Did India have to do the nuclear deal?

Global Geopolitics Net Sites
Thursday, October 16, 2008

© Copyright 2008 Susenjit Guha. All rights reserved.

By Susenjit Guha

Way back in the 1950s and early 1960’s, U.S. media couldn’t really figure out why India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was not as comfortable in the United States as he apparently was during his trips to Britain and Western Europe.

Even though former U.S. President John F. Kennedy failed to charm him during a White House visit, journalists noticed that Nehru’s eyes lit up when his wife Jacqueline entered the room.

Later, Nehru’s daughter Indira Gandhi had her famous face-off with U.S. President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in 1971 – the latter going on record as having used the choicest of expletives over her “obduracy.”

Critics pointed out that India had missed the Greyhound bus many times. First, it was non-alignment, then a strategic partnership with the Soviet Union during the Cold War years, to counter the U.S. alliance and obsession with India’s arch foe, Pakistan.
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INDIA/US: Nuclear Waiver – Blow to Non-Proliferation

Global Geopolitics – Global News Blog – Global Politics Online – IPS
Sunday, September 07, 2008

All rights reserved, IPS – Inter Press Service, 2008.

Analysis by Praful Bidwai*

NEW DELHI, Sep 8 (IPS) – The special waiver granted to India by the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG) from its nuclear trade rules is being seen as a massive setback to the cause of global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

The NSG’s waiver will allow India to resume nuclear commerce with the rest of the world with very few restrictions although India is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and has refused to accede to any other agreement for preventing the spread of, reducing the numbers of, or abolishing nuclear weapons.

The 45-nation conglomerate, a private arrangement set up after India’s first nuclear weapons explosion in 1974, turned a full circle at its special meeting in Vienna, on the weekend, the second one in a fortnight, held at the behest of the United States.
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Russia and Iran: crisis of the west, rise of the rest

Global Geopolitics
Tuesday, August 26, 2008

This article was originally published on opendemocracy.net under a Creative Commons license. Read the article in its original form.

Paul Rogers

Moscow’s war in Georgia and Tehran’s nuclear project highlight the failings of United States and European security policy.

(This article was first published on 21 August 2008)
24 – 08 – 2008

The military and political leaders of the United States and Europe could be forgiven in August 2008 for recalling the English phrase "it never rains, but it pours". For they are currently faced by a series of security problems in relation to Russia, Afghanistan and Iran, each of which is testing in its own right but which together strain their resources (and perhaps nerves) to the limit. These are only part of a chain of problems for strategists of the "west" (a category that analysts are notably feeling more and more obliged to qualify or clarify) that is highlighted in this period alone by events in Algeria, Iraq, Pakistan, and Poland.

The most high-profile security issue of the month has been the Russia-Georgia war of 8-12 August, whose unsettled and violent aftermath includes the continuing presence of Russian troops on the territory of what analysts are starting to call "Georgia proper" – that is, excluding the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This issue was a source of anguished debate at the emergency meeting of Nato in Brussels on 19 August, whose outcome was the formation of a new Nato-Georgia commission (under the rubric of the North Atlantic Council) which will focus on post-conflict reconstruction (see Vladimir Socor, "Nato’s Ministerial Meeting…", Eurasia Daily Monitor, 20 August 2008)

The nature of this decision and the degree of Nato’s support for Georgia at the meeting are already in dispute, however (see Julian Borger & Ian Traynor, "Russia: Miliband backs Georgia and widens Nato split", Guardian, 21 August 2008). The question of whether the formation of the commission was linked in any way to the "membership action plan" (Map) that Tbilisi is already involved in was answered differently by the Nato secretary-general (Jaap de Hoop Scheffer) and the British foreign secretary (David Miliband). This reflects a wider tension within the alliance over policy towards Georgia and, more generally, of establishing a coherent strategy in relation to what it perceives as an increasingly bold and abrasive Russia.

The armed reality

The sudden outbreak of the war over South Ossetia provoked confusion in many western capitals. Russia’s quick and heavy military operation after Georgia’s initial assault on Tskhinvali meant that Georgia had effectively lost the war before Washington or Brussels had formed a coherent view about what was happening. Since those early days, there has been a striking vehemence in the criticism of Russia from the George W Bush administration – Georgia’s main ally and military backer since Mikheil Saakashvili came to power there in January 2004. Indeed, Washington’s rhetoric suggests a consistent effort to depict Russia in ways that echo the confrontation with the Soviet Union during the cold war: as a militarily powerful and expansionist state that presents a formidable threat to the west.

The Georgia crisis, in this understanding, is part of a broader and emergent geopolitical confrontation. A number of writers on openDemocracy have subjected this view to scrutiny, at least insofar as they emphasise the conflict’s local roots and regional, Caucasian dimensions (see Donald Rayfield, "The Georgia-Russia conflict: lost territory, found nation", 13 August 2008) and George Hewitt, "Abkhazia and South Ossetia: heart of conflict, key to solution", 18 August 2008); others have addressed the issue of Russian strategy, but questioned whether the conflict can be understood in terms of a return to the cold war (see Ivan Krastev, "Russia and the Georgia war: the great-power trap", 19 August 2008). But to assess the thinking behind the combative American line that Russia’s military campaign in Georgia is evidence of its revived aggressive intent, it is necessary also to look in more detail at its actual military performance in South Ossetia/Georgia and the resources it has mobilised in the short, brutal war and lingering occupation.

In order to occupy South Ossetia and some cognate parts of Georgia proper, the Russian army deployed some of its best-equipped elite forces – including the 76th air assault division (based in St Petersburg) and the 96th airborne division and 45th intelligence regiment (both stationed near Moscow). Its armoured forces included some of the relatively small numbers of modern T-80 and T-90 tanks Russia currently has available.

The significance of this deployment is that the Russian army had effectively to use some of its key units for a small-scale operation against a diminutive neighbouring country (see David A Fulghum, “Russian Assault Reveals Weaknesses”, Aviation Week, 20 August 2008). True, the Georgian army has been extensively equipped by the United States in 2004-08 (see Vicken Cheterian, “Georgia’s arms race”, 4 July 2007). But during the cold war, no small country on the Soviet Union’s borders – such as Czechoslovakia, invaded on 20-21 August 1968, had its forces chosen to fight – could have hoped to match almost any of the divisions of the old Red Army. The Russian army today is barely a shadow of that force.

