2008 May — Global Geopolitics Viewpoints

COLOMBIA: No Big Changes Expected after Rebel Chief’s Death

May 26, 2008 By editor

Global Geopolitics Net / IPS
May 26, 2008

Diana Cariboni*

MONTEVIDEO, May 26 (IPS) – The death and replacement of FARC chief ”Manuel Marulanda” will bring neither a breakdown nor a change in direction in the Colombian rebel group, which has been militarily weakened and has fallen silent on the political front, according to experts on Latin America’s longest-lived guerrilla movement.

The death of the founder and top leader of the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), whose nom de guerre was ”Manuel Marulanda”, was announced Saturday in an interview with Defence Minister Juan Manuel Santos in the Semana magazine and confirmed Sunday by ”Timochenko”, who forms part of the insurgent group’s seven-member secretariat, in a video broadcast by the Latin American TV channel Telesur.

”A great leader is gone,” said ”Timochenko”, whose real name is Timoleón Jiménez. He said Marulanda died of a heart attack on Mar. 26, in the arms of his girlfriend and surrounded by his troops.

Marulanda (Pedro Antonio Marín) was succeeded by guerrilla commander ”Alfonso Cano” (Guillermo Sáenz), Timochenko reported.

The late rebel chief, also known as ”Tirofijo” or Sureshot, was born in 1928 or 1930 — according to conflicting versions — in the coffee-growing town of Génova in the central Colombian province of Quindío.

His death was preceded by two other major losses for the FARC.

On Mar. 1, ”Raúl Reyes”, the group’s international spokesman, was killed in the aerial bombing of his camp, which was located in Ecuador. The cross-border incursion by the Colombian military sparked a serious diplomatic crisis in the Andean region.

And on Mar. 6, another member of the FARC secretariat, ”Iván Ríos”, was killed by one of his men, who cut off his hand to collect the huge reward offered by the government.

Marulanda ”is an extremely wary ‘campesino’ (peasant farmer) and a born military strategist,” was how he was once described by Gilberto Vieira, secretary general of Colombia’s Communist Party from 1946 to 1991, who knew the rebel chief very well.

Born into a poor rural family, Pedro Antonio Marín took up arms at the age of 18, after the assassination of Liberal Party leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in 1948, which triggered a decade of political violence known as ”La Violencia”.

According to his official biographer, historian Arturo Alape, Marín and his brothers and cousins joined the armed struggle in 1949, because ”rising up in arms was the only way to survive.”

In 1950, he took the name Manuel Marulanda Vélez, in honour of a trade union leader who was tortured and killed.

During an armistice that began in 1957, after the collapse of the four-year dictatorship of General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, Marulanda was even a public employee, working as a highway inspector.

In 1964, Conservative President Guillermo León Valencia ordered, as part of the U.S. Latin American Security Operation (Plan LASO), an attack on the village of Marquetalia, where 49 families of former combatants, led by Marulanda, were living.

The military operation forced the families to scatter, and Marulanda, along with several dozen other guerrilla fighters, created the FARC in the southern region of El Caguán, in the province of Caquetá. More than four decades later, the group still maintains its original aim, agrarian reform.

In 1984, a peace agreement between the government of then president Belisario
Betancur and the FARC led to the creation of a leftwing political party, the Patriotic Union. But it was destroyed, as 5,000 of its members and supporters were killed off by far-right paramilitary groups and the security forces.

Between 1999 and 2002, under Conservative President Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002), a 42,000 square km demilitarised zone was created in El Caguán, for peace talks between the government and the FARC.

But the only real advance made by the talks was a humanitarian exchange of hostages held by the FARC for imprisoned guerrillas.

After the talks broke off, Marulanda never again appeared before the cameras, and it was rumoured that he was in bad health.

”It is sad news?He was an important figure, which is not recognised by those who fan the flames of class hatred,” the secretary general of Colombia’s Communist Party, Jaime Caycedo, told IPS.

”He was important because of his trajectory, background and agrarian traditions against the oligarchy. It is also significant that he died of natural causes,” he added.

Iván Cepeda, head of the Movement of Victims of Crimes of the State, told IPS that ”it cannot be denied that he was a historic leader.”

But he also expressed his hope that ”this will represent a shift in course by the FARC, and that a priority will be put on negotiations that would lead to the release of the hostages” held in remote jungle camps by the rebel group.

MARULANDA’S SUCCESSOR

”We must not see Marulanda’s death in terms of a ‘before’ and ‘after’,” Luis Eduardo Celis, of the Bogotá think tank Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris, told IPS from the town of El Retorno in the southern province of Guaviare.

The new head of the FARC secretariat, Cano, ”represents a long-expected succession, because he has a more intellectual background and can serve as a bridge between Marulanda’s generation of peasant fighters and the younger, more urban, university-educated generation,” he said.

”He has the complete support of the FARC, and his leadership does not come as a surprise to anyone,” commented Celis, who was in Guaviare to attend the National Forum for Reconciliation in Colombia, along with 400 other delegates from around the country.

The FARC represents the Colombia ”of the poor, marginalised coca farmer, and he (Cano) is very familiar with the movement, to which he has dedicated more than half his life. He has lived and worked alongside all of the FARC’s commanders, so I foresee a very smooth transition,” he added.

Under his leadership, ”there will be no significant changes. This is a very reclusive, meticulous and conservative guerrilla group, which is engaged in a trial of political and military strength with (rightwing) President Álvaro Uribe, something that is not going to change,” Celis predicted.

Changes could come ”if the political scenario is modified, for example, if a humanitarian hostage-prisoner swap is achieved,” said Celis, a former non-combatant member of the National Liberation Army (ELN), Colombia’s second-largest insurgent group.

But Uribe ”has dug in his heels against an agreement,” he said. ”The government’s aim is to defeat the FARC militarily, to force them into an armistice.”

Cano, 62, studied anthropology at the National University of Colombia and was a leader of the Communist Youth before joining the FARC. He led failed peace talks in Caracas, in 1991, and in Tlaxcala, Mexico in 1992.

The collapse of the talks in Mexico gave rise to a dispute within the secretariat, in which Reyes’ position of refusing to engage in further negotiations outside of Colombia reportedly won out.

Cano is the founder of the Bolivarian Movement, FARC’s clandestine political wing.

He is now apparently somewhere between the central province of Tolima and the southwest province of Valle del Cauca, an area besieged for months by 8,000 military troops.

But ”we are talking about huge areas, of 40,000 or 50,000 square km,” said Celis. ”This is a peasant army that moves around calmly and easily within that area. They’ve been there for 50 or 60 years, they aren’t improvising.”

Despite the recent loss of several members of the ruling secretariat, ”a military defeat of the FARC does not lie just around the corner,” said Celis.

He estimates that the group currently has 10,000 combatants, having lost a similar number — ”mainly the youngest, those who were recruited between 1998 and 2000” — over the last six years, to death, desertion or capture.

”The army has made important, but not strategic, advances. But if Uribe ends up in office for a third term (for which a constitutional reform would be necessary), the FARC would definitely find itself in a complicated position, because the guerrillas are not capable of returning to their previous military strength,” he said.

Continuing to wage war until a total defeat ”would be a very bloody route to take. Defeat would also mean the end of a social and community network” that supports the FARC.

POLITICAL ACTIVITY AT A STANDSTILL

Another question is the group’s current lack of political initiative. ”The FARC no longer presents proposals to the country,” said Celis.

The director of the Institute of Studies for Development and Peace (INDEPAZ), Camilo González Posso, said Saturday at the National Forum for Reconciliation, in Guaviare, that ”major rectifications are needed on the part of the FARC.”

”This policy of seeking a humanitarian hostage-prisoner exchange has even silenced the FARC itself, because the group has suspended its political discourse while pressing for an agreement,” added the former government minister.

”Get into politics, we know you are politicians, engage in politics, don’t wander around the world asking for your status (as a terrorist group) to be changed; change it by getting involved in politics,” he urged the guerrillas.

But Uribe must also rectify his position, and move ”from humanitarian rhetoric to practice,” because the country ”does not deserve an escalation of the conflict within its borders as a result of the failure to reach a humanitarian accord on the hostages,” said González Posso.

