a poll on religion and spirituality in China. The poll covered 4,500 people. The results of the poll were published by a magazine called the "Oriental Outlook". They were also covered by the "Washington Post" on February 7,2007.

2. The poll concluded that 300 million people in China out of its total population of 1.3 billion admitted that they were "religious believers". This was three times the official figure of 100 million religious believers in China. This number (300 million) represented only those, who had the courage to admit openly that they were religious believers. It is believed that many more secretly believe in religion, without having the courage to admit it openly. While the poll findings did not say so, it is estimated that the majority of the Buddhists and the Muslims have the courage to admit their belief in religion, but instances of open admission are less among the Christians.

3. The poll was jointly conducted by Mr.Liu Zhongyu, a philosophy professor, and his colleague Mr. Tong Shijun.Explaining the results of the poll, Mr.Liu told the "Oriental Outlook" magazine: "More Chinese feel unstable and harassed by the rootless lives they lead now. The standards of morality are declining. People don’t trust each other anymore. They are looking for something to anchor their lives in."

4.Mr.Liu said one factor in the fast growth of religion was the expanded freedom of belief in China. He said that during the 1960s and the1970s, radical political orthodoxy enforced by Mao Zedong and his followers replaced religious beliefs, often under the threat of imprisonment. He added that although the Communist Party remained officially atheist, the Chinese were free now to practice the religion of their choice as long as it did not challenge the party’s monopoly on power.
5. The poll did not indicate how many of the religious believers came from the ethnic minorities such as the Tibetans, the Mongols and the Uighurs, and how many from the Han Chinese. The poll indicated that 67 per cent of those, who admitted that they were religious believers, believed in Buddhism, Taoism and Islam. That is, roughly 201 million. Another 40 million said they believed in Christianity. One does not know in which religion the remaining 59 million believed. It is quite likely that a substantial number of them also believed in Christianity, but did not have the courage to say so.

6. Keeping in view the growing number of those, who admit that they are religious believers despite being under Godless communism for nearly 60 years,the Communist Party of China (CPC) has decided to come to terms with the reality that long years of Communist rule have not been able to eradicate the influence of religion on the minds and lives of a large number of its population. The amendment to the party constitution on this subject, which has since become available, says: "The Party strives to fully implement its basic principle for work related to religious affairs, and rally religious believers in making contributions to economic and social development".

7. The other issue, which figured prominently in the 17th National Congress of the Party is the importance of soft power.In an article titled "CHINESE QUEST FOR SOFT POWER" written by me on April 15,2007, which is available at http://www.saag.org/papers23/paper2209.html, I had stated as follows: "The term soft power was first coined by Joseph Nye, a Harvard Professor, who had served as an Assistant Secretary of Defence under President Bill Clinton. Nye was quoted more frequently than any other American analyst during the session of the Chinese National People’s Congress (NPC), which was held at Beijing from March 5 to 16, 2007. The importance of China strengthening its soft power was repeatedly stressed by different speakers at various sessions dealing with China’s economic development, military modernisation, the working of its Foreign Ministry and the various institutions dealing with the development and propagation of the Chinese language and culture. There were references to the importance of strengthening China’s soft power even at the sessions devoted to discussing the preparations for the Olympic Games of next year, which are to be held in China. Many Chinese athletes—-men and women— who had participated in the past Olympic Games, spoke about the opportunity that would be provided by the forthcoming Olympics to project a soft, lovable image of China to the world through the thousands of participants and journalists from all over the world who would be coming to China for the Games. This is not the first time that the importance of soft power has received such attention. Since 2004, many analysts had been drawing attention to the various steps being taken by China to develop and increase its soft power to promote its national interests and to make its influence felt across the world through means other than coercion. But this was the first time that this subject received such concentrated articulation."