Moreover, the five-day war produced outcomes that must have surprised the Russians and were certainly unexpected among western military analysts. For example, the Georgians shot down several SU-25 Frogfoot ground-attack aircraft and even one of the Russian air force’s frontline Tu-22M3 Backfire bombers (see David A Fulghum et al, "Georgian Military Folds Under Russian Attack", Aviation Week, 15 August 2008). That plane – and almost certainly others – was piloted by a flying instructor; the Russian air force is so short of resources that instructors and test-pilots are often the only crew with enough experience to be sent into combat.

The victory of the Russian side in the war in narrow military terms is clear, even if the longer-term implications are – as Ivan Krastev writes – far less certain. But such details suggest that the impression conveyed by much of the language and commentary in Washington in particular – of a revanchist superpower eager to bully its way to restored domination of its "near abroad" – is unsupported by evidence of its real military capacity.

Indeed, the very importance for the Russian leadership of securing a victory over Georgia – not least in terms of bolstering national self-perceptions and ensuring a boost in its domestic popularity – can be seen as a further indication of the country’s relative weakness rather than strength: the opposite of the image Washington seems determined to attach to Russia.

The restoration project

The calculations that have informed the Russian campaign in Georgia are more complex than may be allowed for in any one-sided view. The decade of economic chaos and impoverishment that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 was an acutely painful period for millions of Russians – and the pain was compounded for many by what was experienced as the humiliatingly "superior" attitudes of many western politicians, advisers, and economic know-it-alls.

Vladimir Putin’s presidency (2000-08) responded to and refocused this sentiment in politically very skilful ways. He accompanied the re-establishment of political authority at the centre with the resourceful use of a Russian nationalism that long predated the Soviet period and indeed could be anchored as or even more legitimately in the centuries-long experience of imperial Russia (see Geoffrey Hosking, "Russians in the Soviet Union: rulers and victims", 26 June 2006). Putin was – and is, in his new guise as prime minister and his successor Dmitri Medvedev’s overseer – both clever and lucky: for his project has been indispensably aided by the bonanza Russia has accrued as a result of a long period of rising world energy prices (especially from natural-gas exports to western and central Europe).

Putin also played on Russian fears of Nato expansion and of the countervailing image of a United States determined to develop a ballistic-missile defence system. Here, the cold-war precedent is relevant in explaining Russian antagonism to such a capability (even though this is missed by most western observers). The "balance of terror" during the cold war was believed to be stable as long as both sides possessed substantial but "only" adequate strategic nuclear forces. The ability of either side also to develop defences even as offensive forces were maintained would upset the balance. Indeed, that was why the Soviet Union agreed to the bilateral anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty in 1972 and why the George W Bush administration’s withdrawal from the treaty in June 2002 had such a bad effect.

No one pretends that United States missile-defence capacity will be able to counter Russia’s nuclear forces any time between now and around 2020 (see "Behind America’s shield", Economist, 21 August 2008). But that is less relevant to an assessment of the current situation than two current facts: that the US’s still sees itself as the world’s only great power and is determined to remain so; and that in securing this reality it is pursuing "full-spectrum dominance" (a project that has a crucial symbolic aspect as well as one of outright military capacity). Both grate on Moscow in ways that feed in to the violent and excessive conflict, and the hard rhetoric, over South Ossetia/Georgia.

But it is in more than the military sphere that the image of a resurgent and powerful Russia is less grounded in reality than its projectors often allow. Russia’s economic performance is crucially (and dysfunctionally in the longer run) dependent on its energy resources, and there is a critical need for heavy investment in the oil-and-gas sector if current revenues are even to be maintained. The country also has great social problems (which are felt inside the military and have the potential to damage its standards and performance): among them a declining and aging population, rampant alcoholism, and low male life-expectancy for men (see Rebecca Kay, "’Being a man’ in contemporary Russia", 7 March 2008). These factors must be part of an overall judgment of the true face of Russian power today; and taken together they suggest that Russia has far less capacity to undertake a unilateral drive to restore its great-power status than it might appear.

The trial and the test

In the same week that Georgia has continued to cause much anxiety among western leaders, events in Afghanistan have provoked even more sleepless nights. The seriousness of the escalating conflict between the forces of Nato / Isaf and the Taliban was evident again in an intense engagement between French paratroops and Taliban paramilitaries on 19 August in which ten Frenchmen were killed. The lightning visit to the country of Nicolas Sarkozy in the aftermath reflects the extent of political concern in western capitals about the endemic violence as well as the French president’s hyperactive style – for high-level worries over the course of the Afghan war as it nears its eighth year include how far western publics will continue to support their countries’ involvement.

It never rains, indeed: for if Georgia and Afghanistan were not enough, attentive policy-makers or advisers in the United States and Europe might have noticed three significant actions in recent days by Iran’s government – all of which nominally concern civil rather than military programmes, yet all with implication for Tehran’s tense relations with the United States in particular.

The first was on 17 August 2008, when Iran’s news media reported the launch of a Safir-e Omid ("ambassador of peace") two-stage rocket with sufficient power to put a satellite into orbit. This may have been an attempt to actually launch a satellite, or it may have carried a dummy; in any case, the rocket veered off-course at the second stage. This, plus the fact that the firing had already been delayed by a couple of months, indicates that it may have been less than an unqualified success (see William J Broad, “Iran reports test of craft able to carry a satellite”, International Herald Tribune, 18 August 2008). Washington responded by both calling the launch a failure and condemning it on the familiar grounds that an ostensibly civil programme could easily be diverted into an offensive missile with a substantial range.But whatever the precise circumstances and fallout, for Iran to get this far was a further demonstration of the country’s technical capabilities.

The second action arrived a day later, when the Tehran authorities revealed a plan to develop a satellite-launch facility that would be made available to other Muslim countries. The third, also on 18 August, was an announcement by Iran’s atomic organisation confirming that Iran was planning to build six more nuclear-power plants (in addition to the one that has long been under construction at Bushehr on the Persian Gulf). It is reported that contracts have been made with companies to begin site-surveys for the new sites, with the intention is to complete the reactors by 2021 (see "Iran plans to build six more nuclear plants", 20 August 2008).

The Bushehr reactor, which is being built with Russian help, has been much delayed; it is by no means certain that the additional reactors will be built; and the satellite rocket-test may well have been a failure. At the same time, these developments may matter less in the context of Iranian perceptions of their national status than that in general nuclear-power and space research are seen as strong indicators of modernity that light the way to better future for Iran. The offer of satellite-launch facilities for other Muslim countries reflects a similar impulse, reflecting the fact that Iran is intent on affirm a confident stance in the international arena. In pursuing its strategic course, Iran’s leadership is drawing on a mix of available elements – including the sense of a long civilisational history, modern Iranian nationalism and the Islamist ideological solidarities of the 1979 revolution.