For his part, Celis said ”there is a great deal of space for negotiating. Of course they (the guerrillas) have very big aspirations, which are out of line with their real capacity, but there is a possibility for discussing change.”

In Bogotá, meanwhile, Cepeda said ”we hope that under the new FARC leader, a political approach will prevail over a military focus.”

*With additional reporting by Constanza Vieira (from El Retorno) and Helda Martínez (Bogotá).

Filed Under: Latin America, News

JAIPUR BLASTS AND PAKISTAN CRISIS

May 21, 2008 By editor

Global Geopolitics Net
May 21, 2008

MALLADI RAMA RAO
Delhi based journalist

The reaction in the Pak media to the Jaipur blasts is indeed very swift. Most mainline dailies came out with editorials two days after eight blasts rocked down town Jaipur on Tuesday May 13. A common thread running through these commentaries is that the four – year – old peace process between India and Pakistan must not derail.

Surprisingly, however, none of the dailies, the Lahore based Daily Times and Karachi based Dawn including, referred to firing across the Line of Control (LOC) in North Kashmir also on Tuesday. The Times of India (TOI) termed the firing as heavy and described it as the ‘first clear-cut major violation’ of the almost five-year-old ceasefire along the contentious LOC.

Ceasefire was a confidence building measure (CBM) agreed to by both sides and is enforced not only along the 778-km long LOC but also 198 –km long International Border (IB) and the 110-km Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) in Siachen Glacier, which emerged as the highest battle field under Gen Zia-ul-Haq doctrine of ‘Bleed India’.

Over the past five years there have been instances of firing from across the border but these were minor and at best sporadic aimed at providing cover to militants trying their best to sneak into India. Only a week back Samba sector witnessed a major infiltration and the killing of a Photo Journalist covering the gun fight between militants and troops. But Tuesday, May 13, firing came directly from Pakistan army’s Papa- Bunker Post targetting the Indian T-Hut bunker which was around 9000 feet from the LOC. It was not fire cover to infiltrating militants but as the Times of India says quoting military sources, an irrefutable violation of the ceasefire CBM.

There is however some significance which Pakistan commentators have not missed. The leader in the Daily Times said, “The blasts (and also ceasefire violation) occurred on the 10th anniversary of the May 13 nuclear tests’ that India had conducted in Rajasthan where Jaipur is located”.

It is the general practice of Pakistan over the past several decades to whip up anti-India sentiment whenever the domestic going becomes tough. And admittedly, Asif Zardari led – People’s Party of Pakistan (PPP) and its government are facing tough challenges what with inflation raging at a record 30 per cent and with foe cum ally Nawaz Sharif baying for his pound of flesh in his new found capacity at the ‘saviour’ of the coalition. The Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) leader has made his ministers walk out of the coalition but that move has not deprived him of the ability to undermine the Syed Yousuf Raza Gillani government.

The Zardari-Nawaz differences are not centred on the question of reinstating former chief justice Iftikhar Ahmed Choudhary, as some media reports say. These are far more fundamental and relate to Zardari’s willingness to do business with President Pervez Musharraf at the behest of the Americans, who see in the General, whom they had forced to retire from the army last year, the only life-line to their plans to checkmate Al Qaeda and Taliban

For a layman steeped in conventional politics, the Zardari gamble may appear as political suicide. But as the News International said editorially on May 12, Benazir Bhutto’s husband has his compulsions. To begin with the permanent establishment of Pakistan, an expression coined by the News International, to describe the army and intelligence set up as also top brass of the civil service, is not neutral but sharply divided into pro-Musharraf and pro-Nawaz factions.

Musharraf camp has been pampering PPP; initially it offered several concessions and relief’s Benazir. After her assassination, Zardari is kept in good humour. This makes the shrewd businessman to tag along Musharrafites and milk their desperation to his advantage. He has two immediate goals – one install a government of his choice in Punjab and second teach lessons to the Chaudhary brothers – Shujaat Hussain and Pervaiz Elahi, who dominate the King’s Party as the PML-Quaid created by Musharraf in the early days of his presidency is known. .

The pro-Nawaz establishment includes primarily his Saudi Arabian backers and ethnic Punjabi elite who had forced his return in a bid to offset the return of Benazir. They are no longer enamoured of his anti-Musharraf plank and therefore will not like to push his cause beyond a point. The turn of events show that Nawaz politics are once again entering a dead-end unless of course his overseas patrons like to put in a rescue act for him yet again. Any how the home grown patrons will not like to distance themselves from Musharraf as they see their interests are secure in the longevity of the General in the Presidential palace.

What would Benazir have done had she been alive? This is a question with no answers. Probably, she might have strived for a middle path cashing in on her image as the daughter of the East and as a bridge for the West to the Muslim world. She would not have discarded Musharraf certainly since he had gone out of his way to ensure her return home and participation in the elections last year.

By refusing to quickly solve the judges’ issue, Zardari has helped Musharraf in no small measure. And as a leading Pak daily said editorially, “Musharraf camp is back in business and the President seems to be in high spirits with making efforts to revive the PML-Q by ditching the Chaudhrys”. The Daily Times doesn’t rule out the possibility of PPP and PML-Q forming a coalition. Already PML-Q seniors like Sher Afgan Khan Niazi, Rana Asif Tauseef and Muhammad Asim Nazir are active openly at the behest of Musharraf.

Another PML-Q, Mian Manzoor Ahmed Wattoo quit his party and became an Adviser to the Prime Minister on Science and Technology. The Ministry of Science and Technology was headed by PML-N vice-president Tehmina Daultana before she and eight other ministers belonging to the party quit the cabinet on Nawaz Sharif’s orders. Wattoo’s appointment is a clear indication that the PPP may have started thinking about minus PML-N though PML-N ministers’ resignations are yes to be accepted. Wattoo was speaker of the Punjab assembly when Sharif was chief minister of the province but their honeymoon was brief.

At least in the near term Zardari may not like to appear to be firmly in the Musharraf camp. It is in his interest and in the interests of the image of the PPP to keep up a semblance of distance from the King’s Party. Nevertheless, he will not hesitate to find a solution to the Judges issue that is acceptable to President Musharraf. Only after a trade off that gives him a talking point. There fore the possibility is that Musharraf will allow his powers to be clipped and Zardari will reinstate all the sacked judges except the Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry. Nawaz Sharif will naturally go into a sulk. But how he will react and try to bounce back on the centre stage will be interesting to watch.

Two more developments are equally worrisome for Pakistan watchers. One is the admission of Information Minister Sherry Rehman on the floor of Pakistan that permission for an English Channel from the Geo TV stable was denied as ‘a sensitive secret agency did not give clearance and No Objection Certificate (NOC)’. Sherry attributed the denial to the rules of the game put in place by the previous regime. Though she took care to say that the present government would dismantle them soon, the fact remains that the writ of the invisible hand of the establishment runs in Zardari’s Pakistan.

In his media interactions, Prime Minister Gillani has emerged as a soft spoken gentleman who is determined to break with the past. And his answer to an Indian journalist about Dawood Ibrahim was interesting. Because while trying to be different from his predecessors, he spoke exactly as his predecessors. “If India shows proof of Dawood Ibrahim’s existence, we will send him to your country”, Gillani told Karan Thapar in a CNN-IBN interview early May. The interview took place shortly after Gillani visited Muzaffarabad (April 30) and addressed Kashmir leaders. It was his first visit outside Islamabad after becoming Prime Minister.

Frankly speaking, the Gillani address to a joint sitting of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly and AJK Council had no new spark from the Indian perspective. According to The Nation (May 1), “Prime Minister Syed Yousaf Raza Gillani said Pakistan desired result-oriented talks with India for the resolution of the lingering Kashmir dispute. He said the ceasefire along the Line of Control in Dec 2003 was still effective and the bus service still plying and entry points along the border opened”. The Dawn quoted the Prime Minister as saying, “We are hopeful that the ongoing composite dialogue between the two sides will arrive at a better outcome”.

The second development that is of significance is Prime Minister Gilani’s visit to the General Headquarters (GHQ) of the Army on May 14. Local media termed the visit as a routine one to meet Chief of the Army Staff Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani for a briefing on ‘defence preparedness against external and internal threats’. He was also briefed on ‘the operational environment’ and ‘the spectrum of threat’.