8. There was a significant difference between the way the importance of soft power was projected at the NPC session and the way it was projected at the Party Congress. The NPC session projected the development of soft power as a means of improving China’s international image and influence through the spread of the Chinese language and culture across the world, through better non-confrontational diplomacy and through people-to-people contacts with the people in other countries. The Party Congress highlighted the internal role of soft power as a way of promoting national unity by strengthening the cultural bonds of different sections of the people.

9. In his report to the Congress, Mr.Hu Jintao, in his capacity as the Party Secretary, said: "Culture has become a more and more important source of national cohesion and creativity and a factor of growing significance in the competition in overall national strength.We must enhance culture as part of the soft power of our country to better guarantee the people’s basic cultural rights and interests." For this purpose, he proposed the following tasks to the Party for the next five years:

To step up the development of the press, publishing, radio, film, television, literature and art, give correct guidance to the public and foster healthy social trends;

To strengthen efforts to develop and manage Internet culture and foster a good cyber environment;

To conttinue to develop nonprofit cultural programmes as the main approach to ensuring the basic cultural rights and interests of the people, increase spending on such programmes, and build more cultural facilities in urban communities and rural areas;

To vigorously develop the cultural industry, launch major projects to lead the industry as a whole, speed up the development of cultural industry bases and clusters of cultural industries with regional features, nurture key enterprises and strategic investors, create a thriving cultural market and enhance the industry’s international competitiveness;

To establish a national system of honors for outstanding cultural workers.

10. He added that Chinese culture had been an unfailing driving force for the Chinese nation to keep its unity and make progress from generation to generation. "The great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation will definitely be accompanied by the thriving of Chinese culture’, he said

To be continued

(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com ).

China in Hu’s Colours—Part III

Global Geopolitics Net
Saturday, October 27, 2007

Copyright © B. Raman – South Asia Analysis Group
www.saag.org

By B. Raman

In a despatch on October 21, 2007, the State-owned Hsinhua news agency of China reported as follows: “For the first time in its history, the Communist Party of China (CPC) has mentioned the word “religion” in an amendment to its Constitution, adopted on Sunday (October 21, 2007) at the closing session of the 17th CPC National Congress. To insert CPC’s guiding principles and policies in religious work in the Party Constitution is conducive to their full implementation, according to a resolution on the amendment to the Constitution. It said the insertion has been made to meet the demands posed by the new situation and new tasks. The CPC has been widely known as atheistic since its founding in 1921.”

2. The actual text of the amendment has not been available so far. However, a resolution on the amendments passed by the Congress at its concluding session stated as follows: “The Congress holds that incorporating into the Constitution the principles and policies the Party has formulated for guiding efforts to strengthen the armed forces as well as the work related to ethnic and religious affairs, the united front and foreign affairs in light of the new circumstances and tasks is conducive to fully implementing these principles and policies and getting better results in the work in these areas.”

3. In the past, the reference used to be to “the work related to ethnic affairs”. The Tibetans and the Uighurs were treated as ethnic communities and not as distinct religious communities. The Catholics and the Protestants were not treated as distinct religious communities. They were identified with whatever ethnic group to which they belonged. Does the present reference to “ethnic and religious affairs” presage their being treated as not only ethnic groups, but also distinct religious groups? It would be difficult to answer this question till more details become available.

4. The Chinese project every concept or idea as having unique Chinese characteristics. Thus, they have “socialism with Chinese characteristics” and “democracy with Chinese characteristics”. Similarly, they have religious freedom too with Chinese characteristics, though they do not openly use that expression. One could give the following examples of the Chinese characteristics of religious freedom:

The Buddhists have the freedom of worship in their places of worship, but they cannot project the Dalai Lama as their leader or possess his picture. Nor can they speak of their faith in reincarnation. They have to accept the Panchen Lama chosen by the Communist Party. When the Dalai Lama dies, they have to similarly accept the Dalai Lama chosen by the Party. Reports from Sikkim say that local trans-border traders have complained of harassment by the Chinese police in Tibetan territory for possessing pictures of the Dalai Lama.