Iran’s search for status is fuelled by its very large reserves of oil and (even more) of natural-gas, though an over-dependence here too entails a neglect of the serious economic problems facing the country. These include high inflation and unemployment (and under-employment), as well as the need for huge investment in oil-and-gas production if Iran’s resources are to be used effectively to support the country’s development.

The economic imperatives create reinforce internal political pressures on Iran’s current leadership. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad faces an election in mid-2009 in which he will face a difficult challenge from rival candidates – including Mohammad Baqer-Ghalibaf, who aspires to replicate the same journey Ahmadinejad himself made from the mayoralty of Tehran to the presidency of Iran. The current project to upgrade Iran’s technical prowess is a key part of the leadership’s attempt to bolster its domestic popularity as well as its international standing – though whoever is elected in Iran will have the defence of perceived national interests as a primary concern.

The defiant other

To understand Iran’s policy and outlook in this way is quite compatible with a recognition of potential dangers in an Iran that seeks nuclear weapons, or overreaches itself as a regional power. What is important, though, is that western diplomats have to understand that much of what Iran is doing derives from the country’s perception of its millennial history and current standing in the world. A part of this national sentiment that is close to the surface is the memory of Iran’s dependence on or subjugation by Russia, Britain and the United States for much of the 20th century. In its broad contours, moreover, this momentum of Iranian action is comparable to that which underpins the Russian leadership’s political project as it has developed in the 2000s.

This context for Iranian (as for Russian) action may be more readily appreciated in some European capitals circles than it is in Washington (with an emphasis on the "may" and the "some"). What is more emphatically clear is that the rebarbative language directed by United States officials at Tehran and Moscow can sound strikingly similar.

The similarity of language reveals one of the core realities of the complex and shifting landscape of early 21st-century global security: that the United States is responding to the "rise of the rest" with strenuous efforts to protect its own hegemonic role. This, coupled with Washington’s predilection for tough talking and even (in the case of Iran) direct threats are likely to be both ineffective and counterproductive. In relation to both Moscow and Tehran, classical diplomacy – supplemented by understanding (including historical understanding) of the other – offer a far better prospect of progress. Such a path might also prevent the August downpour becoming a November hard rain.

About the Author:

Paul Rogers is professor of peace studies at Bradford University, northern England. He has been writing a weekly column on global security on openDemocracy
since 26 September 2001.

This article is published by Paul Rogers,Global Geopolitics Net , and openDemocracy.net under a Creative Commons licence. You may republish it free of charge with attribution for non-commercial purposes following these guidelines.

INDIA/US: Suppliers’ Group Stalls Nuclear Deal

Global Geopolitics – Global News Blog – IPS
Friday, August 22, 2008

All rights reserved, IPS – Inter Press Service, 2008.

Analysis by Praful Bidwai*

NEW DELHI, Aug 23  (IPS)  – Dashing hopes that the United States-India nuclear cooperation deal would sail through the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG), a two-day meeting in Vienna of the 45-nation association has failed to produce a consensus on a U.S. drafted text.

The deal cannot be finalised unless the group grants India a special exemption from its nuclear commerce rules and allows the export of nuclear fuel and civilian nuclear technology to India. Under the rules, no nuclear trade can take place with a country that has not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and yet possesses nuclear weapons, a description that fits India.

The NSG has informally agreed to meet again on Sep. 4 and 5. But it will do so to discuss a new text which takes into account some of the numerous suggestions and amendments moved by several members at the Vienna meeting.

This is a significant setback to the prospect for the controversial deal’s completion before the U.S. Congress adjourns on Sep. 26 prior to elections in November. Without Congressional ratification of a bilateral agreement signed with India under the deal, called the ”123 agreement”, the deal cannot go through.

The U.S. government still hopes to present the 123 agreement to Congress when it resumes it session on Sep. 8 with a busy schedule, but the time-line is now looking extremely tight.

Indian officials had hoped that no more than a handful of countries would raise objections to the American text at the NSG meeting in Vienna.

But at least 15-20, and according to one report, as many as almost half, of NSG members moved amendments and suggestions, which seek to promote the objective of nuclear non-proliferation while granting India the exemption the U.S. a seeking on its behalf.

Even more important, New Zealand’s disarmament minister Phil Goff has disclosed that eight nations –Ireland, Austria, Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, Finland and Denmark, besides his own country– are now working in concert in pushing amendments to the U.S. draft.

The amendments broadly fall into three categories. The first suggestion calls for a periodic review by the NSG of India’s compliance with its commitments to non-proliferation and tight restrictions on nuclear exports.

The second seeks to explicitly exclude the technologies of uranium enrichment and reprocessing of spent fuel from what can be exported to India.

And the third says that nuclear trade with India must cease if India conducts a nuclear test.

”India will find all such conditions unpalatable,” says  Prof. Achin Vanaik, who teaches international relations and global politics at Delhi University. ”Indeed, India made a big fuss about a paragraph the United States had inserted in the original text calling for India’s eventual adherence to ‘fullscope’ safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency. It succeeded in getting that paragraph removed before the text was circulated amongst NSG members.”

Adds Vanaik: ”India can possibly live with the condition for a periodic review, although even this will be difficult for Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to sell to the domestic political opposition. But it will be well-nigh impossible for India to accept the other two conditions.”

Singh has repeatedly assured India’s Parliament that the deal does not and cannot prevent India from conducting a nuclear test if that is considered absolutely essential, and that India will not compromise on its sovereign right to do so as the price to be paid for the deal

Even on the issue of exclusion of enrichment and reprocessing technologies, the Indian position is that the U.S. must adhere to its commitment to have full-scale civilian nuclear cooperation with India.

It is by no means clear that the proposed NSG meeting in two weeks’ time can reconcile differences over such conditions, and grant India the ”clean and unconditional” waiver that it seeks from NSG rules.

U.S. officials have repeatedly stated that India should expect a clean waiver, but not an unconditional one.

Prime Minister Singh, who has staked his political reputation on the nuclear deal, and who forced India’s communist parties to withdraw support to his United Progressive Alliance government, would find it difficult to agree to any conditions, especially substantive ones.

And if the deal does not go through before Singh and President George W. Bush complete their respective terms, it cannot be renegotiated under the favourable conditions that prevail today in domestic U.S. politics.