Gillani’s Kashmir sojourn coincided with an op-ed article by security specialist Shireen M Mazari in the News International. She is a hawk on defence and security issues. She echoes pro-Musharraf establishment. And anti-India rhetoric. Often to mould the public mood. So, her critique provocatively titled, “Surrendering sovereignty willingly’, questioned soft pedalling India.

Mazari began her thesis saying, “ Scant attention is being paid to the rapid threats to the country’s sovereignty that are emerging from different quarters that are linked together in an overarching strategic partnership – that is India and the US with the UK an avid supporter. If one only examines events that took place April 23 to April 29 and connects them up, it becomes clear that either by default or by design Pakistan is in danger of losing its sovereignty”.

And she is quite uncomfortable with the Gillani ‘going the extra mile, unilaterally, to support India on all fronts’. She asked: “Will India allow us to transport foodstuff to Nepal through the land route from across India”.

The reference is to the decision ‘in principle’ to let India send wheat to Afghanistan through the long sought after land route. She went on to observe, “Hopefully, this decision will include certain safeguards like ensuring that the transportation from Wagah to the Afghan border is done by Pakistani transporters and that India pays a transport levy. Since the decision has been taken on principle, one must wait to see how it is operationalised, but to allow India physical access through Pakistan’s sensitive areas surely cannot be contemplated”.

Shireen Mazari then brought up the question of India’s plea for clemency to Sarabjit Singh, who is facing death sentence in Pakistan. Calling for a linkage between the Sarabjit case and the case of Pakistani prisoners languishing in Indian jails, she wrote, “No one seems to have shown any sensitivity to this issue at all. Even more critical, commutation of Sarabjit’s death sentence to life imprisonment should first be linked to an overall decision by the state to commute all death sentences …. After all, if an Indian who killed innocent Pakistanis is to live why not the poor Pakistanis rotting on death row? Is a foreign life worth more than a Pakistani life for us?”

Interestingly, on May 14, Prime Minister Gilani terminated the services of Mazari as Director-General, Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI) though her contract is valid till August 2009. Was she axed for her continued anti-India rhetoric? Banish such thoughts. Because she herself told a local daily, “United States government has influenced her removal” as she was writing hard-hitting articles highlighting US intervention in internal Pakistani affairs.

She may have a point. But it in no way dilutes the ground reality in so far India-Pak relations are concerned on the eve of yet another round of composite dialogue between the two countries on May 21.

About the Author

Malladi Rama Rao is an analyst and writer on the Indian political scene and geo-political and security issues of South Asia. He directs a Weekly Feature Service in English, Syndicate Features, in colloboration with his wife
Vaniram. He is also the India Editor of Asian Tribune.

Filed Under: Asia

WILLIAM E. ODOM, LT GENERAL, USA, RET. – TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE ON IRAQ

May 19, 2008 By editor

Republished on Global Geopolitics Net
Monday, May 19, 2008

This report is being presented on Global Geopolitics Net with permission from the author. The full text of General Odom’s Senate testimony of April 2, 2008 follows below:

TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE ON IRAQ

By William E. Odom, LT General, USA, Ret.

2 April 2008

Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee. It is an honor to appear before you again. The last occasion was in January 2007, when the topic was the troop surge. Today you are asking if it has worked.

Last year I rejected the claim that it was a new strategy. Rather, I said, it is a new tactic used to achieve the same old strategic aim, political stability. And I foresaw no serious prospects for success.

I see no reason to change my judgment now. The surge is prolonging instability, not creating the conditions for unity as the president claims.

Last year, General Petraeus wisely declined to promise a military solution to this political problem, saying that he could lower the level of violence, allowing a limited time for the Iraqi leaders to strike a political deal. Violence has been temporarily reduced but today there is credible evidence that the political situation is far more fragmented. And currently we see violence surge in Baghdad and Basra. In fact, it has also remained sporadic and significant in several other parts of Iraq over the past year, notwithstanding the notable drop in Baghdad and Anbar Province.

More disturbing, Prime Minister Maliki has initiated military action and then dragged in US forces to help his own troops destroy his Shiite competitors. This is a political setback, not a political solution. Such is the result of the surge tactic.

No less disturbing has been the steady violence in the Mosul area, and the tensions in Kirkuk between Kurds, Arabs, and Turkomen. A showdown over control of the oil fields there surely awaits us. And the idea that some kind of a federal solution can cut this Gordian knot strikes me as a wild fantasy, wholly out of touch with Kurdish realities.

Also disturbing is Turkey’s military incursion to destroy Kurdish PKK groups in the border region. That confronted the US government with a choice: either to support its NATO ally, or to make good on its commitment to Kurdish leaders to insure their security. It chose the former, and that makes it clear to the Kurds that the United States will sacrifice their security to its larger interests in Turkey.

Turning to the apparent success in Anbar province and a few other Sunni areas, this is not the positive situation it is purported to be. Certainly violence has declined as local Sunni sheiks have begun to cooperate with US forces. But the surge tactic cannot be given full credit. The decline started earlier on Sunni initiative. What are their motives? First, anger at al Qaeda operatives and second, their financial plight.

Their break with al Qaeda should give us little comfort. The Sunnis welcomed anyone who would help them kill Americans, including al Qaeda. The concern we hear the president and his aides express about a residual base left for al Qaeda if we withdraw is utter nonsense. The Sunnis will soon destroy al Qaeda if we leave Iraq.

The Kurds do not allow them in their region, and the Shiites, like the Iranians, detest al Qaeda. To understand why, one need only take note of the al Qaeda public diplomacy campaign over the past year or so on internet blogs. They implore the United States to bomb and invade Iran and destroy this apostate Shiite regime.

As an aside, it gives me pause to learn that our vice president and some members of the Senate are aligned with al Qaeda on spreading the war to Iran.

Let me emphasize that our new Sunni friends insist on being paid for their loyalty. I have heard, for example, a rough estimate that the cost in one area of about 100 square kilometers is $250,000 per day. And periodically they threaten to defect unless their fees are increased. You might want to find out the total costs for these deals forecasted for the next several years, because they are not small and they do not promise to end. Remember, we do not own these people. We merely rent them. And they can break the lease at any moment. At the same time, this deal protects them to some degree from the government’s troops and police, hardly a sign of political reconciliation.

Now let us consider the implications of the proliferating deals with the Sunni strongmen. They are far from unified among themselves. Some remain with al Qaeda. Many who break and join our forces are beholden to no one. Thus the decline in violence reflects a dispersion of power to dozens of local strong men who distrust the government and occasionally fight among themselves. Thus the basic military situation is far worse because of the proliferation of armed groups under local military chiefs who follow a proliferating number of political bosses.

This can hardly be called greater military stability, much less progress toward political consolidation, and to call it fragility that needs more time to become success is to ignore its implications. At the same time, Prime Minister Maliki’s military actions in Basra and Baghdad, indicate even wider political and military fragmentation. We are witnessing is more accurately described as the road to the Balkanization of Iraq, that is, political fragmentation. We are being asked by the president to believe that this shift of so much power and finance to so many local chieftains is the road to political centralization. He describes the process as building the state from the bottom up.

I challenge you to press the administration’s witnesses this week to explain this absurdity. Ask them to name a single historical case where power has been aggregated successfully from local strong men to a central government except through bloody violence leading to a single winner, most often a dictator. That is the history of feudal Europe’s transformation to the age of absolute monarchy. It is the story of the American colonization of the west and our Civil War. It took England 800 years to subdue clan rule on what is now the English-Scottish border. And it is the source of violence in Bosnia and Kosovo.

How can our leaders celebrate this diffusion of power as effective state building? More accurately described, it has placed the United States astride several civil wars. And it allows all sides to consolidate, rearm, and refill their financial coffers at the US expense.

To sum up, we face a deteriorating political situation with an over extended army. When the administration’s witnesses appear before you, you should make them clarify how long the army and marines can sustain this band-aid strategy.