The Catholics and the Protestants similarly have the freedom of worship in their churches, but the Catholics cannot project the Pope as the head of the Catholic church or possess his picture. The Chinese look upon the Dalai Lama and the Pope as political and not religious figures.

The Muslims too have the freedom of worship in their mosques, but they cannot have madrasas to impart religious education to their children. There are also restrictions on how they worship in order to prevent large gatherings at the time of worship. To talk of jihad even in the benign sense (the inner struggle to make oneself a better Muslim) is a crime.

5. The apparent decision of the Congress to give a de jure recognition to religion in the Party Constitution has come in the wake of continuous pressure from the West—particularly the US— on the Chinese Government to grant full religious freedom to those Chinese who believe in religion. The decision has also been motivated by the desire to improve the image of China as it nears next year’s Beijing Olympics. To improve its visage, China has been using a lot of cosmetics and religious freedom is one of them.

6. The pre-Olympics angle is evident from the report on this amendment carried by the Chinese media. To quote from a despatch of the Hsinhua news agency: “The CPC is atheistic but allows freedom of religious beliefs. China is home to 100 million religious faithful, largely Buddhists, Taoists, Christians, Catholics and Islamites. “The Party’s secret in handling well China’s religious issues lies in its principles and policies,” said Ye Xiaowen, director of the State Administration of Religious Affairs. “Their insertion in the Party Constitution shows the Party is sincere, and capable, of its implementation of policies on the freedom of religious beliefs.” He said religious problems are reported in many parts of the world. “But in China we enjoy peace and quiet because we have the established policies and principles.” With the new elaboration on religious work, Ye said the Party is determined to enhance the active role of the religious circle and faithful in boosting social and economic development. Hao Peng, vice Party chief in Tibet, described the relations between the Party and the religious faithful as “united, cooperative and mutually respectful”. The CPC’s tenet of building socialism with Chinese characteristics, featuring prosperity, democracy, cultural advancement and harmony, reflect the common aspirations of Tibet’s religious faithful, said Zhukang Tubdankezhub, president of the Tibetan branch of the Buddhist Association of China. As the host country of the 2008 Summer Olympic Games, China has pledged to offer religious services for foreigners arriving for the Games. “A large number of religious faithful will be arriving for the Games,” Ye Xiaowen told reporters at a news conference on the sidelines of the 17th Party congress. He said China is working on religious facilities at its Olympic venues with the help of the International Olympic Committee and referring to the practices at previous Games. “Our religious services will be up to previous standards.” Ye also dismissed allegations that China restricted the printing and sale of Bibles, which he said receive state subsidies and other preferential policies. China, with 16 million Protestant Christians, has printed 42 million Bibles, he said. “

7. In an article under the title “God As A Threat To National Security” written by me on July 11, 2002, which is available at http://www.saag.org/papers5/paper492.html, I had stated as follows: “The Chinese people have reasons to be grateful to their leadership, which has given them increasing prosperity and a well-run administration. People definitely have more money in their pockets now than in the past and than the people of India have in theirs. Despite this, why are they attracted to God? Why this feeling of emptiness inside them despite a bulging money purse? Why more and more people seek solace in religion and spirituality, even at the risk of falling foul of the establishment? These are questions which continue to confuse and haunt the Chinese leadership, which is not able to find an answer to them. The way they monitor religious and spiritual activities, one gets the impression as if they feel that God is a major threat to their national security. The pragmatic and far-sighted Chinese leadership has handled the economy with aplomb. The chances of political instability due to economic causes are low. One wishes the leadership develops an equal understanding of the force of religion and spirituality. If one day there is serious instability in China and if its society comes unstuck, it will, most probably, be not due to political, economic or social causes, but due to the State continuing to come in the way of the religious and spiritual yearnings of the people. “

