By Roger P. Hamburg
Professor Emeritus in Political Science, Indiana University South Bend

Global Geopolitics Net
Republished Saturday, February 10, 2007

Copyright (c) 2007 Roger P. Hamburg, all rights reserved.

George Will observed that the United States has been in an almost perpetual crisis from 1929 to 1990.The withdrawal of the USSR from Eastern Europe in 1990 and the Belovesk agreement of December, 1991 which marked the Dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the “50 Year Wound”, as one scholar called it delineated the end of that crisis.

American academic and popular writing were euphoric. The “exceptionalist” feature of American policy, the fact that the U.S. is a nation, state, and cause since its inception became paramount. It has always been present in U.S. history but was muted by the dangers of the Cold War and “mutual assured destruction” that hovered over the Korean and Vietnamese wars. Absent the Soviet adversary in its global adversary role as an obstacle, there were fewer obstacles to advancing a more ambitious global agenda especially later under George W .Bush a global democratic agenda. This more ambitious agenda was present through Gulf War 1 and into the late 1990s but gained impetus under Bush. America could be accused of hubris but the more ambitious agenda seemed attainable.

But a new sobering reality emerged on September 11, 2001, the most destructive attack on America since the British burned the White House in 1814. Everything that has happened since, especially the 2003 war against Iraq, has been deemed a part of the war against terror by the President despite his critics.
Before launching into the broad contours of the world as the U.S. faces it, I will say a few words about the relationship with its old adversary, Russia, the successor state of the Soviet Union. The latter has been termed a “managed democracy”, not quite a reversal to its communist past but certainly retrograde in its movement toward democratic institutions. It is a “chameleon”. But since this essay is concerned with foreign policy, I would argue that the old ideological political rivalry has been replaced by a nuanced, not “zero sum” rivalry. Russia seeks to restore its influence in the former parts of the Soviet Union. It meets U.S. support of the “colored“ revolutions, Orange, Rose, Tulip along its periphery with arms and other materials to Venezuela, the successor state to Castro’s Cuba as a U.S. irritant. But it cooperates with the U.S. with the U.S. on nuclear proliferation, keeping nuclear weapons and components out of terrorist hands along with other “WMDs”, but the relationship is a mixed one. The U.S. must find areas of cooperation with a Russia that feels its strength and self confidence returning because of “stabilization” at home and supplies of gas and oil that give it external leverage but it still needs foreign expertise and investment to develop them.

There are times in the contemporary world, when, as some have remarked, the U.S. will “miss” the Cold War. Moscow or Washington’s clients might drag them into a war that neither wanted. The Cuban missile crisis is the classic example. This is no longer that case, but then neither has the control over events that it had in the past – the current crisis in the Middle East being an example.

As part of the global revolution in communications and the internet, as well as the workings of “networks” like Khan’s in Pakistan, there are now wars between nations and “networks”. These “net warriors” are computer literate, agile, mobile, and improvisational. The “jihadists” and other global Islamic warriors can overcome obstacles of language, distance, and other obstacles to formal membership in the international community. Liberal democracies find it difficult to offer new sophisticated responses to this. Global jihadists, following the progenitors of 9/11, can use the internet in ways that have a disproportionate effect on the global environment in ways that support their strategic objectives.

This is but one aspect of “globalization”, the movement of people, goods and ideas across national boundaries. The U.S. is no longer, relatively speaking, master within its own house as it was after WW 2 until the early 1970s. People in all income brackets, especially the unskilled are vulnerable; there is a “race to the bottom” as firms try to remain competitive in the global economy where someone, somewhere can always make it cheaper. The U.S economy in terms of deficits is partially kept stable by the rising power of China, a former bitter adversary and erstwhile future geopolitical rival which recycles its huge export earnings into U.S. treasury bonds. Is China a global economic partner or a state that may confront the U.S. for global dominance? How will it use its economic leverage with U.S. adversaries like North Korea? Will it replace Russia as the chief peer rival of the U.S.?

The U.S. is also vulnerable in the new global economy because of its growing dependence on unstable sources of energy as in the Middle East, Africa, etc. This is a reminder that the U.S., which may be the most powerful nation militarily, economically, and in terms of cultural influence, is yet vulnerable in many areas. Despite occasional bursts of “ exceptionalism”, and unilateralism, it must deal with like minded nations in areas of common concern and even with professed enemies in a world grown smaller because of high speed air travel, the internet, and other forms of communication which can bring both increased global understanding and lethality from those who hate the American experiment and what it represents.

The 20th century, which began soon after the Colombian Exposition of 1893 in Chicago, reflected optimism and progress with the advent of the new technology. Over 20 years after Chicago the horrors of WW 1 were followed by the twin horrors of Nazi Germany and Stalin and the Soviet Union. Both are in the past. But the new century that was ushered in by the events of September 11th, 2001 is one where the U.S. will no longer be as dominant as it has been in the past. Historically there could be “some” nostalgia in retrospect, (however the period was in reality) for the Cold War where, as Churchill termed it, “safety became the twin brother of terror”.

Copyright (c) 2006 Roger P. Hamburg, all rights reserved.

About the Author

Roger P. Hamburg, Ph. D. is Professor Emeritus in Political Science and Public and Environmental Affairs at the Indiana University South Bend. He is a frequently sought specialist on the Former Soviet Union, Russia and Russian diplomatic affairs and a participant in U.S. and international government policy councils such as the Atlantic Council on National Strategy.