The only sensible strategy is to withdraw rapidly but in good order. Only that step can break the paralysis now gripping US strategy in the region. The next step is to choose a new aim, regional stability, not a meaningless victory in Iraq. And progress toward that goal requires revising our policy toward Iran. If the president merely renounced his threat of regime change by force, that could prompt Iran to lessen its support to Taliban groups in Afghanistan. Iran detests the Taliban and supports them only because they will kill more Americans in Afghanistan as retaliation in event of a US attack on Iran. Iran’s policy toward Iraq would also have to change radically as we withdraw. It cannot want instability there. Iraqi Shiites are Arabs, and they know that Persians look down on them. Cooperation between them has its limits.

No quick reconciliation between the US and Iran is likely, but US steps to make Iran feel more secure make it far more conceivable than a policy calculated to increase its insecurity. The president’s policy has reinforced Iran’s determination to acquire nuclear weapons, the very thing he purports to be trying to prevent.

Withdrawal from Iraq does not mean withdrawal from the region. It must include a realignment and reassertion of US forces and diplomacy that give us a better chance to achieve our aim.

A number of reasons are given for not withdrawing soon and completely. I have refuted them repeatedly before but they have more lives than a cat. Let try again me explain why they don’t make sense.

First, it is insisted that we must leave behind military training element with no combat forces to secure them. This makes no sense at all. The idea that US military trainers left alone in Iraq can be safe and effective is flatly rejected by several NCOs and junior officers I have heard describe their personal experiences. Moreover, training foreign forces before they have a consolidated political authority to command their loyalty is a windmill tilt. Finally, Iraq is not short on military skills.

Second, it is insisted that chaos will follow our withdrawal. We heard that argument as the “domino theory” in Vietnam. Even so, the path to political stability will be bloody regardless of whether we withdraw or not. The idea that the United States has a moral responsibility to prevent this ignores that reality. We are certainly to blame for it, but we do not have the physical means to prevent it. American leaders who insist that it is in our power to do so are misleading both the public and themselves if they believe it.

The real moral question is whether to risk the lives of more Americans. Unlike preventing chaos, we have the physical means to stop sending more troops where many will be killed or wounded. That is the moral responsibility to our country which no American leaders seems willing to assume.

Third, nay sayers insist that our withdrawal will create regional instability. This confuses cause with effect. Our forces in Iraq and our threat to change Iran’s regime are making the region unstable. Those who link instability with a US withdrawal have it exactly backwards. Our ostrich strategy of keeping our heads buried in the sands of Iraq has done nothing but advance our enemies’ interest.

I implore you to reject these fallacious excuses for prolonging the commitment of US forces to war in Iraq.

Thanks for this opportunity to testify today.

About the Author:

Lieutenant General William E. Odom, U.S. Army (ret.), is a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS. He is also an adjunct professor at Yale University. As director of the National Security Agency from 1985 to 1988, he was responsible for the nation’s signals intelligence and communications security. From 1981 to 1985, he served as assistant chief of staff for intelligence, the army’s senior intelligence officer. From 1977 to 1981, General Odom served in the Carter administration as military assistant to the president’s national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski. As a member of the National Security Council staff, he worked on strategic planning, Soviet affairs, nuclear weapons policy, telecommunications policy, and Persian Gulf security issues.

Filed Under: Americas, Conflict, Featured, Middle East, Security

US/IRAQ: Tangled Web of Allegiances Leads Back to Tehran

May 14, 2008 By editor

Global Geopolitics Net / IPS
May 14, 2008

Ali Gharib

WASHINGTON, May 14 (IPS) – If politics makes strange bedfellows, then the relationship between Iran, the United States and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq is the strangest ménage à trois in international relations today.

Violent Shia-on-Shia hostilities officially came to an end this week when a formal ceasefire was declared between government forces of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and radical Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army, but sporadic fighting still continues. And questions remain about the role that the U.S. is playing.

In testimony before Congress a month ago, Gen. David Petraeus, the commander of U.S. troops in Iraq, and the U.S. ambassador Ryan Crocker characterised the conflict in Iraq as a ”proxy war” to stem Iranian influence.

Declarations by both the U.S. and al-Maliki’s government about Iranian sponsorship of Sadrist activities are often used to paint Iran as a destabilising force in Iraq — the meddling neighbour encouraging unrest to boost its own influence. U.S.-backed Iraqi government excursions against Sadr are defended by citing unsubstantiated evidence of Iranian agents’ influence.

But this perspective has yet to be explained in terms of one of Iran’s closest allies in Iraq, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), who, as part of al-Maliki’s ruling coalition, also happen to be one of the U.S.’s closest partners.

The U.S. military says that it killed three militants in Baghdad’s Shia Sadr City slum on Sunday, alleging that the targets were splinter groups of the Mahdi Army who had spun out of Sadr’s control and were receiving training and weapons from Iran.

Last week, State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said it was clear that Tehran was supporting ”militias that are operating outside the rule of law in Iraq”. Many fear that the rhetoric is part of an effort to ratchet up tensions between the U.S. and Iran.

But the constant barrage of criticism lobbed at Iran and the so-called ”special groups” of Sadrists still fighting against the government and U.S. forces tends to overlook the fact that the coalition of parties ruling Iraq are largely indebted to Iran for their very existence and continue to be closely connected with the Islamic Republic.

There seems to be no solid explanation about the double standard of U.S. denunciation of Iranian influence and U.S. support and aid to one of the strongest benefactors and allies of that influence — the government coalition of al-Maliki.

”I’m not confident we know what the hell we’re doing when we’re making these actions,” Brian Katulis, a senior fellow at the Centre for American Progress, a Washington think tank, told IPS.

The two strongest parties in al-Maliki’s coalition, his own Dawa Party and ISCI, have both been based out of Iran and are both Shia religious parties.

ISCI, formerly known as the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, was born in Iran and its fighters, the Badr Brigade militia, fought against Iraq in the bloody Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s. The Badr Organisation has been widely incorporated into the Iraqi security forces that receive U.S. training and equipment.

While these groups were living in exile, Muqtada al-Sadr’s father was building a Shia movement within Iraq. The Sadrists are the only major Shia political block that can be properly considered an indigenous movement.

ISCI had initially participated in the Iraqi National Congress (INC), an exile group led by Ahmed Chalabi and which the neo-conservative architects of the Iraq war had hoped to form into a government-in-exile that could swoop in and take control of Iraq after the U.S. toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime.

Of their participation in a December 2002 INC conference, Ghassan Atiyyah, an Iraqi democracy activist, declared that ”[ISCI], for its part, was keen on the idea of a conference to prevent America dominating the Iraqi opposition and the future of Iraq.”

After the collapse of Chalabi’s bid and the reign of the Coalition Provisional Authority, elections made ISCI the most powerful bloc in parliament. In December 2006, ISCI leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim was invited to Washington to meet with Pres. George W. Bush at the White House.

Hakim’s visit to Washington coincided with the withdrawal of the Sadrists — once al-Maliki’s kingmakers — from the ruling coalition. At Washington’s behest, Hakim threw his support to al-Maliki to allow him to hold a ruling coalition.

The recent fighting between Sadrists and the government has only strengthened that bond. Al-Maliki’s offensive in Basra and engagements in Sadr City have benefited from U.S. air support and training — leading to accusations that the U.S. has picked sides in what is essentially an internal Shia political issue.

Soon after the aborted advance on Basra, Petraeus said that al-Maliki had prematurely moved on a plan that the U.S. was hoping to carry out in the summer. The offensive of last month is widely viewed as an attempt by the ruling coalition to weaken Sadr ahead of this fall’s provincial elections, and though the attack Petraeus discussed will not happen, the plan to undertake it is notable.

But with the framing of the Iraq war as a struggle between the U.S. and what the U.S. considers the nefarious influence of Iranians, the inherent contradictions of supporting ISCI run deep.

It is Sadr and his followers, in fact, who — in spite of Iranian aid — remain true Iraqi nationalists and even push some policies that the U.S supports.

”Sadr took a lot of Iranian guns and ammunition and money, but Sadr clearly didn’t change,” Middle East Institute scholar Wayne White told IPS. ”Sadr clearly remains a nationalist.”