8. Mr. Hu’s China may no longer see, to the same extent as in the past, God as a major threat to national security, but they continue to see the Dalai Lama as a major threat to their national security and to the smooth holding of the Olympics. Their concerns have increased after the high-profile treatment accorded to His Holiness during his current tour of the US. Their concerns have also increased after seeing the recent massive demonstrations by the Buddhist monks in Myanmar in support of democracy. They are worried over the possibility of the monks of Tibet emulating those of Myanmar. That is why they have been nudging the Myanmar Junta to make overtures to the pro-democracy activists in order to keep the monks off the streets. Remember how the huge demonstrations in Bulgaria, Romania and other Communist countries of East Europe in the late 1980s spread like an European flu? They don’t want the Myanmar flu to spread to Tibet.

9. On the eve of the Congress, the Chinese authorities further stepped up their campaign to denigrate His Holiness. They have been projecting the Dalai Lama not as a respected Buddhist leader, but as the leader of an evil sect comparable to the Aum Shinrikiyo of Japan and the Falun Gong of China. They accuse all the three of being evil birds of the same feather. Annexed is an article on the Dalai Lama, which was carried by the “People’s Daily” on October 9, 2007. To be continued

(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)

ANNEXURE
ARTICLE ON THE DALAI LAMA CARRIED BY THE “PEOPLE’S DAILY” OF OCTOBER 9, 2007

Xinhua was authorized on Tuesday to release a signed article by Shi Shan on the relationship between the 14th Dalai Lama, Aum Shinrikyo cult and Falun Gong. The full text of the article is as follows:

The world has seen rapid development in the scientific civilization of mankind, but the malignant tumor of evil cults is still rampant, plunging innocent people into the depths of suffering. Evil cults such as the Solar Temple Cult of the United States, the Falun Gong of China and the Movement of the Restoration of God’s Ten Commandments of Uganda wantonly preach the fallacy of “the End of the World”, destroy social stability and jeopardize the lives and property of the public. Such perverse acts have aroused strong indignation of the people and governments of various countries. Many countries have staged a fight against evil cults by enacting legislation and setting up special agencies.

Buddhist doctrine advocates good deeds and extrication from the earthly weal and woe. It has also long been viewing evil cults as the “feud of Buddha” and maintaining that “Buddha and demons do not coexist with each other”. The 14th Dalai Lama, who boasts to be a “follower of Buddhism” and “human rights fighter”, however not only has no hatred toward evil cults but instead shows a great deal of compassion for them. Isn’t it worth pondering the reasons behind this? Let’s first start with the Aum Shinrikyo cult of Japan. The cult leader Shoko Asahara claimed that it was “the 14th Dalai Lama who
personally led him into the Mahayana tradition of Buddhism” and that he could shorten the time needed for one to become a Buddha from 2,000-3,000 years to just 10 years, urging people to ditch the ascetic practices advocated by Buddhism and follow his sect tenets to merrily achieve longevity and even to become a Buddha. The 14th Dalai Lama kept writing certificates or letters of recommendation for Shoko Asahara to the authorities of Tokyo, hailing Shoko Asahara as “a very capable religious teacher” and hoping the authorities would “allow the Aum Shinrikyo Sect to be exempted from tax payments and propagandize its credo. The German weekly Focus reported that without the support of the 14th Dalai Lama, it would have been absolutely impossible for Shoko Asahara to build up his sect empire and, within a short period of very few years, gain status as a cult leader in Japan. In other words, it is the 14th Dalai Lama’s all-out “support” that turned Shoko Asahara, a swindler and a mountebank, into “a religious teacher”.

It was because of the 14th Dalai Lama who persistently supported and trumpeted Shoko Asahara that the Aum Shinrikyo cult could acquire the privilege of “tax exemption” and accumulated funds to bankroll his cruel evil doing against the Japanese people. In the Spring of 1995, Shoko Asahara organized a terrorist attack by discharging poisonous gas in Tokyo’s subway, killing 12 people and injuring 5,000 others. The event sparked indignation from the Japanese people. In October of the same year, Shoko Asahara and his die-hard followers stood public trial in a local court of Tokyo and were punished in line with laws.