The discussions at Vienna have encouraged arms control and disarmament groups to make a strong appeal to NSG members, calling on them to push for conditions that would promote the objectives of nuclear non-proliferation.

Says Darryl F. Kimball of the Arms Control Association:  ”At this point, we can expect that Washington and New Delhi will try to wordsmith the proposals to restrict and condition nuclear trade with India to the point of being meaningless and force a decision at the next NSG meeting… In response, responsible NSG states should insist on guidelines relating to India that are clear and unambiguous. And given that the NSG participant states’ actions on this issue will have an impact for decades to come, they should not rush to judgment.”

Adds Kimball: ”At a minimum, the NSG must make clear that nuclear trade with India shall be terminated if it resumes testing for any reason. If India cannot agree to such terms, it suggests that India is not serious about its nuclear test moratorium pledge.”

What happens to the deal will now depend on the furious lobbying and strong-arm tactics that the U.S. is likely to use with key NSG members. India will also mount pressure on them to support an unconditional waiver in the NSG or face the prospect of losing India’s growing market

”One thing is clear,” says M.V. Ramana, senior fellow at the Institute for Social and Economic Change in the southern city of Bangalore. ”The states which raised objections and moved amendments in Vienna are likely to feel strengthened, especially because eight of them have come together. If they refuse to compromise by succumbing to U.S. pressure and Indian embellishments, they could succeed in blocking the deal.”

(*IPS correspondent Praful Bidwai is a noted commentator and author on nuclear disarmament issues and also a peace activist.)

KHAN GATE – NEW COVER UP BID

Global Geopolitics Net
Monday, July 21, 2008

© Copyright 2008 James Crickton. All rights reserved.

By JAMES CRICKTON
London based Research Analyst with a MNC

Now that North Korea has expressed readiness to be forthcoming on its N-enterprise, it should be possible for the world to unravel the nuclear black-markets pioneered and sustained by Abdul Qadeer Khan and his unnamed associates in Pakistan with official patronage. Khan has so far been kept away from the international investigators. He has been claiming for a while that his proliferation activities had the full backing of successive army chiefs of Pakistan.

Both the ‘conditional’ pardon given by President Pervez Musharraf and the ground reality that nothing moves in Pakistan without a general wink or nod from the General Headquarters of the army in the garrison town of Rawalpindi lend credence to Khan’s claim that he is not alone. Howsoever powerful and ingenious he might be, Khan could not have despatched centrifuges to North Korea on board a military aircraft in the year 2000 without the knowledge of the military and the military dominated intelligence agency ISI. At that time Gen Musharraf was the army chief besides being the chief executive of the country.

The Pakistan-North Korea nuclear axis goes back to the time Benazir Bhutto was the prime minister in 1994. In the run upto the elections that have brought about the transition of Pakistan from military rule to quasi – democracy, she had proudly spoken of her own N-connection. And even declared that if voted to power, she would allow Khan to appear before the IAEA for questioning. She immediately came under pressure from the establishment and was forced to dilute her commitment. A few days later Benazir was assassinated. Who assassinated her remains a mystery? It is possible that vested interests felt ill at ease with Benazir’s offer of letting Khan to inquisition by US authorities or IAEA. Such access to Khan could have put the entire Pak story under the lens.

Patently, it is unfair to apportion all the credit (blame?) for Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence to keep India at bay to Khan. Another US-trained Plutonium scientist, Munir Ahmad Khan, who was senior to him, deserves to be hailed for the success Pakistan had notched on the nuclear front. Bad luck to him was that General Zia-ul-Haq disliked him because of his close association with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who could rightfully claim, on the political side, the title of father of Pakistan’s bomb. Zia pump primed the Khan enterprise as a counter foil to Munir Ahmed. Some experts hold a different view. According to them, the wily general wanted to let Munir Ahmed carry out his enterprise beyond the preying eyes of the West. And for this reason deliberately made Khan the visible face of Pakistan’s programme to act as some sort of a decoy. That Khan being a megalomaniac did his best to create an aura for himself and even boasted of fathering an Islamic bomb is another matter.

Munir Ahmed directed Pakistan bomb project between two positions at the IAEA- first between 1957 and 1972 as a staff member initially, then as a member of the Board of Governors and later on as IAEA Board Chairman from 1986 to 1987.

A recent study by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) shows that Pakistan has followed what in business parlance can be termed as insider trading. Khan is the best known example. Writing in the Defence Journal (May 2004), Usman Shabbir, termed Munir Ahmed as the ‘Unsung Hero’ of Pak bomb project. He and others have also gone on record to say that many Pakistani scientists and engineers gained crucial knowledge about enrichment process through education, training and internships in European firms some times under the aegis of UNESCO.

Tens of scientists were trained in Europe, in particular in Belgium and Germany, says a study on assessing Pakistan’s Nuclear Reprocessing Capabilities

IISS strategic dossier on Nuclear Black-markets leaves no doubt that Pakistan’s N- goal was and is a state sponsored and promoted enterprise. Pakistan embassies were systematically used and so were the Pakistan born foreign nationals. Says IISS: “From the early 1970s until at least the late 1990s Pakistan embassies around the world, in particular in Europe were key components of the network and used diplomatic pouches to send material home”.

Put differently, Islamabad can’t shield itself behind Khan; the earlier it comes out of shadows the better for the world. Because, circumstantial evidence shows that Pakistan’s N- imports and exports were centralised. A British intelligence report in 2003 reportedly listed no less than 95 Pakistani organisations and government bodies including diplomatic posts abroad as players in the country’s N- imports.

While on the subject of involving Pakistani- born foreign nationals, the IISS report observes, “Through financial or ideological incentives, Pakistan enlisted the contribution of foreign nationals of Pakistan origin. A Q Khan made extensive use of this method, asking several of his countrymen to come back to Pakistan, collect information, or assist with the procurement of spare parts”. Khan also made extensive use of personnel connections invoking ‘IOUs’. These techniques brought success to its enterprise in the past and ensured the longevity of the network despite regime changes.

NEW INSIDERS

Lately Pakistan establishment is invoking these time tested old practices to ‘guard’ itself from any intrusive campaign to unravel Mush-Khan mystery. There are reports that specially selected and trained young Pak scientists are being placed at the IAEA headquarters and some think tanks in the United States working on non-proliferation issues.

Primarily their task is to help Pak nuclear and defence establishment to effectively deal with key issues at various fora like nuclear watch dog, IAEA, and Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) besides the usual suspects like CTBT and FMCT. Sources in London, Washington and Dubai said that these new Pak Nuclear foot-soldiers did their post-graduation and received hands on training in Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) and Strategic Plans Division (SPD) as also Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA).