ISCI and Iran, for example, support a Shia super-region in the south as part of a loosely federated Iraqi state. The homogenous super-region would likely facilitate Iranian influence. Both Sadr and the U.S. oppose the idea in favour of a strong central government.

Some commentators, such as White, contend that the decision has to do with Sadr’s brutality, but the Badr organisation is well known to have perpetrated violent ethnic cleansing as well. More generally, there are few actors in the Iraq conflict with clean hands.

Perhaps the most obvious answer lends clues to both Iranian support of and U.S. animosity towards Sadr: he is the most outspoken opponent of the continuing U.S. occupation. Sadr still refuses to deal with the U.S. forces, vowing to only talk to Iraqis.

”He is the most anti-American of the militia leaders,” said White, ”and [leads] the only militia that has taken on the Americans militarily.”

But Phebe Marr, an analyst with the U.S. Institute of Peace, suggests that the explanation is even simpler than that. ”Looking at the political spectrum, there are few alternatives,” Marr told IPS. ”I just don’t see much else on the scene.”

Irrespective of Sadr’s opposition to occupying U.S. forces, his isolation poses a threat to stability because of his strong support among many Iraqis.

”U.S. nudging and pushing and manipulation becomes a very dicey affair because we don’t know everything that goes on behind closed doors,” said White. ”Even if [Sadr's] organisation itself is damaged very badly, that street power may still be there. And that’s going to be something difficult to deal with down the road.”

Filed Under: Politics, Report, Security

Maritime Security Cooperation and CBM in Southeast Asia

May 8, 2008 By editor

Report on the ASEAN-China Dialogue Meeting of March 11-15, 2008

Global Geopolitics Net
May 8, 2008

By Commodore Carlos L Agustin AFP (Ret)

I recently attended together with our Defense and Armed Forces Attaché in Beijing, Col Arthur Ang PA (GSC), the ASEAN-China Dialogue by Senior Defense Scholars (CADSDS) held on 11-15 March 2008 at Beijing, China on invitation of one of NDCP’s counterpart institutions, the Academy of Military Science, Ministry of Defense of China. The theme of the conference centered on Military Modernization and Confidence Building Measures (CBM). Twenty six “defense scholars” of all 10 ASEAN countries and China attended the well-organized meeting, intended to provide ASEAN countries with a feeling of security in the light of criticism of China’s massive military buildup, particularly of its Navy.

This was particularly stressed by PLA’s Sr Col Zhao Xiao Zhuo’s concluding remarks during the closing on 15 March:

After 3 days discussion, I think we have made some consensus. The first one is, Respect each other’s right to modernize their armed forces, but at the same time try to make each nation’s strategic intention transparent. Now the technology is developing very fast and the nature of war is changing rapidly. If a military wants to fulfill the obligations of safeguarding its motherland, it has to push forward the modernization drive. So military modernization effort of both ASEAN countries and China is quite understandable and fully justified. However, the key is not the military capabilities, but the strategic intention, namely how to use the armed forces. So each country has to make its defense policy transparent, to make sure that its defense policy is defensive and its armed forces are only used for safeguarding national independence, security, sovereign integrity and unification.

One of the papers presented delved on Maritime Cooperation. Sr Col Zhang Junshe of the PLA Navy discussed “Cooperation between Regional Navies to Enhance Maritime Security”. He emphasized the need to “encourage building of a fair and effective collective security mechanism and military confidence building mechanism in order to prevent conflicts and wars.”

Practically all of the Chinese papers insisted that China’s military modernization has nothing to do with aggressive intentions, while stressing that “Taiwan independence is not negotiable”, clearly hinting that while they would exhaust all peaceful means to solve the matter, they would not hesitate to use force, if necessary to retain Taiwan as part of China. This is the unification aspect in Sr Col Zhao’s carefully worded remarks.

A few other Chinese speakers mentioned the Taiwan issue, emphasizing the same thrust and somewhat attacking US “intransigence” on Taiwan. Noting the relative youth of my counterparts from both the ASEAN and the China side in comparison to me, I hastened to comment on this matter, and taking advantage of my having been considered by acclamation, on suggestion of the Chinese head of delegation as the “learned head and spokesman of the ASEAN delegations”. I commented thus:

On the Taiwan issue and the United States’ position on the ”one China policy”, may I bring you back in history and take you to the tumultuous early part of the 20th century. You will note that the United States was your ally before and during World War II against Japan and the Axis powers. All the allied documents signed by China and the United States were through the KMT, including among others the Potsdam declaration, the Japanese surrender in 1945, and the creation of the United Nations in 1945, and its support of “one China” obviously followed from that, including treaty obligations, which was terminated in 1979 but the US continues to provide a security umbrella that militates against hostile takeover by China. It is for this reason that since 1949, the U.S. military has frustrated China from forcibly uniting Taiwan with the mainland. In the summer of 1959, I had occasion to be attached on midshipman training on board a US destroyer, the USS Boyd (DD544) under DESRON 15 whose mission, among others was to patrol the Taiwan Strait. It was called the “Formosa Patrol” designed to prevent PRC from invading Taiwan and ROC from retaking the mainland. Let me tell you what else the US is committed to, and that is self-determination. If China and Taiwan agree among themselves to unite, you can count on the United States to be among the first, if not the first country to recognize the union.

Surprisingly my comments were taken by the Chinese in a very positive sense and many later during the break and during dinner commented on their lack of previous appreciation of what I stated, hinting that such was not emphasized in their history education.

For Southeast Asia, the Taiwan issue and Spratlys are the two major issues that could be considered as major threats to maritime security that could really spark armed aggression and confrontation. The Spratlys issue has been partially resolved, at least for the meantime, because of China’s acquiescence to the ASEAN Declaration and the ASEAN Regional Forum’s CBM approaches. While expressing great parochial interest on Taiwan, the Chinese however totally ignored the Spratlys issue in their presentations and discussions.

The 26 member countries of the ARF are: Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Canada, China, European Union, India, Indonesia, Japan, Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, Laos PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Russian Federation, Singapore, Thailand, Timor Leste, United States and Vietnam. It is the only formal security forum in the larger Asia-Pacific region. Despite its diverse membership, it provides a unique and valuable platform to foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest between member countries. ARF member countries have built up a high level of comfort between them through the conduct of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), such as seminars, visits and information exchanges. This has allowed the ARF to gradually move into the second phase of its development in the area of Preventive Diplomacy.

At the ARF Maritime Security Shore Exercise, an ARF Confidence Building Measures (CBM) project on "Regional Cooperation in Maritime Security", co-hosted by Singapore and the US on 2-4 Mar 05, several topics of maritime security cooperation significance were discussed during the professional exchange part, such as, among others, “Coordinating Mechanisms of Offshore Search and Rescue Operations” by China; “Information Sharing between National Maritime Agencies“ by India; “Japan Coast Guard’s (JCG) Cooperation with Asian Countries” by Japan; “Maritime Surveillance and Patrol” by New Zealand; and “US Coast Guard Organization and Lessons Learned from Search and Rescue and Disaster Relief Operations” by the United States. The Meeting was attended by representatives from Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Canada, the People’s Republic of China, the European Union, India, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, the Russian Federation, Singapore, Thailand, the United States, Vietnam, the ASEAN Secretariat, and the International Maritime Organisation (IMO).

In addition, the recently established Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) Information Sharing Centre (ISC) also made presentations on the role and functions of the ReCAAP ISC, its links with various focal points, and how it contributes to regional maritime security.

The IMO Secretary-General RADM Efthimious Mitropoulos HCG (Retd) delivered the keynote address on "Multilateral Cooperation in Maritime Security". The Meeting noted that “the maritime security agenda had moved beyond its traditional concern of maritime piracy and armed robbery to include the threat of maritime terrorism and other transnational maritime crimes” The conferees also noted the transnational nature of maritime threats, bearing in mind the strategic importance of key shipping lanes, and agreed that these both necessitated cooperation on the part of the littoral states and the user states..