Even at this moment, the 14th Dalai Lama who claimed to be a “human rights fighter” still spoke plausibly to the Kyodo News Service that Shoko Asahara remained his friend and that he still thought what the Aum Shinrikyo cult preached was in accordance with Buddhist doctrines. It was the support and connivance of the 14th Dalai Lama who took the foe for his friend that made Asahara feel secure in the knowledge that he had strong backing. The evil cult continued to do evils under the guise of constantly-changed names and leaders. Eventually in 1999, the Japanese Senate completed the legislative procedures against evil cults including the Aum Shinrikyo. The Tokyo authorities also took a number of measures to crack down on the leaders of the evil cult.

Why would the 14th Dalai Lama openly violate the teachings of Sakyamuni that urge his followers to get rid of demons and uphold truth and laws to favor Aum Shinrikyo? Why would he flout the tenets of Buddhism urging the masses not to do evils but to do good deeds? The 14th Dalai Lama had confessed in a letter to the cult, appreciating the Aum Shinrikyo Sect for its “generous donation to our Buddhist collective in exile”. Aha, it turned out to be that the “leader” even bartered away the sacred tenet of Buddhism as a cheap bargaining chip in money deals.

It is the 14th Dalai Lama’s own deeds that have step by step betrayed his real intentions and political ambitions put under the guise of Buddhism and peace. A weekly newspaper in Manila commented it was a pity that the 14th Dalai Lama wore the cassock of a Lama but played political tricks, spoke of the pursuit of freedom through peaceful means but harbored in mind the vain attempt of restoring the past feudal rule of Lamaism. Even catholic senator P. Santorum of the United States couldn’t help exclaiming that such conduct reflected a subdued religious sentiment. He held that to establish a society respecting life, cracking down upon crimes and promoting dignity of mankind, efforts must be made to prevent religion from being individualized. It appears that many people of insight across the world have recognized the tricks of the 14th Dalai Lama in using Tibetan Buddhism to engage in political activities and have stayed on high alert to and
repulsed the deed of the Dalai Lama.

Let’s now have a look at the 14th Dalai Lama’s attitude toward China’s evil cult Falun Gong. Cult leader Li Hongzhi of Falun Gong took religion as pretence, trampled upon religious doctrines and thus invited indignation, reprimands and stern objections from the religious circles. They said that Li Hongzhi had blasphemed Buddhism by fabricating his birthday from July 1952 to May 13, 1951, the date on which Sakyamuni was believed to be born. His attempt to pass himself as the reincarnation of Sakyamuni and his bragging about getting true knowledge from Sakyamuni and thus being more powerful than Sakyamuni was “an extreme blasphemy to Buddhism”, they said. However, even such an evil cult leader who is denounced by many people and had to flee abroad to escape the punishment of laws secured compassion and admiration from the 14th Dalai Lama. The latter first dispatched his representative to comfort Li Hongzhi and then sent over his representatives to conspire with Li and staged various farces at the time when the 56th World Human Rights Conference was held in Geneva, stopping at nothing to spread lies and rumors and to trumpet anti-China bills.

As one Chinese saying goes: Birds of a feather flock together. The real reasons for the collusion of the 14th Dalai Lama and Li Hongzhi are their shared situation. They are both in exile after their illegal acts to subvert the Chinese government and the Chinese people ended in constant failures under the august Chinese Constitution and laws; Shared nature—They are both not resigned to failures and attempt to hoodwink and manipulate their few domestic followers to carry on making turbulence and to hold back the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation; Shared intention—They are both hostile to their motherland and regard the 1.3 million Chinese as enemies, dreaming a pipe dream of returning to China, with the support of their masters, to materialize their evil objective of splitting China. Imagine the 14th Dalai Lama, the self-proclaimed “religious leader”, even condescended to associate with Li Hongzhi who has been labeled by the United International World Buddhism Association Headquarters as a preacher of evil cult and a swindler! This obviously reflects that the 14th Dalai Lama has cornered himself into a dead end!