Some of these young scientists are said to have been sent to the London-based South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) for a short warm up. It may be patently unfair to say all young Pak scientists at SASSI come under the tainted category. But there is the talk that after the internship, these youngsters may be posted to Pak embassies to represent PAEC, which offers perfect cover.

Meanwhile there are reports from Pakistan itself that Islamist fundamentalists sympathetic to Jihadis are finding their way into the Pakistan nuke laboratories. These reports need to be thoroughly verified before a view could be taken. At this stage, this much can be said. Given the milieu in which Pakistan finds itself today, the jihadi infiltration into the country’s scientific laboratories, if true, doesn’t come as a surprise.

The United States is said to be monitoring these developments though it doesn’t appear to have achieved any significant breakthrough just as it has not had any success thus far in getting access to the Khan confessions and details of Pak government investigations into the Khan proliferation enterprise.

By 1983 itself, the United States came to believe that Beijing might have helped Pakistan overcome some difficulties in its nuclear campaign. Five years later in 1998, first steps were initiated in Pak-Iran nuclear cooperation. This much is clear since according to US ambassador to Pakistan, Robert Oakley and Assistant Secretary of Defence, Henry Brown, General Mirza Aslam Beg, the army chief, had threatened to transfer nuclear technology to Iran if Washington cut off arms sales to Pakistan.

Benazir Bhutto, as prime minister (1988-90 and 1993-96) was in the Iran-Pak N-loop. Her Security Affairs Advisor Major General Imtiaz Ali and her Military Secretary Zulfiqar Ali reportedly encouraged meetings between Khan and Iran.

The point is whether it is with Iran or with Libya or for that matter with North Korea, Khan did not make a solo effort even if he had cut corners here and there to improve his bank balance. As of now there is no light on the contours of this broad based network or on the extent and depth of cooperation with China. From all accounts, it is clear that nuclear cooperation with China was initiated by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in May 1976. It remains one of the most closely held state secrets of Pakistan. And it is said to be a cause of friction in Sino-American relations.

One doesn’t know whether all members of the Khan network have been identified and put under the scanner. Approximately some 50 individuals may have been actively involved in the network, according to the deposition of David Albright before the Subcommittee on international terrorism and non-proliferation of the US House Committee on International Affairs.

Another report puts the number of persons investigated world wide at 38. How many of them are from Pakistan is unknown as also whether everyone who assisted Khan in Pakistan is named as of now. There is need to trace and question his associates in other countries.

Needless to say, all this calls for a world wide effort and cooperation from the countries concerned. Since North Korea is forthcoming to speak, it is in Pakistan’s interest to let the world unravel the Khan mystery it has gift wrapped over the years as a matter of state policy.

WASHINGTON TRACK

Given the difficult times it is passing through, socially, ethnically and economically, it is in Pakistan’s own interest to come clean on what we may call the Khan Gate. It should allow as much broad based probe as is possible and give up the age old practice of taking shelter under one pretext or the other. If for no other reason, just to prevent the possibility of fundamentalist Islamists gaining access to N-technology since Talibanisation of Pakistan’s countryside is a reality. Certainly the civilised world will be more than willing to lend a helping hand to Pakistan to start on a clean slate.

A related issue that only Washington can answer is how much of Pakistan’s clandestine activity is known to the United States. Three years ago, in September 2005, Ruud Lubbers, who was Dutch prime minister, publicly stated that CIA had made them to free Khan, not once, but twice in 1975 and again in 1986. The Lubbers allegation remains unanswered till date, surprisingly. The CIA is not unaware of Khan contacts and activities either.

George Tenet, a former CIA director, in his book, ‘At the Centre of the Storm”, says Khan had contacts in China, North Korea and through out the Muslim world. His caveat is interesting though – “A Q Khan is at least as dangerous as Osama bin Laden. (But) it is extremely difficult to know exactly what he was upto or to what extent his efforts were conducted at the behest and with the support of Pakistani government”.

But there is one aspect of the Khan Bomb factory that United States cannot say it was not unaware off. And Pakistan government cannot attribute to the greed of the discredited scientist. Before 1985, the year Pressler Amendment came on the American statute, Islamabad placed an order for 40 F-16 aircraft. It wanted to use these aircraft as delivery vehicles for its nuclear weapons. That the US did not configure these aircraft for nuclear delivery is a fact. But the moot question is: Was it a deliberate policy action? Those in the know of these things, say it could be a deliberate decision. Truth if any, only Washington knows. Islamabad knows.

A Strike on Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Facilities: Assessing Potential Retaliation

By Joseph Kirschke

Global Geopoltics Net
Thursday, December 06, 2007

© Copyright Joseph Kirschke. All rights reserved.

Washington, D.C.

In September of 1998, Iran massed more than 200,000 troops along its eastern border with Afghanistan. Some 70,000 Revolutionary Guards, Iran’s elite military force, were part of the ominous military formation, which also included hundreds of tanks, armored vehicles, mobile missile batteries and artillery pieces.

Across the Islamic Republic, passions were running high: protests erupted with thousands swarming the streets chanting slogans like “Death to the Taliban!” Igniting the furor were reports that, on August 8th, Taliban insurgents stormed an Iranian consulate in the city of Mazar-i-Sharif and massacred ten diplomats and an Iranian journalist in cold blood.

For a time, war looked all but inevitable. Negotiations by the United Nations stalled (1.) while public funerals for the slain men – in all likelihood, intelligence agents under diplomatic cover – only fueled popular outrage. But in the end cooler heads prevailed. Iran had just emerged from an eight-year-long war with Saddam Hussein, costing more than a million lives: the torchbearers of the revolution simply couldn’t afford another quagmire.

Though forgotten by the American public as their lawmakers ratchet up the rhetoric against an Iran apparently determined to acquire nuclear weapons, this event presents a barometer of the response Tehran may – or may not – offer should the U.S. strike its uranium-enrichment facilities. It also belies the serious consequences America will face – from Iraq and Afghanistan to the Persian Gulf and beyond – should the Bush Administration continue its relentless drive to disarm Iran militarily at the expense of serious diplomacy.

Asymmetric Warfare

Military and regional experts familiar the region are almost unanimous in using the word “asymmetrical” when it comes to describing how Tehran would respond to an attack on its nuclear facilities.