The Meeting noted the positive role of IMO in catalyzing multilateral cooperation in maritime security, primarily because of its experience in balancing the interests of the littoral vis-à-vis user states and in upholding the fundamental principle of freedom of navigation. It welcomed the recent initiative of IMO to secure vital sea lanes, and it expressed strong support for IMO’s continuing series of meetings on the security of regional waters that brought together both littoral states and the user states. The Meeting also agreed that the IMO could help in building regional cooperation through “the promotion of situational awareness, information sharing, personnel training, capacity building, and technical cooperation”, and underscored the importance of ARF members ratifying the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against Safety of Maritime Navigation and its Protocol, as committed to in the 2003 ARF Statement on Cooperation against Piracy and Other Threats to Maritime Security.

Several Navy chiefs or senior delegates (Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Australia, India, US and China) shared their perspectives and experiences in dealing with security threats and shared best practices.

Among others, the following measures have been undertaken by ARF member countries over the past several years:

Malaysia has established the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA);
Indonesia has set up additional navy control command centers;
China has strengthening its legal system and structure to safeguard the security of its waters, ports and ships;
The US has identified a “performance model” that would provide a framework for collaboration on all the critical elements of Maritime Security.
The Navies of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore initiated their Trilateral Coordinated Patrols of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore;
The Philippines has initiated its “Coast Watch South” project, with possible multilateral cooperative arrangements with neighboring countries;
Annual or periodic ASEAN Chiefs of navies, and ARF Chiefs of Coast Guards meetings;
Annual ARF Heads of Defense Universities, Colleges and Institutions(HDUCI) meetings;
Annual ASEAN intelligence chiefs information exchange seminars;
Possible establishment of joint patrol arrangements, following the RP-RI models;
Strengthening of the Port State Control process under the Tokyo Memorandum of Agreement for implementing IMO Conventions.
Conduct of maritime security exercises starting 2006 as proposed by Singapore;
Conduct of bilateral naval exercises such as between Indonesia and the Philippines and Malaysia and the Philippines;
Conduct of bilateral and multilateral maritime agencies/Coast Guards exercises such as between Indonesia and the Philippines;
India’s hosting of Training in Maritime Security as a form of CBM;
Japan’s hosting an ARF Workshop on Capacity Building in Maritime Security held in Tokyo in the fall of 2005;
The Philippines’ creation of the Commission on Maritime and Ocean Affairs under the Office of the President in 2007;
Conduct of the First ARF Maritime Security Drill in Singapore in January 2007 attended by 102 security experts from 21 ARF member countries;
The conduct of the China-ASEAN Forum on Military Modernization and CBM in January 2008.

With all these measures and show of cooperation, it is likely that confrontation and conflict can be avoided in favor of peace and regional stability and development. Or at least we hope.

Chuck Agustin

About the author:

Commodore Carlos L Agustin AFP (Ret) is President of the National Defense College of the Philippines.

Filed Under: Asia, Featured, Geopolitics, Politics, Security

LEBANON: Al-Qaeda on a Slippery Base

May 8, 2008 By editor

Global Geopolitics Net
May 7, 2008

Mona Alami

BEIRUT, May 7 (IPS) – Al-Qaeda’s second-in-command, Ayman Zawahiri, announced in an audiotape broadcast Apr. 21 that Islamic groups would play a pivotal role in the war against Jews, and encouraged militants to expel invading ‘Crusaders’ masquerading as peacekeepers, referring to UNIFIL troops deployed in South Lebanon.

”There have been three attacks on UN troops in the south since the deployment in 2006,” says Andrea Tenenti from the press office of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

In June 2007, six peacekeepers from the Spanish contingent were killed in a car bombing in South Lebanon, an attack that was celebrated by Zawahiri. An assault on Tanzanian soldiers came along the Litani river in July of the same year, and a roadside bomb exploded near a UN vehicle before a Lebanese army checkpoint at the entrance of the ancient Phoenician city of Sidon, wounding two peacekeepers in January 2008.

Although no specific group has been formally accused of the crimes, the attacks have been attributed to Islamic fundamentalists, various movements of which have been around in Lebanon since the 1980s.

According to a report by the Saban Centre at the Washington-based Brookings Institution, Islamist militancy in Lebanon merged with Salafism — a movement built on the belief that Islam’s purest form was practised during the time of the prophet Muhammad — when local and foreign Salafist jihadist leaders penetrated the generally non-violent Lebanese Islamic community.

”Since its awakening, Salafist militancy in Lebanon was largely defensive and reflected the perceived severity of local crisis conditions,” says the report. Today, Salafist recruits include individuals brainwashed into militancy, ordinary outlaws as well as alienated individuals with deep economic and political grievances, says the report.

Palestinian refugee camps have proven the most common breeding ground for various forms of Islamic militancy. However, the report claims that such groups are relatively weak, which is largely attributed to the systematic security crackdowns by Lebanese authorities, large-scale foreign aggression against Lebanon, and violent clashes among rival Islamist groups.

Islamist activity has nonetheless been on the rise over the last few years. The brutal 2000 conflict in the northern region of Denniye between a group of Islamists and the Lebanese army heralded a new dawn of extremism. Islamists have also been accused of involvement in the assassination of former prime minister Rafik Hariri in 2005. Most recently, the Lebanese army fought a bloody three-month battle against the terrorist group Fatah el-Islam at the Nahr-el Bared Palestinian camp in 2007.

Fears of yet another Islamist uprising have been stoked since the latest message from Osama bin Laden’s deputy was aired, as it called for rejection of resolution 1701, which put an end to the 2006 July war between Israel and Hezbollah. To monitor the shaky truce between Lebanon and its southern neighbour, around 13,000 UN troops are currently deployed south of the Litani river.

”We take all threats very seriously,” says Tenenti, adding that most threats against UNIFIL are video messages posted on the net or sent to the media. ”We have been on high alert for some time,” he said.

UNIFIL has beefed up the number of patrols currently controlling the region south of the Litani river to about 300 or so per day. The spokesperson underlines that UNIFIL maintains excellent relations with the local population, providing the people with medical services among others.

According to a high ranking Lebanese security officer, speaking on condition of anonymity, what makes Zawahiri’s message particularly relevant to Lebanon is his call for transforming the country into a new theatre of operations for extremists. However, the officer maintains that the fractionalisation of the country would greatly limit the ability of fundamentalist groups to freely manoeuvre on Lebanese soil.

”Lebanon has been historically considered by al-Qaeda as a land of logistic support and not one of jihad,” the officer said. ”Its pluralistic social structure, consisting of various religious communities, allows for a more tolerant approach to religious practice.”

Moreover, the officer stresses that the 2007 victory of the Lebanese army against Fatah el-Islam, which is allegedly linked to al-Qaeda, was a hard blow to extremist groups, and reduced the chances of another conflict. ”This (defeat) will undoubtedly make them (terrorist groups) wary of plotting any new attacks.”

The source explains that Lebanese security forces have been able to curb the steady flow of jihadists from the Ain el-Helweh Palestinian camp in the south to Iraq in recent months. The refugee enclave, known for its connections to al-Qaeda, is home to rival extremist factions. According to the officer, Hezbollah’s influence over certain Islamist factions in the Palestinian camps has caused them to shift their support away from al-Qaeda, further weakening the group’s power in the area.

”Al-Qaeda has never adopted a formal hierarchy of power. It is usually comprised of different groups united by shared beliefs and a common enemy,” the source says. According to the officer, Lebanese security forces have been able to thwart the efforts and arrest members of at least five terrorist cells in the Ain el-Helweh area, each of which consisted of five or six people.

The problem of al-Qaeda remains closely linked to the issue of armed Palestinians in Lebanon, as jihadist groups are a violent reality in the country’s many camps. However, the security officer says that the sphere of al-Qaeda’s influence will always be contained. ”The very nature of society in Lebanon,” he concludes, ”plays against its ability to answer the call of Zawahiri.”

Filed Under: Middle East, News, Terrorism

LEBANON: Wobbling In Uncertainty

May 6, 2008 By editor

Global Geopolitics Net / IPS
Tuesday, May 06, 2008

Analysis by Mona Alami

BEIRUT, May 6 (IPS) – As clashes between supporters of Lebanon’s feuding factions become increasingly frequent, Lebanon seems to be walking a fine line between stability and violence.