Source: Xinhua

China in Hu’s Colours—Part II

Global Geopolitics Net
Saturday, October 27, 2007

Copyright © B. Raman – South Asia Analysis Group
www.saag.org

By B. Raman

In the report presented by President Mr. Hu Jintao, in his capacity as the party Secretary, to the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China and in the subsequent discussions, the following three phrases figured frequently in relation to the Chinese economy: scientific outlook on development, a moderately prosperous society and the conservation culture. The Congress also amended the Party Constitution in order to incorporate the concept of a scientific outlook on development. This has been uniquely Mr. Hu’s idea since he came to office after the 16th Party Congress of 2002 and is seen as his contribution to the development of the Party’s economic philosophy.

2. To understand the importance of the emphasis on these three concepts at the recent Party Congress, one has to go back to 1978 when Mr. Deng Xioping opened up the Chinese economy to foreign investment and started introducing economic reforms in order to attract investments. The evolution of the Chinese economy since then has passed through the following three stages:

* STAGE I: 1978 to 1992. As an experiment, Deng opened up only the coastal areas of Fujian, Guangdong and Shanghai to foreign investment. He wanted to study what impact the opening-up had on internal political stability. He did not want to open up the rest of China to foreign investors until the authorities had gained confidence that they would be able to manage the political consequences of the opening-up. Most of the investment flows during this period came from Taiwan, Hong Kong and the overseas Chinese businessmen in the ASEAN countries. There was a trickle of investments from other countries such as Japan and South Korea, but this was affected by the adverse international reactions to the way the Chinese authorities handled the student demonstrations in the Tiananmen Square in Beijing in 1989. The State retained its powers for the macro as well as the micro management of the economy and the emergence of a Chinese private sector was not encouraged.

* STAGE II: 1993 to 2002. The adverse world reactions to the Tiananmen Square incident dissipated. China took steps to encourage investment flows from non-Chinese sources too through incentives such as tax holidays for new manufacturing units etc. There was a significant increase in investment flows from non-Chinese sources too and Chinese exports to the US started picking up momentum. Having gained confidence about its capability for the political management of the consequences of opening-up of the economy, Beijing started encouraging investment flows into other areas too away from the coastal belt. By the end of the 1990s, there was a torrent of investment flows. The Chinese economy remained largely unaffected by the crash of 1997 in the ASEAN countries. China, which was largely self-sufficient in matters of natural resources including energy supplies in the 1980s, found its resources rapidly depleted as a result of the economic development. From an energy-self-sufficient country, it became an energy-importing country. Even in respect of other raw materials such as iron ore, it became import-dependent. As its exports increased, it became amenable to Western pressure in matters such as diluting the role of the State in the micro-management of the economy, encouraging the emergence of a genuine Chinese private sector, better protection of intellectual property rights etc. The rapid economic development not only brought benefits, but also adverse effects. Among the adverse effects, one could mention the economic disparity between the coastal areas and interior China, income disparities between the urban and rural people all over China, including in the coastal areas and the emergence of pockets of resentment in the population due to factors such as the peasants’ protests over the acquisition of their land at throw-away prices by entrepreneurs for setting up industries and real estate and over the rigid controls maintained by the State over internal movement of people in order to prevent an uncontrollable migration from the poor areas to the newly-emerged prosperous areas. This period also saw the emergence of corruption as a major social evil in coastal China and particularly in Shanghai due to the "get rich quick" mentality of the newly-prosperous class of society. Measures to correct the situation were initiated during the second tenure of Mr. Jiang Zemin as the President and Party Secretary between 1997 and 2002. These included a special package for extending the benefits of economic development to the interior areas with special focus on Sichuan, Tibet, Xinjiang and Yunnan, winding-up unremunerative State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), encouraging the emergence of a Chinese private sector, which can compete on equal terms with the reduced State sector, strong action against corruption etc.