“The idea being that the Iranians know they can’t match us in terms of military – they don’t have the same armaments; they’re not as technologically advanced as the U.S.,” said William Samii, a regional analyst for Iran and the Middle East at the Center for Naval Analyses in Alexandria, Va. “And they know it.”

Instead, say Samii and other Washington experts, the Iranians would pursue less confrontational, though equally problematic, retaliatory measures – aimed at both humiliating the U.S. on the world stage, while driving a firm wedge between Washington and its allies. “They would resort to tactics that the U.S. would find difficult to counter,” Samii added.

Kenneth Katzmann, a senior analyst for Persian Gulf Affairs for the Congressional Research Service at the Library of Congress, quoted a former Air Force planner as saying 400 targets must be struck including 75 that would require “penetrating munitions” to sufficiently disrupt Iran’s nuclear ambitions (2.) – as evidence emerges of some facilities being placed inside populated areas. (3.)

A response by Iran, he noted in an interview, could very easily take on economic dimensions. “What they’re going to do is drive up petrol prices,” he said, noting that even threatening speeches by Iranian leaders can impact world oil prices. “We feel they’re going to do something ‘out of the box.’”

For example, he said, Iran could disrupt shipping in the Straits of Hormuz – the channel at the mouth of the Persian Gulf through which two-fifths of the world’s oil passes. “They may even use their influence to get the Basra oil workers to walk off the job,” said Katzmann, “to not only get Iranian oil off the market, but Iraqi oil off the market, too.”

Such moves by Tehran are not without precedent. During the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, foreign oil tankers were frequent targets of Iranian mines, rocket attacks and gunboats, driving up international oil prices – and prompting American intervention.

“Iran could intensely threaten Gulf shipping for short periods, deter commercial ships from entering the Gulf, drive up insurance rates for Gulf shipping and boost world oil prices on nervous markets,” according to the Heritage Foundation, a conservative Washington think tank. (4.)

Others in Washington, however, see an Iranian escalation against shipping in the Gulf as at least somewhat antithetical to its interests – given that at least 40 percent of Iran’s revenue is based on refined oil exports. Any action shutting off – or at least hampering – Gulf shipping, moreover, would be a last resort in the event the U.S. tried to fully blockade Tehran’s oil exporting abilities.

Proxies in Iraq

But by far the biggest immediate challenge to the U.S., Iran-watchers agree, would come in the form of attacks by Shiite militias loyal to Tehran on the ground in Iraq, where 160,000 U.S. troops are already stretched to the breaking point.

Indeed, Moqtada al-Sadr, commander of the Mahdi Army and one of the most powerful warlords in the country, has openly said he would strike back at coalition forces were there an attack on Iran (5.) – as have leaders of other significant groups like the Badr Brigades.

There is no limit to the disruption these groups could do to coalition efforts to stabilize Iraq. Michael Connell, also a research analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses, says it would take little effort for Iran to arm Shiite insurgents loyal to Tehran with hardware that could prove acutely hazardous for U.S. troops.

Such an escalation could quickly, and drastically, change the already difficult realities of life for U.S. troops. “They could up the ante by supplying more IEDs and EFPs,” said Connell, alluding to Improvised Explosive Devices and Explosively Formed Penetrators, roadside bombs that have already exacted heavy losses on U.S. troops and their convoys.

Iran, could also furnish its Shiite loyalists with variations of “Manpads,” or Man Portable Air Defense Systems, which could cause considerable destruction of U.S. aircraft and particularly helicopters, according to Connell. (The acquisition of Manpad-like weapons – such as deadly shoulder-fired Stinger Missiles – by the mujahedin from the U.S. in Afghanistan is widely believed by military historians to have been one of the most decisive factors precipitating a Soviet withdrawal in the late 1980s.)

Kenneth Katzmann of the Congressional Research Service noted insurgents could use such weapons to attack the U.S.-fortified “Green Zone” in central Baghdad from places like the nearby Shiite neighborhood of Sadr City. “There’s plenty they can do,” he said.

Vulnerable Supply Lines

Also dangerously open to guerrilla attack, other experts warn, is the main supply route that snakes for more than 340 miles from Kuwait to Baghdad through the Shiite hinterlands of southern Iraq.

“If they cut our supply lines we will have a very big problem,” said W. Patrick Lang, the former head of Middle East Intelligence at the Defense Intelligence Agency. Eighty-five percent of supplies, in trucks driven by “Third Country Nationals” such as Turks and Pakistanis, he noted, ply the route – and would be wide open to enemy fire.

“With the British army moving out it makes it worse,” Lang added. “The military seems to assume nothing bad like this will happen.”

President Bush, his political allies and U.S. military commanders have frequently and publicly blasted Tehran for “meddling” in Iraq – accusations that have made their way into the mainstream media. Until now, however, Iran specialists believe Tehran’s presence in Iraq has been mutedly “non-operational”: a means to guarantee its own interests – and not cripple American troops.

Iranian Military and Intelligence Assets in Iraq

This is not to say that Iran’s security forces do not maintain an extensive intelligence and military network in Iraq. In fact, as early as May 2003 – shortly after “the end of major combat operations” was announced – Americans immediately began detecting Iranian intelligence activity on the ground in Iraq – much of it dominated by the Revolutionary Guards Corps, the Quds Force, its 3,000-strong paramilitary wing, and elements of Hezbollah. (6.)

In March, for instance, coalition forces captured Musa Daquq, a ranking member of Hezbollah, who officials claimed was working with the Quds Force to help Iraqi insurgents with logistical and arms training. A spokesman for coalition forces in Iraq also recently told reporters that six people linked to the Quds Force have been captured in-country over the past year. (7.) .The full number of Iranian operatives in Iraq – though unknown – is likely in the hundreds.

Their fighting prowess can be impressive. A prime example of this was seen in a strikingly audacious and sophisticated jailbreak in broad daylight that freed a group of Iranians from a police jail near the Sunni insurgent stronghold of Fallujah, in February of 2004.

With what an American military commander would later describe to reporters as “heavy firepower,” a group of as many as 50 insurgents freed the men following a fierce firefight. “The assault was coupled with a simultaneous attack on an Iraqi civil defense headquarters one mile away,” said the commander, “intended to hold them in check until the prison break unfolded.” (8.)

Among the four attackers found dead after the smoke cleared were two Lebanese nationals – and one Iranian.

The Quds Force is also active throughout the greater region, having supplied arms to extremist factions in Lebanon, Israel and throughout the Middle East, including Hamas, the Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah, which waged a bitter war against Israel in the summer of 2006. (In the 1990s, ironically, Washington turned a blind eye when Quds Force operatives were deployed to Bosnia to assist that nation’s beleaguered Muslim-led government against Christian Orthodox Serbian nationalists.) (9.)