Internally, the country’s parliament has been closed for three sessions, leading to an ongoing crisis and a still vacant presidency. Externally, fears abound regarding volatile relations with Israel, especially since Israeli officials began voicing criticism of the performance of UN troops deployed in the south.

Political deadlock has gripped the country since former president Emile Lahoud stepped down from office in November. The 19th parliamentary session for presidential elections ended with yet another postponement on Apr. 22. Another session was tentatively scheduled for May 13 by parliament speaker and Amal party head, Nabih Berri.

The governing majority is calling for immediate election of the consensus presidential candidate, commander-in-chief General Michel Suleiman. However, despite having already agreed to the election of Suleiman, the opposition argues that various issues — such as the composition of the next government, revision of the parliamentary electoral law, as well as filling key positions in the administration — must be decided on before voting in a new president.

The pro-Western March 14 majority — so named after the massive 2005 demonstrations on that date protesting the killing of former prime minister Rafik Hariri — is comprised of the Druze Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), the Christian Kataeb party and Lebanese Forces as well as the Sunni Future Movement. The opposition bloc consists of two Shia movements, Hezbollah and Amal, as well as the Christian Marada party, which is known for its Syrian and Iranian connections, and the Christian Free Patriotic Movement.

An ease in tensions seems to have temporarily emerged, however, with Berri’s initiative to begin a new round of national dialogue (the first round was launched in 2006). The March 14 coalition accepted the invitation for talks, and delegated one representative, Saad Hariri, head of the Future Movement and son of the slain Rafik Hariri, who said last week that he was certain a new president would be elected May 13.

Without the participation of each party’s leader, however, the dialogue will be reduced to bilateral talks between Hariri and Berri. ”The 14th of March majority coalition is waiting for a response from Speaker Berri regarding their request for a bilateral meeting,” Future Movement MP Ammar Houri told IPS.

Both sides seem obstinately trapped in a vicious circle, with each group insisting on guarantees for attending the meeting. While March 14 wants guarantees that the dialogue will lead to an election, the opposition wants clarifications regarding the structure of the next cabinet.

As local political factions pursue their never-ending quarrels, tensions are mounting along the country’s southern border.

The Israeli daily Haaretz stated that Israeli high officials are accusing the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) of covering up Hezbollah activities and misleading the UN Security Council.

According to Israeli reports, there have been at least four cases in the last six months during which UNIFIL soldiers identified armed Hezbollah operatives, but did not take any measures or disclose detailed information to the UN Security Council. Haaretz backed its story by claiming that the recent interception by a UN patrol of unidentified gunmen driving a truck filled with explosives was not reported to the Security Council.

”The accusations voiced in the Haaretz are unfounded,” says Andrea Tenenti from UNIFIL’s Public Information office. The spokesperson, however, admits that the patrol did intercept a suspect truck escorted by gunmen.

”We could not determine the truck’s cargo and were waiting for the arrival of the Lebanese army to intervene as per our rule of engagement set by the Security Council. The encounter did not last more than a few minutes, after which the gunmen fled,” said Tenenti. The spokesperson said the incident was immediately reported to the Security Council, contrary to the Haaretz allegations.

”We have checked some 3,500 vehicles and 4,500 people since April 15. I believe the situation is stable in our area of operation, which is limited to the region south of the Litani River,” said Tenenti.

If the dialogue between the opposition and majority takes place, much attention will be needed to bring some stability to the volatile situation in south Lebanon.

Filed Under: Middle East, News, Politics

The Rise and Fall of Shining Path

May 6, 2008 By editor

Global Geopolitics Net
Tuesday, May 06, 2008

By Waynee Lucero, Research Associate, COHA.org

In the Beginning:

The Shining Path (Sendero Luminosos) Maoist guerrillas were formed by university professor Abimael Guzman in the late 1960s and were based upon Marxist ideology. At the time, Guzman was teaching philosophy at San Cristóbal of Huamanga University, while engaging in left-wing politics. He attracted many like-minded young academics to his cause of staging a radical revolution in Peru. He visited the Peoples Republic of China in the mid-1960s and his collection of inchoate ideas was profoundly influenced by a mumble-tumble of Maoist theories, which became the basis of the ideological foundations of the Shining Path. In 1980, he launched his campaign to overthrow the Peruvian government.

The Shining Path’s main goal was to destroy existing Peruvian political institutions and replace them with a communist peasant revolutionary regime, while resisting any influence coming from other Latin American guerrilla groups like the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), as well as from foreign ideologies. According to researchers, Shining Path’s basic strategy was to use violence to bring down the country’s imperfect democratic institutions, prevent citizens from participating in local government, destroy Peru’s economy, and to thwart government-sponsored programs to provide aid and services to the population. As a result of a series of clandestine meetings, Shining Path officials established a military school to teach young recruits military tactics and weaponry use. At first, Shining Path was successful in many of its endeavors because the Lima authorities were beset by organizational instability, corruption, and were ill-prepared to fight the internal war that would foreshadow the deaths of tens of thousands of innocent villagers caught in the middle of the struggle.

The Revolution Begins:

Shining Path formally initiated its uprising against the Peruvian government in 1980 after decades of inequality and marginality immiserated the peasantry. Led by Guzman, the revolution based itself mainly in the rural areas of the country where it carried out the bulk of its activities; this tactic had been used by other revolutionary guerrilla groups like Colombia’s FARC, due to usual presence of a weak government, as was the case in Peru. The country’s armed forces did not have the necessary physical presence in the area to allow it to effectively deploy against the revolutionary cadres. This lack of on-site military credibility on the government’s part gave Shining Path the opportunity to deploy its forces to wage an effective guerrilla war against its enemies with near impunity. Shining Path initially based its headquarters in the mountainous region of Ayacucho and Huanta, to the remote regions around the central selva and south of Vilcabamba (the site of the last Inca resistance). Characteristically, it launched attacks on agricultural areas in the Upper Huallaga Valley and the southern part of Puno, which also helped to sever any lingering urban ties for its recruits. Guzman played the role of all-powerful military and spiritual leader of his organization; in this sense, Shining Path was organized as a hierarchical cult rather than on a cell-based model.

Buying and Selling:

Similar to the FARC in Colombia and other revolutionary insurgencies, Shining Path in part funded its operations through the process of narcotrafficking, ransoms from kidnapping and forced taxes on small businesses and individuals. Shining Path also required Colombian dealers and buyers operating locally to pay higher than prevailing prices for raw coca in return for protection and the opportunity to buy weapons from them. Today, on a much smaller scale, Shining Path is attempting to revive and re-establish such a financial relationship. It has been listed by U.S. authorities as a terrorist organization based on the tactics it has utilized which include car bombings, kidnappings, and staged political assassinations. In 2006, Shining Path ranked 41 on the U.S. list of top terrorist organizations. Initially, Shining Path targeted local authorities (mayors, governors and mid-level bureaucrats) police barracks, and local political leaders. However, experts believe that by 1983, the group gradually began to target wealthy peasants and state agency heads with violence and the threat of abduction, as well as launched comparable attacks against left-wing activists, grass-roots organizers, and left-liberal intellectuals. This change in strategy eventually proved counterproductive for the insurgents because they were not able to capture the hearts and minds of the average Peruvian by their violent tactics. Instead, villagers were subject to the unremitting brutality by Shining Path and were unprotected by the military and intelligence services. Both the first Alan Garcia administration and his successor, Alberto Fujimori, used intimidation to tromp out local citizens. The Garcia government, as did the Belaúnde government before it, used tortures and randomly assassinated citizens for their alleged backing or at least sympathy for Shining Path.