* STAGE III: Since 2003.While the torrent of foreign investment flows continued and the annual GDP growth continued to average around 10 per cent, the adverse effects of the rapid growth started manifesting themselves even more than in the pre-2003 period. These included persistence of pockets of resentment and social tensions due to regional and individual prosperity disparities, an aggravation of China’s dependence on imports of oil, gas and other raw materials to keep its growth sustained, the negative impact of China’s external quest for energy on its image, a series of environmental disasters due to unregulated industries, a further increase in corruption despite severe penalties awarded to corrupt public servants etc.

3. It is in response to these developments that since taking over as the Party Secretary, Mr.Hu has been stressing these three concepts mentioned above. Stripped of jargon, when he talks of a scientific outlook on development, what he has been advocating is a new development model, which would be people-friendly, resource-friendly and environment-friendly. A people-friendly development model would accord greater priority to the need for removing regional and individual economic disparities and for addressing the economic causes of social tensions. A resource-friendly model would accord greater priority to preventing a rapid depletion of China’s natural resources through measures such as development of alternative and renewable sources of energy, which has not received the required importance till now. An environment-friendly model would initiate and enforce better industrial regulations to prevent damages to the environment. His emphasis on a moderately prosperous society is meant to underline that corruption cannot be reduced, if not eliminated, through the deterrence of severe legal penalties alone. There has to be a change in the mind-set, with the legitimate desire for moderate prosperity replacing the unreasonable desire for affluence as the driving force for individual actions. His emphasis on the need to promote a conservation culture is meant to underline that deterrent laws alone cannot protect the environment. The laws have to be combined with the promotion of a campaign to create in the citizens an awareness of the importance of conserving nature.

4. Some of the observations made by Mr.Hu during the Congress are given below as illustrative of his thinking:

* "We will promote a conservation culture by basically forming an energy- and resource-efficient and environment-friendly structure of industries, pattern of growth and mode of consumption."
* "Awareness of conservation will be firmly established in the whole of society."
* "China will considerably increase the proportion of renewable energy sources in total energy consumption, bring the discharge of major pollutants under effective control and notably improve ecological and environmental quality."
* "China’s economic growth is realized at an excessively high cost of resources and the environment."
* "We must give prominence to building a resource-conserving, environment-friendly society in our strategy for industrialization and modernization and get every organization and family to act accordingly."
* China will quadruple the per capita value of GDP in the coming 13 years and complete the building of "a moderately prosperous society in all respects."
* The new goal must be achieved "through optimizing the economic structure and improving economic returns while reducing consumption of resources and protecting the environment."
* "China has basically accomplished industrialization, with its overall national strength significantly increased and domestic market ranking as one of the largest in the world. It will also feature markedly improved livelihood for the people, more extensive democratic rights, higher ethical standards, greater social vitality coupled with stability and unity."
* The principle of "putting people first" has been a long-time guideline of the CPC, resulting in the abolition of ancient agricultural tax and the implementation of free education in poor rural areas in the past five years. The reform of the income distribution system will be deepened for reversing the growing income disparity. A reasonable and orderly pattern of income distribution will be basically in place, , "with middle-income people making up the majority" and absolute poverty basically eliminated.

5. Under an amendment to the Party Constitution adopted by the Congress, the Party will unswervingly encourage, support and guide the development of the non-public sector, play the fundamental role of the market in the allocation of resources, and establish a macro control system. According to the Chinese media, at the end of 2006, China had 4.94 million private businesses, involving a total investment of more than 7.5 trillion yuan. But among the 73 million CPC members nationwide, only three million come from the private sector. The influence of the newly-emerging private sector on policy-formulation is still limited. To be continued.