More recently, the Quds Force has also begun delivering weaponry to the Taliban, Iran’s longtime nemesis, posing a potential threat to U.S. and NATO efforts to keep the peace in that war-ravaged country. (10.) And while experts have identified the danger of Iran striking at U.S. interests via the Taliban in Afghanistan as real, they say the more convenient theater for retaliation exists in Iraq.

Hezbollah and Prospects for Global Terror

Another very realistic, and equally disturbing, scenario is the specter of numerous acts of terror against American citizens and interests by around the world by Iranian proxies such as Hezbollah, say experts like Connell. “It’s not clear that Hezbollah does everything Iran tells it,” he said. “But they are known to act in concert, because they were founded by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.”

Hezbollah’s reach shadows the long arm of the Iranian revolution, and Iran’s designation by the U.S. State Department as a state sponsor of terrorism since 1984. On March 17th, 1992, for example, a suicide bomber careered a pickup truck into the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina, killing 29 and wounding 242.

Islamic Jihad – a group with ties to both Iran and Hezbollah – would later claim responsibility, citing Israel’s previous assassination of Hezbollah leader Sayed Abbas al-Musawi as justification. (11.)

Two years later, another suicide bomber killed 85 and injured hundreds more at an Argentine Jewish community center, also in Buenos Aires. In October of last year, Argentine officials accused Iran of instructing Hezbollah to carry out the bombing and called for the arrest of former Iranian President Ayatollah Rafsanjani and seven other Iranian officials. (12.)

Previously, in the late 1990s, Argentine prosecutors had issued international arrest warrants against Iran’s ambassador to Buenos Aires at the time of the bombing as well as Imad Maguniyeh, an influential Hezbollah operative.

Maguniyeh is wanted by the FBI, as Americans have also been in the crosshairs: the 1996 terrorist attack on Khobar Towers in Khobar, Saudi Arabia, for instance, claimed the lives of 19 American servicemen, and injured 372 others. (13.) Though Iran has not been directly implicated in that incident, a U.S. federal indictment has since stated that the bombing was approved by Ali Khameini, the Supreme Leader of Iran.

Perhaps the most memorable attack by Iran on American interests took place on October 23rd of 1983 when a truck driven by a Hezbollah recruit, laden with 5,400 kilograms of TNT, slammed into a U.S. military barracks in Beirut, killing 241 Marines, resulting in America’s retreat from Lebanon. (14.) It was widely seen by religious radicals in the region as a major defeat for America – and emboldened terrorists to attack U.S. targets for years to come.

Suicide missions by individual Iranians and government-sponsored cells are also a possibility, although most analysts agree that they would not take on the nightmarish dimensions of the frontal assaults that characterized the trench fighting of the Iran-Iraq War. Throughout the 1980s, Saddam Hussein’s panicked military units only narrowly kept the Basij, an irregular force of thousands, from overrunning their positions. (Largely composed of youths, many Basij believed death on the battlefield would give them the “keys to paradise.”)

But there have since been some remarkably sobering, and specific, reports of Tehran’s intentions of prosecuting suicide bombings against American targets in the event of an attack. In the Spring of 2006, more than 200 Iranians gathered to sign registration forms for “martyrdom seeking operations” to defend the Islamic Republic. (15.)

Most military planners and experts, meanwhile, have publicly conceded that action against Iran’s uranium enrichment facilities would only set Tehran’s program back a couple of years at most. By all accounts, Tehran is still years away from the producing bomb-grade plutonium. Some say an attack could even invigorate the re-armament process, much as the Allied bombing of Germany during World War II galvanized the re-constitution of Hitler’s military forces.

What Next?

All this begs the question: What would happen if Iran’s theocrats did acquire a nuclear weapon? William Samii of the Center for Naval Analyses, for one, maintains that, for all President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad’s bellicose talk about “wiping Israel off the map,” he scarcely represents a unified Iranian worldview – even among its foreign policy leadership.

“There are so many moving points – and it’s quite impossible to isolate things,” among Iran’s rulers, Samii noted. Though power ultimately rests with the Supreme Leader, Ali Khameini, and his ruling council, “he also depends on informal institutions and individual stakeholders,” he added. Iran is “not a democracy, but they do have elections – so the public does have an effect on what they do.”

Iranian public opinion is overwhelmingly pro-American, at that, say analysts – indeed, much more so than in any other country in the region: In the days after September 11th, thousands of Iranians flooded the streets of major cities across the country to hold candlelight vigils to recognize American victims of the worst terrorist attack ever on U.S. soil. Iran’s were the only such shows of solidarity in the entire region.

Rampant unemployment and a stagnant economy borne of international isolation, coupled with a rule based on a tiresome religious ideology, have left Iran’s very young population deeply distrustful of its clerical leadership. Still, many analysts say this could change overnight should the U.S. attack, with the Iranian people rallying behind their government, however unpopular.

As President Bush, presidential candidates and policy makers from both sides of the partisan divide voice their vitriol against the Mullahs for political points, completely obscured is the highly valuable assistance Tehran once provided the U.S. in the opening salvos in the war on terror during Operation Enduring Freedom.

A Helping Hand and an Olive Branch

In addition to providing targets for air strikes against Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan, (16.) Tehran went out of its way to get the Northern Alliance – which the U.S. backed against the Taliban – not only to fully enlist in the American endeavor, but to ensure that the Tajik-dominated force allow participation by ethnic Pashtuns to make the intervention more “pan-Afghan.” (17.)

Iran also gave the U.S. permission to conduct search and rescue missions on and near its territory, made its airfields available for American transport planes, allowed a U.S. freighter with food and medical supplies to dock at one of its seaports and established a vital humanitarian corridor into Afghanistan. (18.) At one point, the Iranians even intercepted an al-Qaeda operative fleeing into Iran based on U.S. intelligence. (19.)

Despite Iran’s obvious mutual interest in neutralizing the Taliban, Tehran had other things in mind. “Iran’s tactical cooperation with the United States was fundamentally positive in character – Iran hoped and anticipated that tactical cooperation with the United States would lead to a genuine strategic opening between our two countries,” said Hillary Mann, the former director of Iran, Afghanistan and Persian Gulf affairs at the National Security Council from 2001-2003. (20.)

However, “in all these cases, it was the United States that was unwilling to build on issue-specific tactical cooperation to pursue true strategic rapprochement,” she added. (21.)