Peruvian Citizens Caught in the Middle:

There is no doubt that the average Peruvian often experienced traumatic brutality from both government forces and Shining Path. The U.S. Department of State, among other sources, determined that the combined death total caused by several decades of conflict reached at least 70,000. The total death toll from the beginning of the uprising in 1980 to 1990, just before the decade-long conflict under Fujimori, can be found in a study conducted by DESCO, in which fatalities attributed to the conflict between the government and Shining Path have been carefully scrutinized. The mid-1980’s, during the Garcia administration, proved to be the years in which a surge of fatalities occurred. This includes casualties inflicted upon ordinary Peruvian citizens, government personnel and security forces, as well as Shining Path recruits. In the early years of the revolution, Shining Path was estimated to have ten to fifteen-thousand members; with its recruitment efforts targeted at the most poverty stricken areas of the country and in the Quechua-speaking part of the highlands. Harsh tactics were an integral step in the organization’s operation and its devilishly skillful propaganda efforts were employed to engage those in the general population who were experiencing the greatest degrees of injustice at the hands of Lima authorities. A key factor contributing to the large number of resulting fatalities in the uprising was that the government found it difficult to distinguish between a Shining Path member and an ordinary inhabitant of the Altiplano, because of the similar native attire. In 1983, President Belaúnde was reported to have announced a 60-day national state of emergency, in which he suspended civil liberties and gave the police broad powers to seize suspected guerrillas for up to ten days without charges. In this account, 200 people were reported as being arrested just 24 hours after the announcement was made. The country had been attempting to move towards democracy before Shining Path declared its war, but President Belaúnde’s action in declaring martial law along with several of these authoritarian initiatives, countermanded the democratic trend taking place in Peru. Ordinary citizens were forced to pay the price, as the then Peruvian leader earned the well-deserved reputation for tolerating human rights abuses.

Under Garcia and Fujimori, the country again found itself caught in the middle of mounting ideological strife and was made to suffer severe human rights abuses from both Shining Path and government forces.

Shining Path singled out the poor, indigenous populations, whose interests it disingenuously claimed to have at heart. It forced farmers to slash production to subsistence levels and to destroy whatever modern farm equipment the campesinos possessed. In addition, Shining Path imposed puritanical regulations that outlawed fiestas and prohibited drinking as part of a strategy of strong-arming local populations into submission and self-abnegation. Any person believed to be sympathetic to the government or to even slightly disagree with Shining Path’s fundamental beliefs, was a candidate to be tortured and killed. Outlandishly, Shining Path then abandoned its professedly leftist ideology and began to identify leftists as candidates to be kidnapped, tortured and/or murdered.

Not surprisingly, Shining Path failed to capture the hearts and minds of the natives due to this extremely bizarre metamorphosis. With leftist and trade union officials being specifically targeted, more and more Peruvians learned to lean more heavily in favor of government efforts to bear down on Shining Path’s revolutionary operations. In the DESCO study, leftist assassinations carried out by Shining Path began to rise a few years after the revolution was triggered—peaking in 1988 and then slowly declining. In 1992, now under Fujimori, assassinations increased drastically, and then dropped after Guzman’s capture. During the Garcia era, leftist assassinations were targeted against two main groups when ideological factors gave way to more bare-boned battles between Shining Path and the government: Garcia’s American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) and the more radical United Left (IU). Shining Path’s tactic to force individuals into submission was a strategy calculated to eliminate the competition. Considering its goals of ousting foreign influence and rival organizations, it was Shining Path’s sudden and unpredictable strategy to turn against its own people as well as like-minded potential allies which foredoomed its end. In the ensuing struggle, large numbers of deaths occurred, helping to transform its revolution into a stark case of conflicting interests. The question of principle was increasingly not in play.

In 1992, the Alberto Fujimori administration staged a coup against itself which led to the dissolving of Congress and the dismantling of the country’s legal system. This cynical ploy enabled his administration and the military police to carry out large numbers of murders and kidnappings of those though to be enemies of the state without having an opposition party or legal capacity capable of challenging various illegal acts.

The various degrees of power under the administrations Belaúnde, Garcia and Fujimori worked to subvert law and order more than to uphold it. Under these governments, Lima’s security forces exponentially increased the murders of ordinary Peruvians, who were suspected of being part of the Shining Path. In addition to the unrestricted power of the government, the Fujimori administration did little to solve the country’s stressful economic situation. Research reports at the time found that 4.5 million people in Peru were living in extreme poverty (lack of sanitation, water, electricity, and gas). Fujimori then sought to enlarge the death squads that carried out orders to kidnap, torture and murder those suspected of being part of the Shining Path or known to harbor anti-Fujimori sentiments. For example, in 1997, the gruesome discovery of anti-Fujimori activist Mariella Barreto Fiofano’s body was found with her hands cut off and spine broken in half. This demonstrated how far the regime was prepared to go in order to suppress and silence those it saw as its foes.

The Decline of Shining Path:

After his 1992 auto-coup, Fujimori took control of the press and almost all of the country’s other institutions, promising a return to democracy within a year. This formula enabled him to rule Peru by decree, with a massive number of killings taking place during this period as the result of fierce fighting between Shining Path and Lima’s security forces. On September 12, 1992, Abimael Guzman was captured by local authorities without a drop of blood spilled. This resulted in a major decrease of fatalities and the shrinking of the Shining Path’s armed effectiveness. One of Guzman’s top lieutenants had been interrogated after being detained and eventually was induced to reveal some of Guzman’s hiding places. By the local authorities rummaging through trash cans looking for any signs of his presence, the security forces were able to close in on him, finally locating him and placing him under arrest. Subsequently, Fujimori displayed him in an outdoor cage so the press could witness this act of public humiliation—simultaneously boasting of his success. Since capturing Guzman meant the destruction of Shining Path’s hierarchy, the group began to disintegrate due to organizational issues and opposition in the ranks. Research by DESCO demonstrates this decline in political assassinations of moderate leftist figures as part of the general trend after Guzman was captured. Looking back on the process, the government was able to bring down Shining Path, but only at the cost of suppressing civil rights and by carrying out a barrage of human rights violations against Peru’s general population. A few years after his capture, Guzman called for a supposed peace deal which caused the Shining Path to split into two groups: those who insisted on continuing to fight and those who wanted to put down their arms. Since then, the Shining Path has not come near having the success that it achieved as a guerrilla group in the mid-1980s. It has remained relatively quiet in comparison to the past, racking up relatively few kidnappings and murders.

The Return of Shining Path:

Recent reports show that Shining Path may be making something of a comeback, reorganizing its cadres and military capabilities to combat the Peruvian state. Over the past decade a number of Shining Path leaders have been peacefully apprehended. For example, news articles reported in 1999 that Ramirez Durand, who goes by the nom de guerre “Comrade Feliciano,” had been cornered, along with three women rebels, after being pursued for two weeks by a force of more than 1,500 commandos. Durand was captured without a shot being fired.

On March 25, 2008 Shining Path rebel members working with drug traffickers killed a police officer and wounded 11 on anti-drug patrols. The unit is said to have been led by one of Shining Path’s last remaining leaders—Comrade Artemio. Comrade Mono—who eventually was caught in March of this year was, in fact, part of another branch of the Shining Path hierarchy. Their apprehension demonstrated that police efforts have been achieving some success in dismantling the organization. Along with these efforts, Peruvian authorities currently hold ex-President Fujimori. Fujimori now faces trial for corruption, fleeing his presidential office, and the ordering of death squads. Others are to be tried for a range of human rights and law violations. This shows that Peruvians may finally be witnessing some sort of justice, rather than the past neglect of democratic standards and the exercise of privilege in the country. Peruvians are responding to this movement toward justice. “Human rights groups in Peru and family members of the victims killed in a 1992 massacre are celebrating now that four members of a paramilitary group will spend between 15 and 35 years in prison” (LivinginPeru.com).

In recent months, there have been accounts of political kidnappings and murders which could be an indication of the recrudescence of the Shining Path. Other reports have told of police forces closing in on them. Shining Path is rumored to be financing their reviving terrorist activities by charging for protecting drug-traffickers and intertwining the organization with coca production and distribution networks. Consequently, Peruvians may soon find themselves dealing with an increase in drug violence, a growing insurgency and an increase in government repression.

This analysis was prepared by COHA Research Associate Waynee Lucero
May 6th, 2008

The Council on Hemispheric Affairs, founded in 1975, is an independent, non-profit, non-partisan, tax-exempt research and information organization. It has been described on the Senate floor as being “one of the nation’s most respected bodies of scholars and policy makers.” For more information, please see our web page at www.coha.org; or contact our Washington offices by phone (202) 223-4975, fax (202) 223-4979, or email coha@coha.org.

Filed Under: Featured, History, Latin America

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