(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)

China in Hu’s Colours: Part I

Global Issues Web
Saturday, October 27, 2007

Copyright © B. Raman – South Asia Analysis Group
www.saag.org

By B. Raman

"People’s democracy", a "moderately prosperous society", a "scientific outlook on development", a "harmonious society" and "strengthening the soft power of the Chinese culture"—–these were the main themes of the proceedings of the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, which concluded at Beijing on October 21, 2007.

2. As the Chinese media pointed out, the expression "people’s democracy" was the most frequently used in the report presented by President Hu Jintao, in his capacity as the Party Secretary, to the Congress at the beginning of its proceedings. There were 60 references to it in his report and it figured repeatedly in the subsequent discussions on his report.

3. As China nears next year’s Bejing Olympics, its leadership is keen to shed the image of China as an authoritarian State and to project its image as a genuinely democratic state—- but it is a democracy in Chinese colours and not in Western colours. What the Chinese Party leaders sought to convey to their own people and to the rest of the world was that what one saw in China is not the rule of the few over the many, but the rule of the many through the few, it is a State where decisions are made and power is exercised not in darkness, but in full sunshine.

4. For China’s progress and stability in the future, political development is as important as economic and social development. That is what Mr.Hu sought to underline in his report. What should be the political characteristics of the Chinese State would be decided by the Chinese people through their party in accordance with their genius and experience. It will not be imposed from outside. The Chinese media quoted Mr. Yang Guangbin, Professor of the Renmin University of China. as saying: "With more individual freedom, gradual shaping of unique concept of democracy and solid forming of institutional arrangements, China-style democracy is emerging."

5. What are the characteristics of this emerging Chinese-style democracy? Hu himself drew attention to them in his report as follows:: The supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of the law, avoidance of arbitrariness in decision-making and governance, collective leadership through the party tempered by a division of individual responsibilities, democratic centralism moderated by inner party democracy, decisions based on information and intellectual support to the decision-making process, self-management, self-service, self-education and self-oversight. Mr.Hu emphasised that "power must be exercised in the sunshine to ensure that it is exercised correctly".

6. The key points in his report were:

* Public hearings must be held for the formulation of laws, regulations and policies that bear closely on the interests of the public.
* The most effective and extensive way for the people to be masters of the country is that they directly exercise democratic rights in accordance with the law to manage public affairs and public service programmes at the primary level, practice self-management, self-service, self-education and self-oversight, and exercise democratic oversight over cadres. Such practices must be emphasized and promoted as the groundwork for developing socialist democracy.
* The Party organizations at all levels and all Party members should act under the Constitution and laws on their own initiative and take the lead in upholding the authority of the Constitution and laws.
* The functions of the government must be separated from those of economic enterprises, matters requiring administrative examination and approval must be reduced, procedures must be standardised and Government should not intervene in microeconomic operations.
* Laws and rules of procedure should be improved to ensure that state organs exercise their powers and perform their functions within their statutory jurisdiction and in accordance with legal procedures.
* The need for continuous political re-structuring in order to improve political management.

7. While China would continue to be a one-party State, the Party should avoid any pretension of a monopoly of wisdom. Non-party intellectuals and technocrats would have an increasing role in policy-formulation and governance. One need not have to be a party member in order to be associated with the Government, but those associated with the Government—whether they are party members or not— must accept party supervision over their functioning.

8. Liberal democracy has two important features: The right of the people to elect their leaders and to question in open the wisdom of the decisions taken by the Government. The Chinese-style democracy would not have these features. The leaders will be elected by the party cadres in accordance with party procedures. While there would be a widest possible public contribution to decision-making by the leadership, once a decision is made, its wisdom cannot be challenged. The expression of any reservations or dissent should be in the darkness of party corridors and not in open sunshine. However, it was stated that the party has decided to experiment with direct elections of Party chiefs in more than 200 townships in Chongqing, Sichuan and Hubei. (To be continued)

(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)