This window of opportunity fully opened in May of 2003. Not long after the fall of Baghdad, Iran made a profound and comprehensive diplomatic gesture to U.S. officials through its envoys in Switzerland, which, according to Mann, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and former Administration officials have since acknowledged.

“Everything would be on the table, including Iran’s support for Hezbollah as well as its nuclear ambitions and role in Iraq,” Mann added. “But the Bush Administration rejected this proposal out of hand. Less than two weeks later, Washington cut off the (diplomatic) channel with Iran on Afghanistan and al-Qaeda over questionable and never substantiated allegations linking Tehran to the May 12, 2003 bombing in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.” (22.)

America, she noted, will pay a steep price for years to come. “This mishandling of U.S. relations with Iran continues to impose heavy costs on American interests and policy efforts in the Middle East,” Mann added, “on the Iranian nuclear issue, in Iraq, in Afghanistan, in Lebanon, and in the Arab-Israeli arena.” (23.)

History with the West

Throughout modern history, Iran has grown accustomed to being on the short end of the stick in its dealings with the West.

In the 1800s, Persia played host to the “great game” of Russia and the British Empire. In 1953, not long after nationalizing British oil interests in Mohammed Mossadegh, Iran’s democratically-elected prime minister, promptly found himself ousted in a coup hatched by Washington and London. Later, when Iraq invaded Iran in 1980, the United Nations stood by idly before the U.S. began to pour millions in aid to buttress Saddam’s ruinous war.

In 2002, Iranians were deeply concerned yet again to suddenly find themselves in George W. Bush’s “Axis of Evil”: Not only had they just enabled the U.S. to unseat the Taliban, they were being thrown together into the same vortex as their longtime adversary – who American military forces were about to depose.

Nonetheless, a nuclear-armed Iran would not spell doomsday. “The regime is hostile to, and suspicious of, the U.S., but Iranians are very rational – they’re not crazy,” added Samii. “The survival of their country, and their revolution, is very important to them.”

Take Iran’s aborted showdown with the Taliban in the late 1990s – not to mention its recent about-face alliance with its longtime Sunni fundamentalist foes to keep Washington in check on its eastern frontier. And while the Iranians watched with dismay as Saddam Hussein crushed uprisings by their Shiite brethren across southern Iraq in the immediate aftermath the Gulf War of 1991, they stayed out again, fearing another morass.

Having already imposed sanctions on the Revolutionary Guard’s Quds Force for being “terrorist” organization over the summer – the first time the U.S. has ever named an arm of a foreign military as such – the Bush Administration has been steadily escalating the volume of its saber-rattling against Iran’s Mullahs.

“A Fool’s Gamble”

Analysts say preparations for air strikes are now fully complete – and could happen at any time. Sam Gardiner, a retired U.S. Air Force Colonel, writing for the Century Foundation, a Washington think tank, says any attack would begin “Below the CNN line” – that is, without the knowledge of the media, the public, or even many lawmakers. (24.)

“That was the guidance given to the Air Component Commander, General Mike Mosley, as the secret air strikes began against Iraq in Operation Southern Focus,” he wrote, pointing to a classified bombing campaign that struck nearly 400 targets in southern Iraq in 2002 amid President Bush’s promises to European governments that he had no immediate plans for war. (25.)

Militarily, an assault on Iran would echo failed strategies that have been regrettably common throughout world history, according to Lawrence B. Wilkerson, former chief of staff to Secretary of State Colin Powell. (26.)

“Using military force against Iran is a fool’s gamble,” Wilkerson said. “To do so would replicate one of the oldest failures in military history – that is that when a leader encounters strategic failure, his first inclination is to reinforce that failure.”

“From Xerxes to Mark Anthony, from Napoleon to Hitler, from World War I to Vietnam,” Wilkerson, a former U.S. Army Colonel, added, “history is replete with leaders who simply could not say ‘Enough!’ and instead choose to deepen their failure – and sacrifice more blood and treasure – by adding to it.”

Notes:
1.) “How the West armed Saddam, fed him intelligence on his enemies, equipped him for atrocities and then made sure he wouldn’t squeal,” Robert Fisk, The (U.K.) Independent, Dec. 31st, 2006
2.) Kenneth Katzmann, “Iran: U.S. Concerns and policy responses; report” Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports and Issue Briefs, for Congress updated weekly
3.) “The End of the ‘Summer of Diplomacy’: Assessing U.S. Military Options on Iran,” Sam Gardiner, Colonel, USAF (Ret.) A Century Foundation Report, The Century Foundation, New York, New York, 2006.
4.) “Countering Iran’s Oil Weapon,” Heritage Foundation Reports, Ariel Cohen, James Phillips and William L.T. Schirano, Nov. 13th, 2006
5.) “Contra Iran” The National Interest, Ted Galen Carpenter and Jessica Ashooh, March-April 2007
6.) “The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America,” Kenneth Pollack, Saban Center at the Brookings Institution, Random House, Inc., 2004
7.) “Iran’s Revolutionary Guards,” Greg Bruno, The Washington Post, Oct. 3rd, 2007
8.) “25 Slain and 40 Wounded in Iraq as Raid on Police Frees Prisoners,” The New York Times, A1, Dexter Filkins, Feb. 15th, 2004
9.) Greg Bruno, Ibid.
10.) Associated Press Online, June 12th, 2007
11.) “Terrorism Project In the Spotlight: Hezbollah (Party of God)” Michael Donovan, Research Analyst, Center for Defense Information, Feb. 25th, 2002
12.) BBC World News Online Edition, Oct. 25th, 2006
13.) Michael Donovan, Ibid.
14.) Council on Foreign Relations, Backgrounder, CFR.org staff July 17th, 2006
15.) Reuters, April 16th, 2006
16.) Hillary Mann, testimony before the Congressional Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs Committee on Oversight and Reform, Nov. 7th, 2007
17.) Kenneth Pollack, Ibid.
18.) Hillary Mann, Ibid.
19.) Kenneth Pollack, Ibid.
20.) Hillary Mann, Ibid.
21.) Hillary Mann, Ibid.
22.) Hillary Mann, Ibid.
23.) Hillary Mann Ibid.
24.) Sam Gardiner, Ibid.
25.) Sam Gardiner, Ibid.
26.) Lawrence B. Wilkerson USA (Ret.), testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Nov. 14th, 2007

About the Author:

Joseph Kirschke is an independent journalist, writer and analyst of world political issues based in Washington D. C.

JoeKirschke@aol.com